In the course of time different methods of mine clearance were developed and tested. A quick clearing of larger areas was to be achieved by machines. For example, armored vehicles specially converted for this purpose pushed massive cylindrical clearing devices in front of them, which detonated the mines without causing any damage to the vehicle itself. In impassable terrain or areas with heavy vegetation, however, this method was usually ruled out. In these cases, portable mine detectors had to be used. The mines were marked with a warning flag after detection until the time was found to dig them out by hand. During an attack, possibly still under enemy fire, this kind of search was hardly feasible.

In early 1940, the idea therefore arose to detonate laid mines by means of a so-called “Knallteppich” (literally translated as “bang carpet”). Sometimes it is also referred to as a “blasting carpet” or “blasting net”). This net was made of explosive igniter cord and could be laid over a detected minefield. When ignited by a fuse, it detonated, and the blast wave was sufficient to detonate the mines below it.

The Waffen-SS also showed great interest in this development and on 4 September 1941 a meeting took place between representatives of the Heeres-Waffenamt and the SS-Waffenamt. SS-Gruppenführer Hans Jüttner, as head of the SS-Führungshaupt- und Kommandoamt, received a protocol of this meeting that shows the technical details and the still unsolved problems.

Due to the positive assessment by the Pi.Lehr-Btl.2 in Dessau-Roßlau, 3,200 “Knallzündschnurteppiche” (blasting cord nets) were ordered and delivered to the troops. However, at this point in time there was no feedback. The carpets delivered had a length of 10 meters, a width of 7.5 meters and a mesh size of 10 to 15 centimeters. The weight was about 0.5 kilograms per square meter. The nets could be laid next to each other to cover areas of any size. It was not necessary to connect them, but they should overlap by about 10 cm to ensure a proper activation. If necessary, such carpets could also be made provisionally by stretching igniter cords over a slatted frame. When laid out, the carpets were insensitive to rifle ammunition (including tracer ammunition), but extremely sensitive to shrapnel, which caused an immediate detonation.

According to a leaflet of June 1942, the easiest way to unroll the rolled net was by two men using a rod inserted into the roll and, to the surprise of the opponent, preferably at dusk or in the dark. The loud bang of the exploding nets was to be camouflaged by simultaneous fire of the artillery. So far so good, but from this we can already see the disadvantages: to roll out the net, the two soldiers had to walk through the minefield themselves. And this, as far as possible, in the dark! Furthermore, it turned out that the nets worked very well with anti-tank mines, but almost not at all with anti-personnel mines. Trials with treated, meshless fabric (nitrated cotton cloths) brought no success.

As an alternative to the dangerous rolling out by hand, the use of line-throwing devices was tested and found to be useful. A rope was attached to an anchor, with which the net could then be pulled over the minefield. However, the method only worked in unobstructed terrain, otherwise the carpet tore when pulled over rocks or vegetation. Another idea was laying the nets from the air and so together with the Luftwaffe, they tested dropping the nets from airplanes. The success was moderate. A helicopter was a better option, but this would not have made much sense due to the danger of getting shot down while hoovering so close to the front line.

Another development called automatic net-layer did not get beyond the planning phase. A light vehicle, steered from a safe distance by cables, would have rolled out carpets 3-meters-wide over the minefield. It was controlled from a PzKpfw II, which protected the operating crew from spall. The Talbot wagon factory in Aachen had produced a prototype, but shortly afterwards the order was cancelled as “not decisive for the war”.

Although the idea with the blasting nets was well-intentioned, it failed due to the rigors of reality. No type of net or laying device was actually introduced by the Heer or Waffen-SS.

Once the creator of one of the first mass-produced light machine guns, Denmark had slept through the dawn of the submachine gun era.

While Denmark’s neighbours busily experimented with the new type of weapon in the 1930s, at first nothing happened in the country of the machine gun. The Dansk Rekyl Riffel Syndikat (DRS), which was founded in Copenhagen before World War I, continued with machine gun production. The Model 1903 and its successors sold well, and the brand name “Madsen” had already established itself into far countries. The officer, inventor and Minister of War Vilhelm Her-man Oluf Madsen had been the driving force behind the development, and in his honor the weapons bore his name.

When the Wehrmacht invaded Denmark in April 1940, there were only a few foreign submachine guns in use by the Danish Army. Negotiations with the Finnish arms factory, Oy Tikkakoski Ab, on a licensed production of the Konepistooli M31 (Suomi) were in progress but could not be finished before the German occupation. At the end of 1940, the company, now renamed Dansk Industri Syndikat A/S (DISA), began production of the Finnish submachine gun with a slightly modified stock and protected front sight as the M/41 under German control. The approximately 1,400 weapons produced were first used in Danish units and taken over by the Germans after the disarmament in October 1943. At DISA, each weapon model and each variant received its own P (project) number, even if only some mark-ings were different. For example, the P.5 was the version for Portugal, to which the weapon was offered in 1943.

Otherwise, not much happened in the course of the war. The development of their own submachine gun was going on slow. By the time P.13 was finally finished as the “Model 1945,” the war was over, and the design was already obsolete. An interesting feature: the bolt was attached to a slide which extended over the barrel and also covered the recoil spring. For cocking, the slide was pulled back until the bolt was locked by the sear—just like a conventional blowback pistol. This slide moves back and forth with each shot. This circumstance, and the elaborate milled parts, a solid wooden stock and a complicated interior were no longer up-to-date. The installation of a folding stock did not help either. Only Mexico and El Salvador bought a few pieces.

At the same time, however, a further development had been worked on, and it was to become a major commercial success for DISA: an uncomplicated, modern submachine gun with a sheet metal receiver, folding stock and a simple but effective safety.

The work on project P.16 would be completed by the end of 1946. The production-ready weapon was called “Model 1946” (M-46) and was sold under the brand name “Madsen.” The first weapons were sold to the Danish police. Thanks to a cost-effective production, inquiries soon came from South America and Asia. El Salvador, Paraguay and Thailand were among the first foreign customers.

The weapon is an unusual design, consisting of two receiver halves, each of them pressed from one piece of sheet metal including the grip piece and magazine well. They are held together at the back by the hinges of the side-folding wire stock and at the front by the barrel nut. The cocking handle is a bracket-shaped slider that rides along on top of the receiver. Disassembly of the M-46 is very easy: one must unscrew the barrel nut, pull out the barrel, remove the cocking slider and then open the left side of the receiver, almost like a book. All internal parts such as bolt, recoil spring and buffer will remain in the right receiver half and can be easily removed. No tools are needed, and there are no connecting pins that can get lost. Weapon cleaning has never been easier, as there are no inaccessible places.

