Cold Steel, a leading manufacturer of professional grade self defense knives, has announced the introduction of a pair of Sword Canes designed to provide a discreet self defense option for anyone who employs a cane. Cold Steel’s Sword Canes will be available in two models. One is a stainless steel handle model, the other features a handle of faux cocobolo wood. Each is a stylish complement for the well dressed gentleman, collector or businessman, and offers both support and protection to the elderly, handicapped or infirm. There is no denying that a sword cane is an uncommonly handy weapon and that it can be put into action with lighting speed as an effective and reliable means of defense. The stainless Sword Cane has a 24” long, 4 sided cruciform blade that is forged from 420J steel. The overall length of the cane is 37 1/2”, and it weighs 22.3 ounces. The actual sword is 31” long including the 7” handle. Cold Steel’s cocobolo handle Sword Cane also incorporates a 24” long, 4 sided blade forged from 420J steel. It is also 37 1/2” long but weighs just 17.5 ounces, while the sword and handle are the same length as the other model. The scabbards of both swords double as highly effective impact weapons. They are built from 11 layers of fiberglass, weigh just 8.5 ounces, and can be swung faster than the speed of sound. In Cold Steel’s impact tests they proved to be virtually unbreakable. The Sword Canes will retail for $139.99 for the stainless handle model and $119.99 for the cocobolo handle model. Like all Cold Steel fixed blade knives, each is protected by Cold Steel’s exclusive 5 year warranty. For more information contact Cold Steel, Inc., Dept. SAR, 3036-A Seaborg Avenue, Ventura, CA 93003. Phone 1-800-255-4716. Fax: 1-805-642-9727. Website: www.coldsteel.com.

TRIPOWER™ SIGHT FROM TRIJICON

Trijicon, Inc., the industry leader in the development of innovative, self-luminous aiming systems, has introduces the industry’s first triple illuminated sight. The new TriPower is a failsafe firearms sighting system that provides a fully illuminated reticle that’s easy to see under virtually any lighting conditions including partial or total darkness. The new TriPower features a red chevron-shaped reticle illuminated by three lighting sources. 1. The Integrated Fiber Optic System, which is an ultra-reliable system that automatically adjusts the brightness level of the reticle to the ambient light conditions. 2. Tritium-Illuminated Reticle, in which the glowing Tritium provides a vivid, distinct aiming point even in total darkness. 3. On-Call Battery Backup, a innovative system which is ideal for tactical entry or other uses in which the need for a bright reticle in low light is critical. This unique battery back-up system includes a reliable digital circuitry and an automatic shutoff. A remote pressure switch is optional. The TriPower has also been designed with an easy to mount 30mm tube, coated lenses, and it’s completely sealed for underwater use up to a depth of 30 meters. The TriPower is 5 inches long and weighs just 6 ounces. For more information on this and other high quality sighting devices contact, Trijicon, Inc., Dept. SAR, P.O. Box 930059, Wixom, Michigan 48393-0059. Phone: 1-800-338-0563. Fax: 1-248-960-7700. Web site: www.trijicon.com.

LEUPOLD MARK 4 CLOSE QUARTER TACTICAL SCOPE

Leupold has just introduced their latest and possibly their most talked about new optic, the Mark 4 CQ/T® scope. The new scope is the latest and maybe the most exciting addition the their line of tactical scopes. The Mark 4 CQ/T is a multi-functional optic sight designed specially for tactical firearms, such as the AR-15 and M-16. It combines the strengths of a red sight and a variable riflescope. Developed in cooperation with law enforcement and the military from around the world, the Mark 4 CQ/T can help accomplish a range of missions that can’t be done with any other single scopes. Use the Mark 4 CQ/T at 1X and it functions as a non-magnifying, illuminated sight for tactical scenarios or engaging targets at extremely close ranges. The Mark 4 CQ/T has a true 1X setting, allowing the user to use it with both eyes open. The clear, bright Circle Dot reticle is a bold aiming point for the operator, ensuring instant target acquisition in close quick encounters. You can also dial the scope up to 3X and accurately engage targets at medium ranges. This is where then Circle Dot reticle really shines. The dot won’t obscure a 9-inch target at 300 yards and the circle’s edge can be used to lead targets at long distances. You can also use the Circle Dot to estimate range. Ten illumination settings match any light conditions and even includes two low-intensity settings that work with night-vision devices. The scope also features built-in picatinny style rails that can be used to attach accessories. Other features include water-proof integrity, large field of view, windage and elevation adjustments of 1/2 MOA and DiamondCoat™ lenses. The new scope is powered by a single AA battery which provides up to seven hours of continuous use. It includes a mounting base for carry handle style AR-15’s and M-16’s and can also be mounted be mounted to weaver style bases with the optional mounting hardware. For more information on this innovative new scope contact, Leupold & Stevens, Inc., Dept. SAR, P.O. Box 688, Beaverton, OR 97075. Phone: 1-503-526-1400. Website: www.leupold.com.

COLORFUL FIREARM FINISHES FROM LAUER CUSTOM WEAPONRY

Lauer Custom Weaponry now offers a full line of custom firearm finishes that will satisfy even the most discriminating users. Their CAMOCOAT is a proprietary oven-cured coating offering the perfect combination of outstanding durability, extraordinary artistry and unparalleled quality. They also offer Parkerizing which is a non-reflective and durable finish. Gun-Kote is another of their finishes which is a durable, thermo-set resin finish that will not break down, peel or dissolve. In fact, the only way to remove Gun-Kote is to blast the part with an abrasive. It can be used on internal as well as external parts where a close-tolerance fit is required. Dura-Kote is their proprietary finish that consists of a two-part oven cured urethane and catalyst. It is by far the most durable and versatile coating available in the industry. Powder Coating is another coating that has several benefits including a wide range of colors, show quality finish and outstanding durability. Teflon/Moly, Electroless Nickel and Bluing are also available. Lauer is one of the few refinishers that offer an H&K Finish that matches H&K factory original color, sheen and durability. All in all if you need any kind of firearm refinished Lauer Custom Weaponry can do it. For more information contact Lauer Custom Weaponry, Dept. SAR, 3601 129th Street, Chippewa Falls, WI 54729. Phone 1-800-830-6677. Web Site: www.lauerweaponry.com.

BARRETT FIREARMS PLANS TO IMPORT ISRAELI MADE TAVOR 21

According to Barrett Firearms, noted at the Shot Show, they plan to import the new Israeli made Tavor 21 sporting rifle. The new rifle is a bull-pup configuration in .223 caliber. The Tavor 21 features a stock of a polymer type material and is completely ambidextrous. It also has a built-in picatinny rail for the attachment of accessories and a replaceable foregrip with various optional foregrips available. It is gas-operated with a rotating bolt locking mechanism. Barrel length is 18.1” with an overall length of just 27.8” and a weight of 7.7 pounds. Watch future issues of SAR for more details on this exciting new rifle. Until then you can contact Barrett Firearms Manufacturing, Inc., Dept. SAR, P.O. Box 1077, Murfreesboro, TN 37133. Phone: 1-615-896-2938. Fax: 1-615-896-7313. Web Site: www.barrettrifles.com.