On the other hand, the operating principle is not very innovative. The Model 1946 is a conventional blowback design firing from the open bolt. The cocking slider can be operated from both sides due to its position on top of the receiver. It moves forth and back with every round fired. The weapon is fed by a stick magazine with 32 rounds (9x19mm). The small magazine loader is practically stored inside the hollow grip together with a spare extractor and a second firing pin.

The safety mechanism is extraordinary: the bolt can be locked in the open or closed position by means of a manual safety switch located on the left side of the receiver right above the trigger. And then there is an additional automatic safety in form of a lever just behind the magazine well. To fire the weapon, one must grasp the magazine and this lever securely with the non-firing hand to release the bolt. Otherwise, the lever protrudes into the receiver and blocks the way of the bolt. This kind of safety is highly unusual in submachine guns. Only a few weapons, such as the Italian TZ-45 from World War II, have almost identical safeties. Most commonly the designers rely on a grip-safety located in the grip piece. The lever behind the magazine well has one big disadvantage: the weapon cannot be fired with one hand. In case of injury or if only one hand is free, the shooter has an unsolvable problem.

In the following years, DISA did a slight revision of its submachine gun, resulting in the P.56. The main improvement was the new cocking handle. It got the shape of a button, was firmly attached to the bolt, and there was no need to remove it before disassembling the weapon.

On November 7, 1950, the submachine gun was presented as “Model 1950” on the shooting range at the old Mosede Fort near Copenhagen. Military representatives from Great Britain, India, the United States and several other countries were allowed to attend the successful demonstration of firing 20,000 rounds with a weapon from the current serial production. After 2 hours and 17 minutes the test was over—and the gun still alright. Not a single malfunction occurred during firing. In the days before the demonstration a barrel was already stressed with 42,970 rounds and then measured. The muzzle velocity decreased by less than 10 percent and the bore widened by 0.04mm (0.0015 inch). The military, in any case, seemed to have been convinced by the Mad-sen M-50, because it soon became an export hit. Orders followed (again) from El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Indonesia and many other countries.

To be even more successful in the international market, there were a few minor improvements to the weapon, as well as a few variants to choose from. From the Model 1953 (P.74), the thread for the barrel nut was relocated from the receiver to the barrel. A curved magazine was supposed to improve the cartridge feed (although the straight stick magazines were working properly). In addition, an alternative barrel nut could be used in connection with a perforated bar-rel jacket with integrated bayonet lug. The last DISA submachine gun was the Madsen Model 1953 Mark II (P.127). It too was optionally available with barrel jacket and bayonet. On request, wooden grip plates could be attached so that the grip piece did not heat up in the sun as much as the standard grip piece made of pure metal.

In Brazil, the Indústria Nacional de Armas S/A manufactured the submachine gun under license in São Paulo. Contact with the Danes was made in 1949, and DISA assem-bled some prototypes in the desired .45 ACP caliber. Already in the middle of 1950, serial production began in the factory in Brazil. The weapon was given the model designation INA M950. The most noticeable difference to the Danish model was the cocking handle relocated to the right side of the receiver. Three years later, a slightly improved version followed—the INA M953. Among other things, the magazine well was extended. The submachine guns were used in large numbers by army, navy, civilian police and other armed units. When the military forces switched to 9mm ammunition in the early 1970s, the INAs were gradually sent back to the depots for storage. The number of weapons is not known, but it was enough to let the military think about a conversion to 9mm caliber. Originally, the state-owned armaments company Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil (IMBEL) was to produce a conversion kit consisting of barrel, bolt and magazine so that the replacement work could be carried out directly in the respective depots. But the conditions of the weapons varied a lot, and many had to be repaired first. Ultimately, therefore, the weapons were sent to the IMBEL factory in Itajubá for rework and conversion. In addition, the submachine guns received a fire selector switch because most of them went to the police, and they wanted a semiautomatic function.

As great as the success of the Madsen sub-machine guns was in the world, it remained modest in its homeland of Denmark. Only the Danish police bought weapons from DISA. The army, however, preferred the M/49 “Hovea,” which was adopted in 1949. It was nothing more than a copy of the Swedish Carl Gustaf m/45. The state-owned weapons factory (Haerens Vabenarsenalet) in Copenhagen was chosen for its production.

During the war, the Red Army used the ROKS-2 for the first time in the fight against the Finns. Later it was also used on the other fronts. This flamethrower was disguised as a rifle, the lance embedded in the converted wooden stock of a Mosin-Nagant rifle, with original sling and with ignition by pulling the trigger. For the firing method, the Soviets used special primers made from standard 7.62x25mm cartridge cases. The two incendiary tanks on the back carrier were boxed with sheet metal to simulate a rucksack. The bottle with the propellant hung crosswise under the box.

When filled, the ROKS-2 weighed about 23kg (50lb) and required two men to operate. Towards the end of the war, smaller quantities of the simplified ROKS-3, on which the tanks were no longer covered, were sent to the front. Although both models had proven to be quite reliable in action, after the war the military leadership demanded an easier-to-operate model with a longer range.

After testing and introduction as the LPO-50, the new model went into series production in the spring of 1955. LPO is the abbreviation of Lyogkiy Pyekhotnyy Ognyemyot (Легкий Пехотный Огнемет), i.e. a light infantry flamethrower. The weight itself, however, was not lightened, because the LPO-50 weighed 23kg (50lb) just like its predecessor.

Instead, the construction had changed completely. The backpack now consists of three cylindrical tanks arranged next to each other, each with a capacity of 3.5 liters (0.76 gallons). Each tank has a filler neck. A powder chamber is then inserted and screwed into each filler neck. An additional pressure relief valve per tank, non-return valves on each hose connection and a grip safety device on the front of the grip provide the necessary safety.

To make the LPO-50 ready for use, first insert one powder charge per tank into the powder chamber and one PP9-RO primer cartridge into the socket above each. At the bottom of each chamber there are six holes through which the gases flow into the tank after ignition and push the incendiary mixture through the hose to the lance. Underneath all three tanks is a common manifold to the hose.

The lance resembles a rifle with a stock, pistol grip and folding bipod. At 85cm (34in), it is rather long and unwieldy. On both sides and below the muzzle are three chambers for one incendiary cartridge each with PP9-RO primer. Each chamber is connected to a specific tank. The battery for the electrical control and ignition system is located in the butt. It lasts for about 600 ignitions.

The shot is activated by pressing the trigger, which sends an electric impulse to the glow igniters of the two primers. A switch allows the operator to select the desired tank. It was thus possible to fill the tanks with different mixtures and fire them as required. The incendiary mixture ignites on the incendiary cartridge when it leaves the muzzle.

Without reloading, the flamethrower could fire three shots – one from each tank. The duration of a shot was 2-3 seconds and the range 50 to 70m (55 to 77yd), depending on the viscosity of the mixture. If there was a tailwind, even a little more. This was a very short firing time and in reports of the East German Army (NVA) this was also criticized by soldiers. They also felt that the effect on the target was insufficient.

In a combined arms engagement, the platoons and squads of flamethrower units were to be linked up with motorized rifle units. The flamethrowers then accompanied the rifle platoon or squad but had to move hidden behind it. Experience had shown that if they were discovered, they quickly drew the enemy’s fire. Only when a target could not be eliminated with the other infantry weapons were flamethrowers used. In this case, using camouflage and covering fire, they had to advance up to a distance of about 40 to 50m (44 to 55yd) from the target.

For all its advantages, the LPO-50 also had the characteristic disadvantages of a flamethrower. In a real battle, such weapons were not only dangerous for the enemy, but also for the own operating crew and the surrounding comrades. For this reason, the military was also looking for alternative ways to increase the infantry’s firepower.

And so, at the beginning of 1975, they introduced the new type of infantry rocket launcher, the RPO “Rys”. It could be carried and operated by one man, weighed only 3.5kg (7,7lb) empty, fired rockets filled with 4 liters (0.9 gallons) of napalm up to 200 meters (220 yards) away and could be reloaded. The LPO-50 thus became obsolete and was gradually taken out of service, stored and in some cases passed on to friendly countries.

In the 1950s, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China intensified their cooperation in military and weapons technology. China showed great interest in the new flamethrower and even acquired the rights to manufacture it under license in their own country. They only changed a few minor details in the production process, otherwise their Type 58 corresponded to the Russian model. A longer series of tests was carried out with different incendiary mixtures.

Based on the experience gained, China developed a modernized version in the 1970s. This Type 74 had an improved lance with only two incendiary cartridge chambers, as well as only two tanks. Overall, the flamethrower became somewhat lighter, although the capacity of the two tanks was increased to 4 liters (0.9 gallons) each. The Type 74 is still in active service today and is regularly and impressively staged for the press photographers during various exercises and demonstrations.

Apart from China, only one independent production in Romania is known to date. All other Warsaw Pact countries received their LPO-50s from Russian production. Some of the decommissioned ROK old stocks were also passed on to friendly states. The German Democratic Republic acquired larger quantities and used them in the NVA forces as the ‘Light Flamethrower LPO-50’. The earliest known service record dates back to 1966. Flamethrowers from Soviet and Chinese production were also used in Vietnam. However, their active use was limited because the required quantities of flammable liquids were often not available at the front.

Of course, the worldwide distribution also led to devices disappearing into dark channels time and again. When the Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacked the Derryard vehicle checkpoint on 13 December 1989, an LPO-50 flamethrower was also present. British units subsequently recovered at least six Russian-made units. How and where they came from is still unknown.

In many phases of military training, the recruits have no need for fully functional service rifles. The standard service rifles are too valuable to be used for marching, parade drill, obstacle course or even the first “dry run” lessons in handling rifles on the shooting range. Dummy rifles are absolutely sufficient for this kind of use. In German, these rifles are called “Exerziergewehr” (“drill rifles”). Optimally, they have the same appearance, size and weight as the bolt-action service rifle model. And in most cases, the trigger is the only moveable part because it is needed for simulating the trigger pull characteristics to give the trainees a better feeling for their weapon. 

At the beginning of World War I, the German Army had used obsolete and captured weapons for training purposes. To improve the training, in spring 1915, the arms depot in Ingolstadt was advised to temporarily provide 10,000 model 98 rifles that were in need of repair. 

These rifles were intended for use as training rifles and had to be marked with a white color ring painted between the front and lower barrel band. Finally, in January 1916, a completely newly designed drill rifle was introduced as the “Exerziergewehr 98 (Nachbildung)” (“Drill Rifle 98” (“Mockup”)). After its introduction, it was named “Exerziergewehr 16” (relating to the year of introduction). 

In a related note to its use, it was written: “The drill rifle is to be used on every drill ground and during marching exercises, when carrying a weapon is necessary, but no live or blank firing is done. This way the service rifles in the hands of the troops are saved and will keep their good shooting performance.” 

The drill rifle has the shape of the standard Gewehr 98 and approximately the same weight and trigger pull characteristics. The sling is fixed in the same way so that the rifle can be carried and handled like the Gewehr 98. Because of the moveable trigger with trigger pull, the drill rifle can be used for aiming drill. 

The standard service bayonets could be put on the bayonet lug, but it was strictly forbidden to use the rifle for bayonet fighting. The design was not sturdy enough and could get damaged. The barrel is just an iron tube without rifling. 

The receiver and the rear sight are made of one casting with only a rough and low detailed outline. The barrel is inserted into the receiver and fixed with a screw that reaches through the front part of the sight and the rear of the barrel. The fixed rear sight is not adjustable, but it shows a V-notch for simple aiming purpose. 

Because the Exerziergewehr receiver was made of one solid cast iron, the weight and the center of gravity are approximately the same as the Gewehr 98. The cocking handle is screwed in a fixed position into the right side of the receiver. Normally, all metal parts are lacquered with field grey color, but sometimes a black color was used for the barrel. 

The beechwood stock is similar to the one of the Gewehr 98. The cleaning rod is a dummy (short metal stick with thread) and screwed directly into the wood at the front end of the stock. It can be used to put the rifles together to form a pyramid. 

Altogether, 100,000 of these Exerziergewehr 98s were ordered by the Prussian War Ministry. This included the numbers of drill rifles that were distributed to the non-Prussian parties. For example, Saxonia got 8,000 and Bavaria got 12,000 drill rifles. 