Zoya Matveevna Smirnova-Medvedeva joined the 25th Chapayev Division of the Soviet Army in July 1941 as a machine gunner. She had wanted to be a flyer but was kept from entering a club to learn to fly because there were so many male applicants. The Chapayev Division had originally been formed during the Russian Civil War or 1918-1921. It fought the “interventionists,” British, French and American troops sent to Russia to oppose the Bolsheviks after the revolution of 1917, and also the monarchists, or White Russians.

One of the Bolshevik secular saints of the period was “Anka the Machine Gunner,” a woman who enlisted in the 25th Chapayev Division and fought in the Civil War.

Medvedeva and Nina Andreyevna Onilova, another female machine gunner, who became Medvedeva’s mentor, took Anka as their role model. Onilova was killed during the fighting near Sevastopol, a port city on the Black Sea during the German drive into the Soviet Union in 1942. She was posthumously decorated as a Gold Star Hero of the Soviet Union 20 years after “ The Great Patriotic War.”

Medvedeva was partially blinded in the defense of Sevastapol, was treated in a hospital, and went back to the front. Her vision was still poor, but she continued to serve until the fall of 1944, becoming a senior lieutenant. She was concussed during an air raid and was invalided out of the Soviet Army. It took 10 years for her to regain some vision, and after that she began to write.

“I am still interested in the history of my famous unit and have not forgotten my promise given to Nina Onilova in the spring of 1942 that, were I to survive, I would tell the story of my comrades-in-arms of the Chapayev Division…”

There are some interesting stories in the book. One is her recently formed unit’s first trip on a troop ship and the difference between them and experienced troops. The best tale was told in Chapter IV, “Breaking Out Of Encirclement.” This told the story of a group of released hospital patients, unarmed, who managed to overpower Germans, gain weapons and transport, and escape from a German encirclement.

One of the problems I found with the book is the lack of detail. Although Medvedeva was supposedly able to strip and reassemble a machine gun blindfolded, she never identifies the gun with more than the generic “heavy machine gun” or “Maxim.” Identification of other weapons, including captured Wehrmacht ones, was equally imprecise.

Another thing that rang false to me was the human perfection of the Soviet troops described in the book. Medvedeva does mention one hurried and unauthorized retreat but most troops fight almost to the last man. Aleksandr Solzhenitzen revealed that political officers in the field were hated for having troops arrested and sent to the Gulag for critical remarks made in letters or in casual conversation. Medvedeva paints the same class of Soviet operatives as beloved by the troops. In On the Road To Stalingrad, we read of only one mild warning against anti-Soviet speech.

The basic work of the book was done while the Soviet Union was still an expansionist military power which supported insurrections around the world and ran a brutal domestic Gulag. Perhaps the book would have been different if written after the Soviet Union had fallen.

WAR OF THE RATS
by David L. Robbins
ISBN 0-553-5831-58135-X
Bantam Books
1540 Broadway
New York, NY 2000
$6.99
Reviewed by Charles Cutshaw

The Germans besieging Stalingrad called it Rattenkrieg —”War of the Rats,” and it is from this term that this riveting novel derives its name. The Germans and the Soviet soldiers opposing them were the “rats” that scurried about in their “runs” – trenches and tunnels – during some of the most intense close combat battles in history. There was no better term for the horror and desperation that characterized the pivotal battle of World War II. City combat is bad enough, but Stalingrad was something else. Rather than a single large battle or siege, Stalingrad was characterized by close combat at only a few meters’ distance. Many small unit actions were fought inside a single building. For the Soviets it was a battle to preserve the Rodina, the Motherland. For the Nazis, Stalingrad was essential to Hitler’s overall strategy of isolating Crimea and Moscow so that the Nazi war machine would have access to much-needed Crimean oil.

War of the Rats is without doubt one of the best, if not the best, historical war novel this reviewer has ever read. It reads like a fictional thriller but is a historically factual account of the Battle of Stalingrad in general capturing the horrible essence of war in almost every detail. War of the Rats at its core is a study of the career of the heroic sniper Vasily Zaitsev and his comrades who wreaked havoc on the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. In that context the book also chronicles in some detail the events that transpired at Stalingrad during the last months of 1942. Most of the book’s protagonists are historical characters about whom little personal information has been passed on to their posterity, but Robbins has investigated every possible detail of their lives to bring them to life in a way that is rare in modern writing. The sole fictional character is a German corporal, added to provide balance to the book from the German standpoint.

This is not only a book about the Battle of Stalingrad, but a book about sniping under the most horrendous conditions imaginable. Although this reviewer makes no pretense of being a true sniper, he has undergone sniper training, graduated from one sniper school and has knowledge of how snipers work. War of the Rats has the ring of truth. Robbins clearly has done his technical homework in describing combat sniper operations. There are very few technical errors in War of the Rats. Robbins also makes it very clear that sheer number of “kills” does not make a good sniper. Indeed, Zaitsev cashiers a member of his team who is intent only on running up a large number of kills. As mentioned, Robbins has also done his homework from the standpoint of character development. He studied the early life of the primary characters and works this into the book, using it to show how they became effective as snipers and what drove them to the near-fanatical urge to kill as many Germans as possible. Much of the research that went into this book was based on personal notes and letters from people who participated in the battle. Each character has his or her reason for being a sniper and each personality is carefully developed. The reader feels that he actually knows each of the central characters. Only personal thoughts and details are fiction, but the characters are real, thanks to Mr. Robbins’ literary craftsmanship. This book is a tribute to these heroic individuals who stopped the German juggernaut at Stalingrad.

The well-known romance between Vasily Zaitsev and Tania Chernova is included, as is the “duel” between Zaitsev and the German Colonel Thorvald. This is the central theme of the novel, around which all other events and actions revolve. Zaitsev was so effective, reputedly killing upwards of 300 Germans, that he was a real “morale buster” for the German forces at Stalingrad. At the same time, Zaitsev became a national hero to the Russian people due largely to his publicist, political officer (Capt.) Igor Danilov. As Robbins puts it, “…the men in the trenches had come to believe that there was no haven…. Any movement, even while smoking or relieving themselves could draw a sniper’s attention.” While dying for one’s country is bad enough, dying in battle was considered at least a noble end by the Germans. Getting one’s head shot off from 400 meters while taking a pee or having a morning smoke, on the other hand, was not. The German command also realized that Zaitsev was boosting Russian morale, not only at Stalingrad, but nationwide. Thus, the Germans decided to do something about Zaitsev and called upon their premier sniper, Colonel Heinz Thorvald (NOT Major Koenig) to eliminate the Soviet sniper. The events leading up to the duel between Thorvald and Zaitsev have the ring of truth, as does the rest of the novel. The duel between Zaitsev and Thorvald is a study in countersniper operations that might well serve as a text on the subject.

While many of the events described in War of the Rats have little historical detail beyond the fact that they happened, the author of War of the Rats obviously has conducted meticulous research into the subject and fleshes out details of the Battle of Stalingrad at the “grunt” (or rat) level in a way that this reviewer has seldom encountered. War of the Rats immediately grabs the reader “by the stacking swivel” and doesn’t let go until the “ride” is over. It is one of those rare books that is difficult to put down once one begins reading. Robbins is an author on a par with the best. Unlike the writers of “techno thrillers,” who depend mostly on action to keep their thinly written novels moving, Robbins develops his characters while at the same time weaving a historical plot and subplots, all the while keeping up almost nonstop action. War of the Rats is without doubt the best novel to come out of the Stalingrad Battle since Cross of Iron, but in the opinion of this writer it surpasses Willi Heinrich’s classic in terms of readability and realism because the central characters are themselves real. War of the Rats is a MUST READ for any student of military history, World War II, the Battle of Stalingrad, or sniper operations. It is destined to become a classic.

Hitler’s Garands: German Self-Loading Rifles in World War II
by W. Darrin Weaver
ISBN 0-88935-275-5
Collector Grade Publications
PO Box 1046
Coburg, Ontario K9A 4W5
Canada
US $69.95
Reviewed by Charles Cutshaw

Although many have referred to World War II German semiautomatic rifles as German “Garands,” the semiautomatic rifles developed by the German arms industry were not the equal of the Garand. The German rifles functioned acceptably for the most part, save for the earliest versions, but even in their final interations they were not the equal of the American M1 Garand. The two self-loading German rifles were designed by Mauser and Walther and designated Gewehr 41(M) and Gewehr 41(W), respectively. Both, interestingly, were “gas trap” designs, like early Garands, which also proved unreliable and were changed to a more reliable gas port system. Both German rifles were clumsy, too long, lacking in reliability and unpopular with soldiers. The Mauser version of the rifle was particularly unpopular and was relegated for the most part to rear echelon troops because of its heavy weight, complexity and difficulty to maintain.

In 1942 the Herreswaffenamt (HWaA) requested Walther to improve the G41(W)’s design. This was probably not only due to the unpopularity of the Mauser rifle, but also because Mauser Werke was fully occupied with other production. The result was the Gewehr 43. The story of the transition from G41(W) to G43 is beyond the scope of this review, but essentially Walther copied the Soviet SVT gas system and made other modifications to develop the G43, later designated K43. The rifle continued in production as the G/K43 by several manufacturers until the end of the war.

Like most Collector Grade Publications, Hitler’s Garands is meticulously researched and provides a definitive account of its subject. The book begins with an account of Germany’s earliest unsuccessful attempts to develop semiautomatic rifles, dating back to the turn of the 20th Century. These accounts set the background for the developments that followed during World War II. This book is filled with detailed and unique information directed primarily at the collector, but is also an invaluable reference for the student of small arms history. For example, it was a HWaA requirement that virtually mandated the unsuccessful “gas trap” operating system of both G41 variants. The HWaA mandated that no semiautomatic military rifle have a barrel bored to extract gas, that no part on the upper surface move with the automatic loading components and that if the automatic mechanism were to fail, the rifle must still be usable in a manner similar to that of the Model 98. The first two requirements would have eliminated the M1 Garand, one of the finest and most reliable semiautomatic military rifles ever manufactured from competition! Another little known fact covered in detail in Hitler’s Garands is that the G/K43 was produced by slave labor at the notorious Buchenwald Camp and also at the less well-known Neuengamme Camp. Since the gas system of the G43 was derived from that of the Soviet SVT40, there is also a chapter on Soviet semiautomatic rifles. All manufacturers of the G43 are covered in detail, along with magazines, accessories and optics. The use and manufacture of rifles and components in other countries and after World War II are also covered in some detail. And finally, since all of these rifles along with their accessories are now desirable collector’s items, chapters are included that will prove invaluable to the collector. These are “Fakes, Frauds and Fantasies” and “Waffenamts, Codes and Serial Numbers” and “A Summary of Data Sheets” that compares specifications of rifles from all manufacturers. The first chapter covers and debunks popular myths surrounding the rifles and exposes many frauds passed off to collectors. The second covers markings of all rifles and components. The data summaries list all salient characteristics of every variant of German semiautomatic rifle. Finally, the book ranks G/K43 rifles as to their desirability for collectors, provides an “obtainable” collection of representative rifles and lists sources. There is also an extensive bibliography.

In summary, Hitler’s Garands is a high-quality, comprehensive and invaluable reference for the collector and student of military small arms. It was clearly a labor of love on the part of the author. The book is profusely illustrated with high resolution photographs and drawings. This reviewer knows of no single source which provides the amount of data available in Hitler’s Garands. Like most Collector Grade Publications, Hitler’s Garands is not inexpensive, but then there is nothing else available that is quite like it.

Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943.
By Antony Beevor
New York, London, Victoria, Toronto, Auckland:
Penguin Books, 1999.
xv + 494 pp., illus., maps, preface, notes, bib., index
USD $1695 pb
ISBN #0-1402-8458 3
Reviewed by Vic Fogle

The battle of the Atlantic was, without a doubt, the most important battle of World War II. Contested above, on and under the ocean’s surface, this hard fought contest lasted the entire six years of the war. Everything else in the European Theater depended upon its outcome.

That concession that made the war was decided by three further battles. They were climactic battles that represented turning points in their theaters of operation; battles at whose beginning Axis forces were at full extension and in which Axis momentum stopped and was rolled back into even contracting areas. These were the battles of Midway, El Alamein, and Stalingrad. After these battles, neither the Japanese nor the Germans would ever command so much territory while their former advances would turn into retreats toward their capitals.

Understandably, considerable literature has accumulated about each of these battles. In his 1999 book Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943, Antony Beevor updates the story of one of these battles by using material which became available only after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Beevor opens his preface by quoting the poet Tyuchev’s observation that “Russia cannot be understood with the mind.” He supplements purely military material with diaries, letters, interviews, chaplains’ accounts, prisoner interrogations, security police reports, etc., “to convey the unprecedented nature of the fighting and its effects on those caught up in it with little hope of escape”. Here, then, is the theme which unfolds in a time based narrative that proceeds without becoming bogged down in unit histories. Anyone interested in militaria will find this a splendid approach, for it casts much of the description in the words of the participants.

Beginning with the commencement of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany on June 21, 1941, the author portrays the gigantic battle as an obsessive contest of wills between two tyrants. It was launched by Germany as a war of ethnic conquest which went so far wrong that it developed into a struggle for national survival. Besides being a decisive turning point in the war as a whole, Stalingrad broke the Wehrmacht, caused the destruction of the Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian armies, restored the morale of the Russians, and greatly influenced the shape of the post war world.

The book is far more than merely a recital of numbers. It is worth knowing that Hitler’s invasion force totaled more than three million German soldiers and approximately a million additional pro-German fighting men, along with 3350 tanks, 7000 field guns, and more than 2000 aircraft. Yet to balance reality for those overwhelmed by other accounts of Blitzkrieg, we are also informed that Germany was unprepared for a long war, that the Wehrmacht was desperately short of trucks, and that most of its guns, ambulances and stores were pulled by 600,000 horses. Thus, with most of the infantry on foot, the speed of advance would be comparable to Napoleon’s in 1813, a matter of immense importance.

The Russian campaign was distinguished from all others by its general barbarism towards all and by its especial ruthlessness towards civilians. Hitler regarded the people of the Soviet Union as subhuman, temporary custodians of territory that he coveted. He directed that Communist officials, Jews, and partisans be handed over to German military authorities, and he exonerated German soldiers in advance for murder, rape and looting. The Wehrmacht forestalled potential opposition to its large-scale execution of Jews and gypsies by deliberately confusing that issue with rear area control of partisans. Faced with an inadequate supply by the army, individual German soldiers looted anything they could use from those civilians whom they encountered, while the army was ordered to send seven million tons of grain per year back to Germany. On September 3, 1941, the Germans used 600 Soviet POW’s for their initial experiment with Zyklon B gas at Auschwitz. Of other Red Army soldiers who reached POW camps alive, disease, starvation, exposure, and ill treatment killed more than 3 million of 5.7 million.