Most of these drill rifles were manufactured by the Union Waffen und Munitionswerke (the former arms company Waffenwerk Kirchner) in Zella St. Blasii (Thuringia, Germany). The smaller part of the order was placed at the company Jakob Kaufmann in Bayreuth (Bavaria), from where 28,230 rifles were delivered to Bavaria and Saxonia. 

Unfortunately, the rifles came too late— at this stage of the war there was no longer enough time for a thorough training of the recruits. Now the main focus of the drill was on live shooting. Marching drills were no longer so important. A report from the I. Bavarian Army Corps tells that the drill rifles only saw limited use: The Corps complains about the roughly made sights and a trigger pull characteristic that is very different to the Gewehr 98. The metal parts were carelessly treated. Their sharp edges often caused injuries to the fingers and damage to the clothing. 

In summer 1916 the ongoing production of drill rifles was cancelled. And in November 1916 the distribution of new drill rifles to training units was halted by the Prussian War Ministry. A year later, all drill rifles in the hands of the training units had to be returned to the artillery depots. The intention was to use them for a pre-military training of the German youth, but it is doubtful if this plan was finally implemented. 

It is not known how many drill rifles “Exerziergewehr 16” have left the factories. Today, it is a rare and interesting piece for collectors— even if one can’t use it for shooting. 

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the entire local arms industry came under German influence. The Czechs were very advanced in weapons engineering, rich in experience and know-how and possessed modern factories. In the course of the reorganization of the industry, the conglomerate Československá Zbrojovka a.s. Brno (“Czechoslovak arms factory AG Brno”) was placed under German administration. 

From 1938 until 1945, the conglomerate operated under the names Waffenwerke Brünn I (Brno) and II (Bystrica) and was affiliated to the Reichswerke Hermann Göring. The main products were military equipment for the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS. Not only were German weapons like the Karabiner 98k made, but also Czech pre-war developments under a new designation. For example, the vz. 24 rifle as Gewehr 24(t), the ZB vz. 26 as MG 26(t) and the ZB vz. 37 as MG 37(t). The (t) in the German name means “tschechisch” (Czech). 

The Waffen-SS quickly succeeded in gaining full control of the arms factory in Brno. The Waffenwerke’s development department worked from then on as a part of the “SS-Waffenakademie Brünn” (SS-Weap

ons Academy Brno) on the implementation of many innovative ideas, which would not have been possible through the official channels involved with the Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance Office) because of the intense rivalries between the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS. While the Wehrmacht was able to provide weapons through the official channels, the SS was often left out. Some developments proved to be successful and were then also produced at the Army Ordnance Office, such as the anti-tank rifle M.SS.41. 

The Need to Rise Above 

One particular development was the submachine gun Model SS 42. It was born out of the desire for more reliable function and a higher magazine capacity. The German MP 40 with its 32-round magazine was clearly inferior to the Russian PPSh-41 with its 71-round drum in the decisive moments of close combat and tended to have feeding problems under adverse conditions. Captured Russian SMGs, in the Wehrmacht designated as MP 717(r), were accordingly popular and were seldom delivered to the looted collection points. The Army Ordnance Office experimented with a converted MP 40 with a double magazine well holding two stick magazines. The result was called “MP 40/1” and was produced in a very limited number; however, the weapon was not very stable. On standard receivers taken from the series production, the cut-out for the magazine well was enlarged but without adding additional reinforcement to the weakened part of the receiver. On some of the still existing MP 40/1s, the receivers have been bent due to long-term storage. 

Further Development 

The SS therefore relied on a further development of the Czech pre-war submachine gun vz. 38. The work began at the end of March 1942, and as early as June, the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler was notified of the completion and testing of the first experimental weapons with a drum magazine for 64 rounds. The Army Ordnance Office of course did not remain uninformed about these events and was very angry about the arbitrary action of the Waffen-SS. Therefore, the submachine gun was rejected in a meeting of the Weapons Commission at the Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production in August. The decision was justified by spurious arguments like the imminent adoption of the Maschinenkarabiner MKb42, the improvement of the MP 40 magazines and the impractical wooden stock. 

However, despite that, the development continued. The MP SS 42 is blowback-operated and fires from the open bolt. It does not show any special technical features. Initially, the production was very complex because no components are interchangeable with the MP 38 or MP 40; however, the engineers were already working on simplifications, such as a receiver entirely made of sheet metal. Instead of the drum magazine, a stick magazine could be used alternatively. The MP SS 42 was not compatible with any other German submachine gun. The Waffen-SS applied for the production of a total of 10,000 pieces in December 1942, but nothing came of it. Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments and War Production had the last word. 

The MP SS 42’s Death Sentence 

In a letter dated April 12, 1943, Speer ordered that all further work on the submachine gun was prohibited: 

“1.) The M.P. SS 42 offers no advantages in design and manufacturing technology compared to the introduced M.P. 40, in particular, it can be achieved no increase in performance since it fires the pistol cartridge 08. 

2.) A production at the Waffenwerke Brno would severely affect the output of other equipment, including the Karabiner 98k and the 3.7cm anti-aircraft gun, whose maximum increase has recently been described as urgent by the Führer. 

Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the production of the M.P. SS 42 in a number of 10,000 pieces is not justifiable and ask to refrain from pursuing this matter.” 

The reasons for the refusal were completely different this time. Advantages like the increase in performance due to the higher capacity drum magazine did not count and were obviously not of interest. Thus, the MP SS 42 remains only a peripheral appearance in the variety of infantry weapons of World War II. Only a few unique prototypes have been preserved, all in slightly different variations, in the outstanding collection of the Prague Army Museum. 

• • • 

The author thanks Jan Skramoušský (VHU / Army Museum Prague).

Successful inventors often have to think outside the box. In weapons technology, too, many a smirked-at pipe dream has turned out to be a great success. But now and then it’s difficult to distinguish deliberate charlatanry from actual conviction. This is a problem that the SS-Waffenamt also had to contend with when so-called “inventors” described their ideas in grandiose terms. Like Dr. Christian Fuchs, for example, with his centrifugal machine gun.

Machine guns became an indispensable weapon in warfare. Their firepower helped both in attack and defense. On days of heavy fighting, however, this turned into hard work for the ammunition carriers, considering that a German MG34 could easily fire 800 rounds per minute. The MG42 even managed 1,500 rounds in the same amount of time.

Dr. Fuchs, from Poznań in the Nazi-occupied Reichsgau Wartheland area of Poland, who had a doctorate in law, had the idea of developing a machine gun that used kinetic energy instead of gunpowder to impart thrust to projectiles. Whether he was aware of other prior attempts to create such a device is unknown. He approached the Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance Office) with this idea and on 8 February 1943 his project was discussed during a weapons demonstration at the proving ground Kummersdorf as the agenda item “Development of a new machine gun with mechanical projectile acceleration.” According to Dr. Fuchs, his invention was recognized as correct in principle, but the development time needed to create a weapon suitable for frontline use was judged to be too long and he was refused further support.

However, Dr. Fuchs did not give up that quickly. He contacted a Nazi SS office in Poznań and presented his idea there on 20 November. “With this machine, the projectiles are hurled away without explosives, i.e. silently,” it was reported, and that, “Dr. Fuchs has already achieved a performance of 50 shots per second, that is 3,000 shots per minute, with his model.” Furthermore, he lambasted the lack of support from the Speer Ministry, declaring that he needed only six months to complete a weapon “which could be used immediately at the front,” but, of course, only if qualified mechanics and raw materials were made available to him. Furthermore, Dr. Fuchs urged a quick decision, because the suspension period for the public announcement of his patent would soon end and failing to gain an extension would be contrary to the interest of national defense. He urgently requested the support of Gauleiter SS-Obergruppenführer Arthur Greiser and wanted to demonstrate the invention to him personally.

Despite the support of the SS, Dr. Fuchs was unable to procure the necessary high-speed motors and other individual parts. In May 1944, he travelled specially to the Siemens company in Berlin where he learned the compact, high-speed electric motors he had planned to use in his design were no longer being built. Instead, he had to make do with motors that provided only 7,000 revolutions per minute, for which, however, a gearbox was necessary. Siemens agreed “in the most obliging manner” to produce a model of the machine gun and also commissioned the development of a gearbox that ran in oil. But nothing came of it.

In June 1944, Dr. Fuchs wrote to the SS headquarters (Technical Office VIII FEP), “Due to the two heavy air raids on Poznań, the workshops of the company entrusted with the construction of the gearbox were partly destroyed. […] In addition, the manager of the Poznań workshop of the Siemens company has collapsed due to work overload and is therefore no longer able to provide the kindly promised help in the construction of the machine gun.” Dr. Fuchs then built a prototype gearbox himself that reached a speed of 15,000 rpm. On the finished weapon, one bullet would have left the barrel for every revolution.

Dr. Fuchs felt very important. He again pressed for help from the SS, who this time were to make certain parts for him. The work would only progress so slowly and Fuchs urged, “since I must not neglect my professional duties as a judge, nor can I cease my intensive collaboration as Hauptsturmführer of the SA, lest I betray the cause. […] Without the requested help, it would hardly be possible to make the new weapon operational for this war. In my opinion, however, that would not be in the Führer’s interests”. Two weeks later, the SS-Führungshauptamt agreed to have the parts manufactured in SS workshops and asked for drawings to be sent to them. In mid-July, the finished parts were sent to Dr. Fuchs.

Now the personal staff of the Reichsführer-SS also intervened. SS-Obersturmbannführer Gräßler wanted to know why the matter was taking so long. The head of the technical office, SS-Brigadeführer Schwab, himself a doctor of engineering, made it clear in his answer of 3 October 1944 what he thought of the centrifugal machine gun. He reportedly said the invention was a technical gimmick and that such a weapon would weigh 100 times more than a normal machine gun and the trajectory would be uncontrollable. All this did not justify the use of an extensive test facility and the assignment of dozens of experts, he continued. Presumably in order not to upset anyone, he added, “It must remain the case that we give Dr. Fuchs further opportunities to improve his ideas and to see for himself on basic tests how far things can be realized. […] Dr. Fuchs has now expressed the wish to be transferred to the Waffen-SS in order to be able to continue working here within the framework of the Technical Office. I have no objection to this and will clear the way for him to do so. With the best will in the world, that is all that can be done at the moment.”

Unfortunately, this is where the story ends. The further fate of Dr. Fuchs, the whereabouts of his prototype and the technical drawings of his design are unknown. But, based on what we know of his ambition, the ammunition consumption of his invention would have been incredibly high, if the system worked at all. With some basic math we can see how absurdly the idea was likely viewed at the time. The common heavy pointed bullet (schweres Spitzgeschoss) of the rifle cartridge weighed 12.8 grams. At the intended target of 30,000 revolutions per minute, the centrifugal machine gun would thus have hurled 384 kilograms (about 85 pounds) of lead per minute at the enemy. So, assuming the technology could be developed to realize Fuchs’ design, the weapons insatiable appetite for ammunition would have precluded it from ever becoming a reality given that ammunition was already in short supply in almost every corner of the German Reich by this point of the war.

In rivalry with the Wehrmacht, its aerial warfare branch, the Luftwaffe, had developed its own anti-tank rifle grenade launcher for its paratroopers. But in the end, the fin-stabilized grenade was inferior to the Army model. 

After all units had to return their launcher cups to the depots in 1928, rifle grenades were no longer part of the armament in the following years, and they were not considered during training. Only in the course of the 1930s did they gradually shift more and more into the awareness of the military again. The Wehrmacht leadership expressed serious interest in a further-developed rifle grenade and so in early 1938, the company Theodor Bergmann & Co. from Bernau near Berlin began working on a rifle grenade and a new launcher in accordance with the requirements set in cooperation with the Heereswaffenamt (German Army Ordnance). 

The work continued to the early stage of World War II. It was only in April 1942 that the so-called Gewehrgranatgerät (rifle grenade device) was adopted by the German Army. The new device could be attached to almost all Model 98 rifles thanks to its clamp mounting. According to archive files, the delivered number of devices until the cessation of production in May 1944 reached nearly 1.5 million pieces. In the following years, a variety of different rifle grenades like high-explosive, hollow-charge and flare grenades, and even propaganda grenades for leaflet distribution, were developed and introduced. 

Actually, a very effective weapon was created early on. But the rivalry of Heereswaffenamt (Army), Marine-Waffenamt (Navy) and Technisches Amt der Luftwaffe (Air Force) prevented for the time being a combined use in all three Wehrmacht organizations. Each of these ordnance offices developed its own armament program, which competed with the other two for money and material resources. And so the Air Force tried to create its own rifle grenade device while ignoring the Army development. 