But whatever may be said about Hitler, Stalin more than matched him. Beevor quotes Goebbels’ description of Stalin as “a rabbit mesmerized by a snake”, who out of paranoia rejected Churchill’s Ultra derived warnings of a German invasion as an attempt to foment a Russo-German war. Stalin would not believe in the possibility of a German invasion until some twelve hours after it had commenced. Up until this time he “remained terrified of provoking Hitler”, and when forced to accept the reality of invasion, Stalin, “whose bullying nature contained a strong streak of cowardice”, contemplated suing for peace by ceding to Germany most of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic States. Of course, Stalin would not have been in that position had he not accepted German-planted misinformation suggesting treason with “an inimitable mixture of paranoia, sadistic megalomania and a vindictiveness for old slights” that resulted in the execution, imprisonment, or dismissal of 36,671 Red Army officers, including 404 out of 706 brigade commanders and above. Stalin further decreed that everyone who fell into German hands for any reason was a traitor. As a result, the Red Army executed 13,500 of its own soldiers at Stalingrad alone. After the war, when Red Army soldiers who had been captured wounded and had lived through German POW camps were repatriated, Stalin had them sent straight to the Gulag. So much was Stalin hated and feared that 50,000 of his own people fought on the side of the Wehrmacht in German uniform.

Both armies, along with Russian partisans, looted anything they could use from civilians. While the Ukrainians initially considered the Germans to be liberators, Hitler’s race war and exploitation compelled Soviet citizens to defend Russia and its regime. Meanwhile, Stalin, fearful that the advancing Germans might be able to live off the land, instituted a scorched earth retreat that condemned many of his own people to starvation and to death by freezing.

Interestingly enough, Beevor concludes that a major battle for Stalingrad was not really inevitable until September. Hitler became obsessed with the city when, as the author puts it, “the war of movement turned into a war of virtually stationary annihilation”. He came to believe that winning the war on the eastern front meant taking the Caucasus and that he was being denied victory by a city named for his hated enemy. On August 23, the Luftwaffe carpet bombed the city with 1200 aircraft then hit it again two days later. When Stalin heard that the battle had reached the Volga, he decided to make a stand there, alarmed that his country would be divided and that he would lose both the waterway and the oil fields. But as the Russian winter began to arrive, only a few realized that Richthofen’s bombing raids had “turned the city into a perfect killing ground” for the Russians to defend.

“Not a house is left standing,’ a lieutenant wrote home, ‘there is only a burnt-out wasteland, a wilderness of rubble and ruins which is well-nigh impassable… In parkland, there are tanks or just tank turrets dug-in, and anti-tank guns concealed in the cellars make it very hard going for our advancing tanks.

Much of the fighting consisted not of major attacks, but of relentless, lethal little conflicts. The battle was fought by assault squads, generally six or eight strong… They armed themselves with knives and spades for silent killing, as well as sub-machine guns and grenades…The assault squads sent into the sewers were strengthened with flamethrowers and sappers brining explosive charges.”

Beevor also showcases the differences in fighting methods between the two adversaries. Russian defenders early noticed that the Wehrmacht disliked close quarter fighting, especially at night, preferring instead unexceptional daylight action under a Luftwaffe umbrella. Consequently Russian generals negated the air superiority advantage by ordering their forces to remain within fifty yards of the Germans forcing them to fight house to house. Germans found artillery fire in the city to be disconcerting and shellbursts brought down both masonry and shrapnel. The Russians also did everything possible to maintain pressure and to stretch the Germans nerves:

“If only you could understand what terror is, a German soldier wrote in a letter captured by the Russians. At the slightest rustle, I pull the trigger and fire off tracer bullets in bursts from the machinegun. The compulsion to shoot at anything that moved at night, often setting off fusillades from equally nervous sentries down a whole sector, undoubtedly contributed to the German expenditure of over 25 million rounds during the month of September alone”.

The most gripping parts of the book are Beevor’s smooth and complementary choices of varied participant descriptions of the sights and sounds of the battle.

“The air is filled, wrote a panzer officer, with the infernal howling of diving Stukas, the thunder of flak and artillery, the roar of engines, the rattle of tank tracks, the shriek of the launcher and Stalin organ [Katyusha rocket launcher], the chatter of sub-machine guns back and forth, and all the time one feels the heat of a city burning at every point. The screams of the wounded affected men most”.

“Fighting in Stalingrad…represented a new form of warfare, concentrated in the ruins of civilian life. The detritus of war-burnt-out tanks, shell cases, signal wire and grenade boxes-was mixed with the wreckage of family homes-iron bedsteads, lamps and household utensils…German infantrymen loathed house-to-house fighting. They found such close-quarter combat, which broke conventional military boundaries and dimensions, psychologically disorienting… Often an enemy was unrecognizable, with every uniform impregnated by the same dun-colored dust.

“German generals do not seem to have imagined what awaited their divisions in the ruined city. They lost their great Blitzkrieg advantages and were in many ways thrown back to First World War techniques, even though their military theorists had argued that trench warfare had been an aberration in the art of war. The Sixth Army, for example, found itself having to respond to Soviet tactics by reinventing the ‘storm wedges’ introduced in January 1918: assault groups of ten men armed with a machinegun, light mortar and flame-throwers for clearing bunkers, cellars and sewers. “In its way, the fighting in Stalingrad was even more terrifying than the impersonal slaughter at Verdun. The close-quarter combat in ruined buildings, bunkers, cellars and sewers was soon dubbed “Rattenkrieg” [war of the rats] by German soldiers. It possessed a savage intimacy which appalled their generals who felt they were rapidly losing control over events. The enemy is invisible, wrote General Strecker to a friend. Ambushes out of basements, well remnants, hidden bunkers and factory ruins produce heavy casualties among our troops”.

When German tanks and infantry attacked together, they found themselves skirting strengthened buildings into channels that the Russians had mined. Then Russian trench mortars separated infantry from tanks, and the tanks were then attacked by dug-in camouflaged anti tank guns and T-34’s.

Above all, the Russians made Satlingrad a never ending, twenty-four hour a day battle. Besides the dusk and dawn attacks, Russians fired flares at odd intervals to suggest the possibility of additional attacks. Every night Russian aviators raided German strong points. Russian night bombers drew fire from numerous flak batteries, contributing to the din and the Germans’ nervousness, while small biplanes would approach, switch off their engines, and glide silently to their targets, further alarming the Wehrmacht. But as deadly as the aviators’ artillery spotters made life for the German, they were not the only threats from above. There were also the Russian snipers.

What Deevor calls “a new cult of ‘sniperism’” arose, with recognition and awards for “the largest number of Fritzes killed”. Upon reaching forty kills, the sniper would receive the For Bravery medal and the title “noble sniper”. Best known was Vasily Zaitsev with 149 kills. Sergeant Passar, a head shot specialist, had 103. Studentov was credited with 124, Ilin 185, Zikan 224. Anatoly Chekhov once bagged seventeen in two days; he was particularly skilled at hiding in the tops of tall buildings, where he employed a flash hider and tried to have a white wall behind him. At least two Soviet snipers used remotely operated flags or scarecrows to lure Germans into exposing themselves. If there was similar sniping activity on the German side, Beevor does not say so. His only mention of German sniping is to doubt the story of the confrontation between Zaitsev and the head of the German sniper school that served as a basis for the film Enemy at the Gates.

Beevor implies that it was during the battle for Satlingrad that Hilter lost most of his tenuous at best hold on reality, becoming increasingly lost in his maps and in making intuitive, grandiose plans for military units that no longer effectively existed. “Hilter’s notion of the power of the will had completely parted company with military logic. He was fixated upon the idea that if the Sixth Army ever withdrew from Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht would never return. He had sensed that his was the high-water mark of the Third Reich”. It was at this time that Hitler demanded that “Fortress Stalingrad” be held “whatever the circumstances.”

The remainder of the book, from the time Hitler ended any chance of a breakout, is a depressing, harrowing recital of the disintegration of Paulus’ Sixth Army. Some of the elements of this unraveling, upon which it is unnecessary to dwell in detail, include exhaustion of supplies, death by battle, death by starvation, death by freezing, death by disease, death by ill treatment, and cannibalism.

Unfortunately, the most interesting question of the Russo-German conflict is one that Beevor does not address in detail: the question of whether Hitler’s adherence to his allies, Japan and Italy, cost him victory in Russia.

It is well known that Hitler did not plan to fight the U.S. until 1944 or 1945, when he would have a Navy of 300 submarines and an impressive surface fleet. Yet he allowed himself to be finessed into declaring war on the U.S. four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by hints from the Japanese that if he did so, they would attack the Soviet Union from the Pacific side. This attack never occurred.

But it was the Italians who were much more of an impediment to German plans. Part of the reason Hitler was compelled to postpone his invasion of Russia from May 15 until June 21 was because of the need to extricate Mussolini from a series of ill advised adventures in quest of booty and territory. At the same time that Hitler was losing five critical weeks of good weather, his already under-supplied armed forces consumed prodigious quantities of supplies in aiding the Italians. Mussolini, who hoped to establish a second Roman Empire, had begun by attacking Ethiopia in 1935. This invasion was followed by similar forays into Albania in 1939 and Greece in 1940, but Italian failures caused Germany to have to attack the Greeks in late 1940 and the Yugoslavs in 1941 in order to rescue the Italians. Moreover, Italy’s loss to North Africa to Britain in January of 1941 brought Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Corps to the rescue the following month. Rommel’s success in January 1942 came from German command of the Mediterranean, resulting from air superiority gained by Luftwaffe units brought back from Russia. In mid-summer of 1941, the Afrika Corps alone required 40,000 to 50,000 tons of supplies per month, with additional quantities for the Italians. Germany continued to try to supply the Afrika Corps until Britain finally ended the struggle in North Africa in May of 1943, following the Battle of El Alamein. Compare this tonnage with the 700 tons per day (21,000 per month) that Beevor tells us Hitler wanted the Luftwaffe to supply to the Sixth Army to sustain it in the final days at Stalingrad. The supplies and transport which Germany squandered in the Balkans and North Africa, where Germany had almost no legitimate national interests, could easily have made the difference in Hiltler’s attempt to conquer Russia. A detailed consideration would have been most intriguing.

This book is likely to be among the best regarded treatments of this titanic struggle for some years. Readers should be aware that it stresses description over interpretation, but in description it is very good indeed, and it is heartily recommended.

By the late 1930’s, most militaries with anti-tank rifles in their inventory had discarded them as obsolete and ineffective. After all, most new tank designs included armor far too thick to be penetrated by a shoulder fired arm, they reasoned, so the weapon of choice for defense against tanks was to be field artillery. Notable exceptions were the 20mm class of cannons such as the Solothurn and the Lahti, and the 14.5mm Soviet rifles that are the subject of this article.

In November 1938, the Soviet Union was barely 20 years old. They were still having difficulties meeting the armament needs of a peacetime army that had far more manpower than arms. And there were strong indications war was coming. Recognizing these contradictory facts, the Artillery Committee of the RKKA Artillery Directorate issued a report that foresaw the probability their under-equipped army would eventually be forced to fight against tanks with only infantry. Further, they decided that the anti-tank rifle was the solution, and that it would be useful as an anti-material weapon as well.

Earlier that year, a suitable 14.5mm cartridge had been designed, featuring a 64 gram (986 grain) boat-tailed armor piercing incendiary bullet with hardened steel core. Muzzle velocity was 1000 meters per second (3280 fps). The design was finalized in 1940 and adopted as the “14.5mm cartridge with B-32 bullet”.

ore was now made of tungsten carbide. While the B-32 was designed to penetrate 20mm of light armor at ranges up to 500 meters at impact angles as great as 60 degrees (or 30 degrees off of perpendicular), the BS-41 could defeat armor as thick as 35-40mm at ranges less than 300 meters. Thus, until the later models of the German Pzkw IV were fielded, the Soviet 14.5mm anti-tank rifles were capable of defeating all known enemy armor within certain parameters.

The Rukavishnikov anti-tank rifle of 1939 was selected to fire the new 14.5mm cartridge though it was never made in quantity. This was due to several factors. First, the Soviets overestimated the thickness and quality of German armor. Second was their reluctance to divert resources away from the urgent production of other needed war materials such as the PPD submachine gun. Lastly it had been demonstrated that the Rukavishnikov design was too complicated to manufacture under wartime conditions given the state of the Soviet Union’s industrial base.

It did not take long for this decision to backfire for in July 1941 Stalin took a personal interest in the situation regarding Soviet infantry versus German tanks. When it was clear that the Rukavishnikov rifle was not fully developed and could not be placed into mass production soon enough, it was ordered that two of the Soviet Union’s most respected arms designers were to produce new designs as fast as possible. Using two different paths to completion, Vasiliy Degtyarev and Sergey Simonov reportedly fired the first shots from their respective designs in less than a month.

The PTRD-41

The PTRD 1941 (14.5mm protivotankovoe ruzhe sistemy Degtyareva, obr. 1941 g.) is a single shot rifle that looks minimalist in the extreme. Except for the pistol grip and the cheek and butt pads, it is made entirely of steel.

The shooter’s face and the sights are offset to the left. The reason for this is to keep the face clear of the recoiling parts, especially the bolt. For while the PTRD is single-shot, it operates somewhat on the long recoil system. Upon firing, the barrel and breech bolt recoil to the rear, during which the bolt handle rides up the inclined plane of a plate welded to the right side of the stock tube, unlocking the bolt. At that point, the bolt is retained in the rearward position and the barrel moves forward back into battery, extracting and ejecting the fired case leaving the rifle ready for the next round to be loaded and the bolt closed manually. This serves to both increase the rate of fire and ease the problem of difficult extraction common in rifles of this power. A skilled team of gunner and loader can achieve 8-10 rounds per minute with this action.