Its history began on September 15, 1941. On that day, engineers from the Westfälisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff-Actien- Gesellschaft (WASAG) from Reinsdorf met with representatives of the Air Force for a discussion on anti-tank weapons for airborne troops. The WASAG presented an already elaborated proposal for an armor-piercing rifle grenade based on the hollow- or shaped-charge principle. Only a special fuze was missing. The company Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken Aktiengesellschaft (DWM) assured the accelerated production of the elongated cartridge cases was needed as a propelling cartridge and also promised to try to design a fuze. The DWM Research Institute in Lübeck would become involved. After delivery of the propelling cartridges and the new fuze, a comprehensive test took place on October 20, 1940, on the shooting range in Hildesheim. 

New Device 

At the end of 1940, WASAG completed its development work to the satisfaction of the Luftwaffe. Officially, the new device was called “Schiessbecher mit Klappkorn” (cup launcher with folding sight) and launched the “Gewehrgranate zur Panzerbekämpfung Modell 1940” (anti-tank rifle grenade Model 1940), in short GG/P40. However, the name is very misleading: In contrast to the Army’s device, in which the grenades are inserted into a rifled cup, the Air Force’s device consists of a kind of barrel extension. The hollow tail of the grenade is pushed onto this extension from the front. 

The new weapon was already urgently awaited by the paratroopers. Although the order ran under the highest priority level, the WASAG initially did not cope with the production. General of airborne forces, Kurt Student, therefore in January 1941 changed the delivery order as follows: 5,000 devices and 30,000 grenades until middle of March 1941, and the rest (25,000 devices and 270,000 grenades) were to be delivered over the months of April to possibly July 1941. 

At the end of January, the Führer personally intervened and demanded a lecture from General Student about the new anti-tank weapons. In preparation, on January 24, General Student was once again briefed by a WASAG employee on the Kampfpistole (flare pistol with rifled barrel) and the rifle grenade. At the same time he ordered another trial to be carried out in order to reach a range of 150m, as this range had been demanded in the lecture which he had given a few days earlier to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. 

The launcher was now finished. What was still missing, however, was a sighting device. For this reason there was a meeting on February 4, 1941, of representatives of the companies DWM and Mauser at the WASAG plant in Reinsdorf. First, minor changes to the fuze were again discussed, and a final design was determined. Fifteen preliminary series fuzes brought by DWM were fired without any failure after the meeting. In question of the grenade sight, Mauser agreed to design and manufacture a suitable sight. Likewise, Mauser expressed the desire to take over the production of the launchers. 

A month later, three different sights were finished and were demonstrated at a meeting at the Mauser factory in Oberndorf. The decision was made in favor of a sight consisting of a pivoting box, laterally attached to the stock next to the normal rear sight. The box carries an U-notch at its front and a scale for setting the ranges for 25m, 50m, 75m and 100m at its rear. It is attached to the stock by means of a flexible steel band and a clamping screw with a knurled nut. The sighting line is 35mm offset to the left of the barrel axis. All other demonstrated sight models would have required permanent changes to the rifles. 

Sight Production 

On March 17 another meeting was held at DWM in Borsigwalde with all involved companies. It was about the planning and execution of mass production. For the initial production (400 pieces at Mauser and 100 pieces at WASAG) on the basis of the previous drawings, slight deviations of the dimensions were accepted. Also, the foresight was mounted rigidly (instead of hinged) to speed up the production. The delivery date was April 15. For the upcoming large-scale production, Mauser should make and distribute new factory drawings for the launcher, foresight and grenade sight until March 22 at the latest. Mauser’s launchers were manufactured at the Berlin plant. Whether the sights should also be made in Berlin or in Oberndorf, was still open at this time. 

Then on May 9, 1941, it was done. The first 450 complete devices were shipped to the Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment 1 (Airborne Assault Regiment) under the command of Colonel Bernhard Ramcke. Just in time, because on May 20, the operation Merkur was launched—the airborne invasion of the island of Crete. Curiously, on the few known combat and propaganda photos showing the launcher, no grenade sight is visible. Special pouches for storing the launcher, tools for maintenance and cleaning or other accessories have not been mentioned in any documents, let alone issued to the troops. 

The Schiessbecher 

The “Schiessbecher” (spigot launcher) weighs 495g and consists of a cylindrical smooth tube (outer diameter 24mm, length 230mm), a permanently affixed mount (same design as the mount of the bayonet) and a hinged foresight on the left side. This can be folded down when not in use. On the underside of the launcher tube, a leaf spring of 8cm in length is fixed with a small screw. Its purpose is to hold the GG/P40 grenade in place. The cleaning rod of the K.98k can remain on the weapon while the launcher is attached, since the mount has a corresponding through hole. The launcher is simply pushed onto the muzzle until the springloaded locking mechanism of the mount engages in the recess of the bayonet lug. Detaching is done in the same way as with the bayonet by pressing a round release button located on the right side of the mount. Since the launcher does not block the muzzle but acts as a barrel extension, ordinary bulleted ammunition can be safely fired if necessary without removing the launcher. 

The GG/P40 was the only grenade developed for the spigot launcher. No other types of grenades were planned, so the enemy infantry had to be fought with this grenade if necessary; not a very effective use of hollow-charge ammunition because of the low splintering effect in the open. The grenade weighed 515g and was used at distances of 50m to 100m. Its maximum penetration was 35mm of armor, and the maximum range when fired at an angle of 45 degrees was 275m. The special propelling cartridge named “Patrone G” weighed 15g and was filled with 3.6g of powder. Its hollow wooden bullet was yellow-colored to avoid being confused with the standard blank cartridge with purple bullets. 

The Luftwaffe seemed to have created an easy-to-use and flexible anti-tank weapon for its paratroopers, which usually did not have heavy weapons at hand in the early stages of their missions. The device was much handier, easier to use, less sensitive to rough handling and less expensive to manufacture than the rifle grenade launcher of the Army. 