The PTRD weighs 17.3 kg (38lb 2oz) and is equipped with a carrying handle and a bipod. The breech is locked by a large but otherwise conventional twin-lugged bolt turned through 90 degrees. The barrel is 1227mm (48.3 in) in length and has eight grooves with right hand twist. The overall length is 2000mm (78.7 in). The tubular buttstock is spring loaded to assist the muzzle brake in absorbing the fierce recoil upon firing. The safety is applied by pulling the hook shaped protrusion from the rear of the bolt and turning it 90 degrees, similar in practice to the safety on the Moisin-Nagant rifle.

One of the greatest advantages to the PTRD’s success was the simple manufacturing technology required to mass-produce it. Almost the entire gun could be turned out on lathes, with over 17,000 being produced before the end of 1941 alone.

The PTRS-41

Simonov used his auto-loading rifle design of 1938 as the basis for the PTRS 1941 (14.5mm protivotankovoe ruzhe sistemy Simonova, obr. 1941 g.), though the family resemblance is even stronger with the later SKS-45 including the fixed box magazine. A departure of interest is that the PTRS is loaded by inserting a five round clip of ammo much like an oversized M1 Garand.

Locking of the breech is by a tilting bolt that is similar to the previously mentioned SKS or the FN FAL. The semi-automatic mechanism is conventional with a gas piston operating on a bolt carrier. The safety is on the right side of the receiver. Like the PTRD, the PTRS is equipped with a bipod and carrying handle. It can also be taken down to allow transport by two men.

The barrel is 1220mm (48.0 in.) long and overall length is 2134mm (86.61 in.). It is also heavier than the PTRD at 20.86kg (46lb 3oz). Its performance is the same as that of the PTRD, though the Soviets were hoping for an advantage over the single shot due to its self-loading capability. Instead, the PTRS was not quite as robust as the simpler gun, and the increased weight and length also hampered it in combat.

In Use

Tanks in WWII were not as tightly packaged as today, and while the 14.5mm cartridge was generally capable of piercing the armor of many of the tanks it faced, often the bullet just sailed right on through, missing anything that would disable the tank, like main gun ammunition or one of the crew members. It was not unusual to find a German tank after a battle with as many as a dozen or more holes in the armor as Soviet infantry anti-tank rifle teams did their jobs. By mid-1943, though, both rifles were already proving less effective against the latest German tanks and were soon relegated to anti-material duty. Sometimes brave souls would try to use one in an anti-aircraft role.

Other Notes

Production of both rifles ended in 1945. They were often deployed in platoon and even company strength. The PTRS was sometimes encountered mounted on lend-lease Universal (Bren) Carriers. A common complaint with both rifles was that the muzzle brake caused excessive blast to be directed against the shooter.

The Germans thought highly enough of both designs that when captured with ammunition in sufficient quantities, they re-issued the guns to their own troops. The PTRD was known as the 14.5mm PaB 783 (r), and the PTRS was the 14.5mm PaB 784 (r).

After the War

Some sources indicate the PTRS was used in small quantities in Korea. The PTRD were fitted with telescopic sights and used as long range sniper rifles during the Korean War. Effective range when used in this role was about 1500 meters, and there was still substantial power in the projectile at that range. The PTRD was also reported to be in frontline service in Albania as recently as the 1980’s.

The 14.5mm cartridge itself gained a new lease on life in 1949 with the Soviet adoption of the Vladimirov KPV heavy machine gun, usually seen on Tanks, APVs and in twin and quad mounts.

Today

At the April 2002 Knob Creek shoot, there was only one 14.5mm rifle for sale; the PTRS pictured from Ohio Ordnance, though it was expected that the PTRD would have been more prevalent. Clips for loading the PTRS were unavailable. In original configuration, either rifle is classed as a Destructive Device due to the over 1/2 inch bore size. Over the years, many of these, especially the PTRD, were converted to .50 BMG. Reloaded 14.5mm “practice” ammo with a turned brass bullet is available from Big Sky Surplus. They also have dies for resizing as well as other components and information for these monsters.

Designed during a dark moment for the Soviet Union during WWII and likely the largest “small arms” round ever to be fielded, the 14.5mm cartridge along with the PTRD and PTRS anti-tank rifles, performed as planned and gave the under-equipped Soviet infantryman a fighting chance against German armor. Though the rifles were mostly obsolete by the end of the war, the cartridge itself soldiers on to this day.

Dan’s note: The KP/KT 14.5mm ammunition in use today in many countries is significantly “Hotter” than these old warhorses were designed for. We strongly suggest that latter date 14.5mm ammunition shooters pay very close attention to signs of possible headspace opening up- look for evidence of strain on the fired cases. If you start experiencing case separations, it is time to take a closer look. Safety first, of course.

When one thinks of Second World War in Europe, one often thinks of the Italian Campaign, Normandy, and the Battle of the Bulge. When one goes deeper, one begins to view the enormity of the War, particularly in the East. In the East one finds Operation Barbarosa, German troops at the outskirts of Moscow, the Kirsk salient, and most of all the Siege of Stalingrad.

As her conquests and alliances grew in 1939 and 1940, Germany needed oil. Rejecting Rommel’s plan of taking the oil fields of the Middle East, Hitler chose to conquer his ally’s oil fields in the Ukraine and southern Russia. In 1941 he launched Operation Barbarosa, the invasion of Russia. By mid 1942, the German Army Group Bua stood poised before Stalingrad, the sprawling city of 500,000 on the eastern edge of the Volga River.

With the outbreak of war in 1941, the Russians possessed only two advantages — the differing gauge of their railroad tracks and the vastness of their country. That first summer the Russians stood and fought. The Russian stands resulted in slaughter or capture by the better equipped and better manned German Armies. By the next summer, the Russians fought the Germans by day and stole away by night. The farther the Russians retreated the longer the German supply lines became. German trains could not run on Russian tracks. This disparity forced the Germans to off load every supply train at the Russian border and to reload their supplies onto a Russian gauge train. The Russian gauge train then would be forced to haul the German supplies to ever lengthening destinations. The Russians had slowed the German’s advances but had not beaten them yet. Then came Stalingrad.

The Small Story Within The Big One

For those who wish the full sweep of the story, this writer strongly recommends ‘Enemy At The Gates — The Battle for Stalingrad’ by the distinguished scholar Mr. William Craig. This fine book captures the sweep and the tragedy of the turning point in the East. Within this wonderful book one also finds the accounts of Soviet sniper Vassili Zaitsev and the German sniper instructor Major Konig (or Konings). This intriguing story became the basis for the wonderful motion picture.

Vassili Zaitsev came to earth to poor parents in the Urals. When Russia needed men to fight the Germans, Zaitsev joined with millions of others. Early on, Vassili Zaitsev distinguished himself with extremely accurate long distance shooting. He became a sniper. In the looming days of the war, his battlefield work attracted the attention of propagandist and political officer Danilov. Danilov began to publicize the record of Zaitsev and increased it during the Siege of Stalingrad.

Major Konig, an instructor at the sniper school outside Berlin, did not see the humor in Danilov’s reports. He picked up his rifle and went to Stalingrad to hunt Vassili Zaitsev. Zaitsev romances fellow sniper Tania while subjecting the Germans to one shot kills. More than two million men and women fought over the turf of Stalingrad. The fight between Konig and Zaitsev came down to the sun and one shot fired by each in the late afternoon. In its way, this fight between these two men symbolizes the Siege of Stalingrad. History today questions the existence of some aspects of this battle within a battle, even to whether Major Konig existed, but the symbolism and legend lives on. In a greater sense, the fight between these two men points out the closeness of the victory at Stalingrad.

With the German armies converging on Stalingrad, Joseph Stalin drew the line. He ordered the Russian Army to hold Stalingrad at any and all costs. A semi-literate ex-coal miner turned party official named Nikita Sergeeyvich Khrushchev took up the challenge. Many citizens fled. Many others died. At the end of the siege in February of 1943, 1515 of the 500,000 pre-war citizens remained alive. The death toll on the Axis side totaled more than 800,000. Estimates of Soviet losses exceed 1,100,000. Two Panzer Armies ceased to exist. General von Paulus and more than 100,000 of his soldiers marched into Soviet prison camps. A little over 5,000 of them would survive the war. The defense of Stalingrad had stopped the German advance. From that point on the Volga in February 1943, the Russians took the offensive.

Mr. Godard and Mr. Annaud

Screenwriters get ideas from many places. The best two places prove to be either from thin air or from books. About seven years ago Alain Godard read William Craig’s wonderful book ‘Enemy At The Gates’. Within the pages, Mr. Godard became intrigued with the stories about Vassili Zaitsev. He sensed the makings of a wonderful film. Mr. Godard took his ideas and a copy of the book to the esteemed director Jean-Jacques Annaud. At their first meeting, Mr. Annuad had the same feeling about the material.

Their research lead them eastward to Germany, Moscow, and Volgagrad (Stalingrad). In Volgagrad they found Vassili Zaitsev’s rifle proudly on permanent exhibit at the Historical Museum. In Moscow they found the telescopic sight from Konings’ rifle displayed at the Armed Forces Museum. Today in Volgagrad one can find Vassili Zaitsev’s likeness standing the tallest in the enormous bas-relief of the battle.

Mr. Annaud and Mr. Godard spoke with veterans of the battle in both Russia and Germany. They examined the Russian newspaper accounts of Vassili Zaitsev. In Germany they found no record of Major Konig (more on this later). Both men viewed the lack of Konig information not as a stumbling block but as a launching pad. They would tell a classic story as best they knew it. They would tell an intimate story against the backdrop of a battle as large as Stalingrad. Mr. Annaud stated it succinctly: ‘We have taken an historical event and tried to understand what happened in the hearts of the people who lived through it.’

After months of script work, Mr. Annaud along with Production designer Wolf Kroeger (whose fine work includes ‘The Last of the Mohicans’) and producer John D. Schofield (whose work includes ‘As Good As It Gets’ and ‘Jerry McGuire’) went on a country by country search for locations throughout eastern Europe. Mr. Schofield worked closely with executive producer Ms. Alisa Tager. In eastern Germany, they found the locations for the massive shoot. Open pit mines near the Polish border, a huge dilapidated military barracks in Krampnitz, and a crumbling factory in Rudersdorf served as stand-ins for the war torn Stalingrad.

During the four months that the production crew built the sets, Mr. Annaud worked south of Brandenburg. In the town of Pritzen he supervised 300 crew and 600 extras filming the evacuation of Stalingrad. Back at the other sets, Ms. Janty Yates (whose credits include ‘Quest For Fire’ and ‘Gladiator’) moved with her customary efficiency. She created 17,000 uniforms in green and ‘mouse gray’ (see SAR Feb 00). Ms. Yates then weathered each uniform to look as if it had withstood months of combat. Ms. Janty Yates fitted every actor and stunt man with a custom fitted combat uniform.

While the uniforms reached completion, stunt coordinator Jim Dowdall began training two armies. He brought with him his experiences as armorer on The Dirty Dozen and Where Eagles Dare. His stunt work includes driving the lead tank in the climactic scenes of Saving Private Ryan (see SAR Oct 99). He trained the 17,000 volunteers to work as opposing armies. Many had no experience with weapons but all stood eager to learn. Mr. Dowdall also trained the actors. He started with drill and continued with rifle craft. After the initial training Jim Dowdall coordinated with director of photography Robert Fraisse. Mr. Fraisse’s credits include Ronin and Keys to Tulsa. Together Jim Dowdall and Robert Fraisse laid out a very rich pallet from which Mr. Annaud could work.

Lights, Camera, Action

After the screenplay is written, the motion picture becomes the director’s medium. Academy Award winning director Jean-Jacques Annaud co-wrote the screenplay. His talented staff laid out a rich pallet. The director picked a wonderful cast. Then Mr. Annaud put paint to canvass. He did so with a feeling that reminds one of the delicate stokes of Vincent Van Gogh. In this motion picture, one will view the death struggle for Stalingrad like the impressionistic views of the fields of Arles.

Mr. Annaud cast Joseph Fiennes, Jude Law, and Rachael Weisz in the roles of Danilov, Zaitzev, and Tania. Joseph Fiennes triumphed in ‘Shakespeare in Love’. When Mr. Annaud viewed Mr. Law in some early rushes of ‘The Talented Mr. Ripley’ he knew that he had his Vassili Zaitsev. Jim Dowdall taught all principals to handle the rifles in excellent fashion. Though both men took to the rifle very quickly, Rachael Weisz proved to be the quickest of all. Ms. Weisz had witnessed fine gun handling opposite Brendon Frasier in ‘The Mummy’. Ms. Weisz took the wonderful role of Tania Chernova, the comely student of Zaitzev and a fine sniper in her own right. Jim Dowdall simply said of Rachael Weisz’s gun handling, ‘She was brilliant.’

Mr. Annaud had only one actor in mind for the role of Major Konings — Academy Award nominee Ed Harris. Mr. Harris has thrilled audiences for years in films like Michael Bay’s ‘The Rock’ with Nicolas Cage and Sean Connery; Clint Eastwood’s “Absolute Power’; and his truly amazing performance opposite Sean Penn in the classic film ‘State of Grace’. Ed Harris did not need instruction in gun handling. He showed up on set ramrod straight holding his rifle like a Prussian sharpshooter. Many people on the set commented on Mr. Harris’s use of his eyes during the filming. One may view what the film talked about in a photograph that accompanies this article. This writer has viewed that look before, not in the eyes of actors, but in the eyes of a rare type of long distance shooter. Many actors instinctively know what they are looking at.

Bob Hoskins brought his special talent to the role of Nikita Krushchev. Viewed in films from his Academy Award nominated role in ‘Mona Lisa’ to his comedic brilliance in ‘Who Framed Roger Rabbit’, Mr. Hoskins seemed destined to play the top political commissar of Stalingrad. Ron Perlman won the coveted role of Nikolai Kulikov, the rifle wielding sniper and born killer of Stalingrad. Few can forget Ron Perlman’s performances in ‘Quest For Fire’ and ‘The Name of the Rose’. Mr. Perlman brings his consummate talent to the role of Vassili Zaitsev’s close friend. Also in the film one will view Gabriel Marshall-Thomson as Sacha and Eva Mattes as Mother Filipov. Matthias Habich well plays the role of the doomed General Frederich von Paulus.

Parting Thoughts

Many of our readers know of Vassili Zaitsev and Major Konig. Konig’s school existed in East Germany, outside Berlin. The story that we know comes from the Soviet perspective. Jean-Jacques Annaud found no evidence of Major Konig in Berlin. This does not say that Konig did not exist. This merely says ‘no evidence’. Mr. Annaud based this motion picture on the best evidence that he had at his disposal.