End of the GG/P40 and Spigot Launcher 

But then, quite surprisingly, everything was over. On April 10, 1942, a demonstration of the improved grenade with a lengthened cap, serving as a spacer, took place in Kummersdorf. Thus, the grenade was now 295mm long and could penetrate 50mm of armor. At 65mm it still achieved deep indents with a splintering effect inside the vehicle. According to the WASAG Reinsdorf department, the spin-stabilized grenade already introduced by the Army could penetrate 65mm but only with a diameter of a few millimeters. The GG/P40 was thus more effective. A disadvantage of the fin-stabilized grenade, however, was the gusty wind, which greatly reduced the accuracy. On April 20, the Reinsdorf team received an angry letter from the Berlin WASAG headquarters: “The test firing on 10.4. has unfortunately showed the total uselessness of the current design of the Gg.P.40, as in gusty winds at distances of 50 meters and less, only 9 hits could be scored from 30 grenades fired […] We agree that you will provide Wa Prüf 1/II with about 50 grenades to complete the performance tests but that they will complete the work on this project. We express our surprise that your report, in perhaps misunderstood whitewashing, did not express the total failure of the Gg.P.40.” 

This sealed the end of both the GG/P40 and the spigot launcher. How many launchers had been delivered is not known. Later in the War, the Luftwaffe received an additional 9,585 pieces of the Army rifle grenade launcher. The improved large anti-tank rifle grenade of the Army, which was introduced in October 1942, even achieved a penetration of up to 80mm of armor. Much more than the GG/P40. 

As the fronts hardened in World War I and little progress was made in trench warfare, the heroic bayonet charges showed less and less success and led to high losses. All sides were looking for new solutions to regain momentum.

The United States had long hesitated to intervene actively in the hostilities of World War I. As the conflict continued to escalate, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were formed in France on 5 July 1917, under the command of then Major General John J. Pershing. The first of the so-called Doughboys landed on the European mainland in June 1917. But Pershing insisted that his soldiers be well trained before they boarded ships. As a result, few troops arrived in France before January 1918.

Initially, four combat-ready U.S. divisions under French and British command were deployed to gain initial front-line experience by defending relatively quiet sections of the front. Initially, the equipment used also came from French and British stocks. Meanwhile, in the United States, resourceful tinkerers and engineers were searching for new and better weapons to give their soldiers an advantage in battle.

The Gas Service Section of the U.S. Armed Forces had a curious idea for increasing combat effectiveness: a kind of miniature flamethrower on the rifle was intended to cause the enemy to take flight in fear when attacking their positions. The development went under the name “Flaming Bayonet.” While work was still in progress, the Gas Service and Chemical Service departments were merged to form the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS).

The Flaming Bayonet was a square sheet metal container with six flame cartridges, three in each of two rows. Initial tests with liquid fuel had to be abandoned because of the danger to the shooter from leaks and difficulties with firing or spraying. Therefore, they switched to cartridges filled with powder. In front-line operations, these would have been much safer to handle and easier to transport.

The container was attached to the bayonet lug from below with a connecting piece when the bayonet was mounted. On both sides of the connector were two spring-loaded pushers that clamped the container in place. It could thus be easily removed and replaced. On its upper side was a metal bracket as a trigger, which was secured by a cotter pin with a ring.

After pulling the cotter pin, the shooter could operate the trigger. To do this, he gripped the rifle with his second hand at the front of the stock above the receiver, as in bayonet fighting. This allowed him to aim the weapon at the target. With the edge of his hand, he then pressed down the trigger and the fireworks went off.

Unfortunately, it is not known exactly how the system worked. It is not clear from the few surviving documents whether all six flame cartridges were activated simultaneously or somewhat delayed one after the other. The former would give a greater fire spell, the latter a longer lasting fire. According to the drawing, individual activation of each cartridge as needed does not seem to have been possible. It is also not known whether the device could be refilled on site or whether this had to be done at the factory.

The official designation was “Flaming Bayonet, Cartridge Type, Mark I”. The weight is given as 285 grams (5/8-pound). Depending on humidity and wind direction, the flame length was between 5 and 15 feet. That is about 1.5 to 4.5 meters. The few available photos of tests show the device mounted only on a rifle U.S. Model 1917. However, it could easily have been adapted to other rifles by altering the connecting piece.

Old but undated notes state that a consignment was shipped to France. However, there is no evidence of this, and no surviving specimen is known to date. Why the development finally came to nothing can probably no longer be explained.

However, the head of the overseas division of the Chemical Warfare Service, General Amos A. Fries, was an avowed opponent of incendiary weapons of all kinds. He saw them as completely useless. Even of flamethrowers, he wrote after the war that they were, “one of the greatest failures among the many promising devices tried out on a large scale in the war,” and one could simply duck under the flames. Fries relied entirely on poison gas and pushed developments in this direction.

Under a leader with this attitude, it is not surprising that the flame bayonet was not given a future. Whereby – based on the photos, the whole thing looks impressive. But would an opponent who had already survived weeks or months of barrage and all kinds of horrors really have been impressed by it?

The increasing air superiority of the Allies and their area bombing had severely damaged the German armaments industry and transport routes during the WWII. In the last months of the war, the precarious supply of weapons and ammunition therefore necessitated a great deal of improvisation.

And in these difficult times everything available was used, as, for example, unexploded incendiary bombs that had been dropped by the Allies. The Forensic Institute of the Security Police (Kriminaltechnisches Institut der Sicherheitspolizei or KTI), a department of the Reich Security Main Office (“Reichssicherheitshauptamt” or RSHA), had experimented in early 1945 with converting Allied incendiary bombs into incendiary devices for ground combat. After all, the Allies dropped more than 80 million of them on German cities – with a correspondingly large number of duds. SS-Hauptsturmführer Professor Dr. Specht, an expert in arson investigation, and SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Albert Widmann, who headed the D2 “Chemistry and Biology” department, were involved in the experiments.

The experiments were satisfactory and immediately aroused the interest of SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny. Skorzeny was generally very open to new weapons and maintained close contacts with the KTI. In February 1945, Dr. Widmann reported to the head of the Criminal Investigation Police Department (Reichskriminalpolizeiamt), SS-Oberführer Friedrich Panzinger, about the Elektrothermit incendiary devices. At the time, he said “3,000 incendiary bombs were being converted for Skorzeny, because they were much sought after by the SS-Jagdverbände. 500 of them could already be finished and shipped to Theresienstadt. With these incendiary devices, files can be destroyed in an emergency or tar-oil barrels, vehicles, buildings, or prepared fire barriers against tanks can be set on fire.”

According to Widmann, the Wehrwolf organization had also reported such a need. The conversion work was carried out by a KTI workshop.

To cover the demand, not only allied duds were collected. The declining German Luftwaffe hardly carried out any major bombing raids and large quantities of bombs therefore lay unused in German depots. As a U.S. report on captured ammunition shows, German 1 kg stick-type incendiary bombs had also been converted from larger ordnance.

From the incendiary bombs, the tail unit, the head fuse and the thermite filling were removed. The body was then filled with a pyrotechnic powder (magnesium and aluminum) and a detonator with a pull cord was installed. The detonator ignited a delay charge with about 100 seconds burning time. The filling then burned for about 3 to 4 minutes.

The Americans puzzled over the sense and purpose of the conversion. The heat development was too low to ignite fires. The original filling would have been better suited for this purpose. Therefore, a use for lighting or ground signaling seemed most likely. The report ends by stating that it was a forced measure with components that were just available, that it worked poorly, and that it was not well suited for fire or lighting purposes.

The Forensic Institute of the Security Police (Kriminaltechnisches Institut der Sicherheitspolizei / KTI) was a department of the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt / RSHA). The Security Office was an organization subordinate to Heinrich Himmler in his dual capacities as Chief of German Police (Chef der Deutschen Polizei) and Reichsführer-SS. The organization’s stated duty was to fight all enemies of the Reich inside and outside the borders of Germany. In 1944, the KTI began to deal with, among other things, toxic bullets for small arms. The initial spark was the arrest of a Russian agent in the area of the Heeresgruppe Mitte in January of that year.

When he was arrested, numerous objects were secured, including a Mauser pistol in 7.65mm caliber, six associated cartridges and two small bombs, one incendiary and one explosive. The use of such a pistol is not unusual, because at that time the small caliber was very common among the self-loading pistols used in the German Reich, and it would have made it difficult to draw conclusions on the perpetrator in an assassination attempt. The serial number 557 453 and the circumstances indicate that the weapon may have been a Mauser model 1934.

However, the security forces became aware of the ammunition. The standard brass cases with the headstamp “Geco D 7.65” were made in Germany by the company Gustav Genschow & Co. The bullets, however, did not conform to any common pattern: hollow-pointed bullets with a steel cap and a four-piece coat. Of course, such suspicious ammunition had to be examined more closely, which is why the seized objects were delivered to the “Chemical Investigation Center” of the Heeresgruppe Mitte on January 13 and 15. There, it was first noted that each of the bullets contained 0.04 grams of an unknown substance that was not one of the commonly used poisons or explosives. It could not be more precise, because the existing equipment of the field laboratory was not sufficient for a precise analysis of all chemical substances.

The commander of the security police in Minsk therefore decided to have the prisoner and all objects brought to the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. There, the agent was questioned again on January 26, and he started to talk. As it turned out, the man should have committed an assassination attempt on SS-Gruppenführer Curt Gustav Friedrich Walther von Gottberg. He received all his equipment by courier from Moscow. The bullets were filled with poison and would be deadly even with the slightest wound. He had received three cartridges, but had three more left from his previous mission. Accordingly, the Russians had probably used such ammunition more often in assassinations.

That same day, the RSHA handed over the items to the Forensic Science Institute. The analysis of the substances was difficult. It was only on March 21 that the final report was finished. The poison was the extremely toxic Aconitine, which can be obtained, for example, from the monkshood plant. It is considered one of the strongest plant toxins ever. The lethal dose for an adult is 4mg. The report thus comes to the conclusion that the bullets with their filling of 20mg to 30mg of Aconitine must be absolutely deadly, because “by a shot, always several blood vessels are injured, so that the poison can get into the body.”

The functioning of the bullet is indeed very well thought out. Its coat has four elongated cuts as predetermined breaking points. In the moment of impact, the rounded steel tip pushes the four-part bullet along the predetermined breaking points apart. The hollow tip and the sharp parts of the breaking bullet increase the wound formation. The poison gets into the wound and the bloodstream even if the shot is poorly aimed.

In a request to the KTI from April 1944, the General of the Nebeltruppe (rocket artillery) pointed to the problem of such bullets, because “the use of poison or poisoned weapons is forbidden according to Article 23a of the ‘Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’ from October 18, 1907. This includes well and food poisoning, poisoned arrows and bullets.” However, the answer did not elaborate on this but merely emphasized that it was special ammunition of the Soviet Russian secret service and not captured Army ammunition.

The design of the small bullet with its extremely effective content seemed to have impressed the KTI deeply. It was considered so important that they sent a report to SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, who immediately expressed his interest in it. In the meantime, the Army Weapons Office (Heereswaffenamt) also got wind of the matter, and in June 1944, requested a copy of the sectional drawing from the KTI. 

Even the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler personally received detailed information including drawings and photos in August. 

Such a kind of special ammunition would fit well into the ordnance of the Waffen-SS and the SS police units. In fall 1944, therefore, a group under the direction of Dr. Joachim Mrugowsky (Chief Hygienist and Chief of Staff III at the Reich Medical Doctor SS and police) began with experiments on humans. The Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp was selected because since 1941, the KTI had maintained a workshop for the production of toxic products, such as hydrocyanic ampoules, by prisoners. For the following experiments 7.65mm bullets were filled with 38mg of Aconite Nitrate in crystalline form. On September 11, the group of doctors (including Dr. Albert Widmann) selected five Russian prisoners who had been sentenced to death; these bullets were shot in the upper part of the left thigh. In two cases, the bullet went straight through, and no effect of the poison was observed. The other three suffered for about two hours until they died. The surviving report describes in detail the development of reflexes, pupils, salivation with foaming and the unsuccessful attempts to vomit: “The motor unrest increased so much that the persons flung themselves up, and down, rolled their eyes and made meaningless motions with their hands and arms. […] Death occurred 121, 123 and 129 minutes after entry of the projectile.” Despite insignificant injuries, the poison had thus unfolded its deadly effect.

As late as September 1944, Dr. Widmann received an order of 200 poison bullets in 7.65mm caliber. The client was a good friend of Otto Skorzeny: SS-Obersturmführer Adrian Freiherr von Foelkersam of the SS-Jagdverband Ost. Whether these bullets were actually delivered, is not known. In general, so far no evidence for the use of toxic bullets on the German side could be found. Von Gottberg committed suicide on May 31, 1945, in British custody and Dr. Mrugowsky was hanged in 1948 in the War criminal prison Landsberg.