The readers of this magazine do not sleep at the wheel. Since the writing of William Craig’s book, Germany has reunited and the Soviet Union is no more. As you read this, this story carries the label ‘Soviet propoganda’. No doubt exists that Tania and Vassili were and are genuine heros of Stalingrad and The Great Patriotic War. Perhaps one of our readers in Germany or Russia has documentation on Major Konig (or Konings). If so and if this person wishes, this magazine would like to hear from you.

Against the background of the Siege of Stalingrad we view a love story and a hunt for the assassin who hunts the lovers. Mr. Annaud used 17,000 extras and five European locations to film his scenes. To tell the story of Stalingrad, Mr. Annaud enlisted a rock solid cast and a crew of consummate professionals. Those of our readers who are ‘out and about’ may wish to purchase this motion picture on VHS or CD. Don’t miss ‘Enemy At The Gates’.

Acknowledgements:

This writer offers thanks to the many people who asisted in this article, especially Ms. Carolyn Sloss of Allied Advertising in Atlanta, Georgia — press reperesentatives for ‘Enemy At The Gates’. This writer also wishes to thank Mr. Ed Harris and his agents in California. On a personal note, some years ago Mr. Harris, along with the equally gracious Mr. Dennis Hopper, made the film Parris Trout two blocks from this writer’s house. We continue to wish this most accomplished actor the best of success.

Credits:

Ms. Carolyn Sloss, Allied Advertising, 1770 Century CIR — Suite 122, Atlanta, GA 30345 404-633-1739
Mr. Meredith Brosnan, Sovfoto/Eastfoto Agency, 48 W 21st ST — 11th Fl, New York, NY 10010 212-727-8170

Specifications for the M 1944 Carbine

Weight: 8.9 pounds
Caliber: 7.62 x 54 mm Russian
Length: 40 inches
Barrel length: 20 inches
Magazine capacity: 5 rounds

By Robert Bruce

“The Great Patriotic War” is what the people of Russia and other countries once known as the Soviet Union call WWII. In a monumental struggle against the Blitzkrieg of Hitler’s invasion in June of 1941, incomprehensible numbers of both Red Army soldiers and ordinary civilians perished in the first year alone. Even more suffered horribly from starvation, disease and exposure in the wake of Stalin’s cynically calculated scorched earth policy as everything of possible use to the advancing Germans was carried away or destroyed in place.

Despite terrible hardships the ordinary Soviet soldier and partisan fought on with courage and determination. Often going into combat without enough weapons to go around and severe shortages of ammunition, these tough men and women were rarely known to falter. While cynics may point out that death in battle was much less certain for them than execution by Stalin’s NKVD secret police goons should retreat be even contemplated, they finally stopped the Germans on the outskirts of Moscow a year later. This marked the turning point of the war in the East and the Red Army began taking the offensive.

The epic siege battle of Stalingrad followed, beginning in the scorching heat of August and ending months later in the bitter cold of 2 February 1943. Artillery barrages by an estimated 25,000 guns on both sides in the early weeks of the siege quickly reduced Stalingrad’s major structures to piles of brick, stone and concrete. This bleak and ragged battlefield provided innumerable pockets of shelter for soldiers as they fought at close range in “a bloody, relentless struggle in which single blocks and buildings became major military objectives and in which the opponents often occupied parts of the same building….”

Soon completely encircled by the enemy and unable to be adequately resupplied by air, it was time for German Sixth Army invaders to suffer as graphically described in the US Army’s official history, STALINGRAD TO BERLIN:

“As the front fell back from the west, the inner city, which after months of bombardment had the appearance of a landscape in Hell, became a scene of fantastic horror. Sixth Army reported 20,000 uncared-for wounded and an equal number of starving, freezing, unarmed stragglers. As many as could took shelter in the basements of the ruins where the tons of rubble overhead provided protection against the constant rain of artillery shells. There, in the darkness and cold, the sick, the mad, the dead, and the dying crowded together, those who could move not daring to for fear of losing their places.”

Following the death or capture of over 200,000 men in the Stalingrad pocket, the Germans began a slow, agonizing withdrawal back toward the Fatherland. Relentlessly pushed by ever-growing numbers of Soviets armed and equipped with fresh new tanks, artillery and other weapons from both American Lend-Lease as well as their own factories, Hitler’s Ostfront warriors could do no more than postpone the inevitable. Exactly 27 months after General Strecker surrendered XI Corps at Stalingrad’s famous Tractor Works, the German capitol city of Berlin fell to an unstoppable Red Army.

Hard Men With Tough Weapons

The weapons, particularly small arms, used by the combatants at Stalingrad were essentially the same for the whole course of the war. Their pistols, submachine guns, rifles, light and heavy machine guns, grenades, mines, mortars and the like were sturdy and effective in the hands of determined soldiers. For the Red Army, the emphasis was on production of existing designs with little time or industrial capacity to spare for improvement or innovation.

This photo gallery shows many of the most common types in use by the Soviets and Germans during the war. Most come from the collection of the incomparable Ordnance Corps Colonel J. B. Jarrett, a leader in U. S. Army small arms development in WWII. Colonel Jarrett’s intense personal and professional interest in soldiers and their weaponry led to his acquisition of large numbers of wartime photos from all battlefronts and from many sources. When he died, this immensely valuable resource was rescued from oblivion by another giant in the field of small arms history, Mr. Thomas B. Nelson.

Nelson, one of the driving forces behind the legendary INTERARMCO and later COLLECTOR’S ARMOURY, went on to collaborate in the writing and publishing of an encyclopedic series of extraordinary small arms books. These include THE WORLD’S SUBMACHINE GUNS and companion volumes on machine pistols, assault rifles, fighting shotguns, as well as GERMAN MACHINEGUNS. We are deeply indebted to Mr. Nelson, along with caretakers at the National Archives, Center for Military History and other sources, for allowing complete access to their holdings so that SAR could bring the powerful images seen here to light once again.

While a few of these pictures are identified as having been taken at Stalingrad, most were shot elsewhere. All are typical of the men and weapons of this pivotal struggle and are included as a tribute to the courage and superhuman endurance of infantrymen of both mighty nations who fought to the death at Stalingrad and countless other cities from Moscow to Berlin.

The caliber of the new pistol has been subject to discussion. The service handgun at the time was a .30 caliber, and not a very strong one. The concept that the caliber was selected so that the same machinery could be used to rifle both pistol and rifle barrels is unlikely. It’s more plausible that the popularity of the Mauser pistol and stores of 7.63mm Mauser ammunition made the adoption of the Tokarev in caliber 7.62mm more acceptable. The Tokarev shot flat at longer range than the 7.63mm Mauser round and had plenty of penetration against soldier’s web gear. It would eventually prove an acceptable submachinegun cartridge.

The TT33 has always been given high marks for reliability and handling in service. The Soviets and most other Europeans regarded the pistol as a badge of office, used to direct troops and for personal protection. The Tokarev was as good as any. Only the High Power and the M1911 were superior among World-War-II service handguns. The TT33 gave good service during the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat of the Third Reich, Soviet satellite nations produced the pistol. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and China produced the Tokarev in substantial numbers. When Egypt was in the thrall of the Soviets, the Tokegypt was manufactured in the old United Arab Republic. This pistol was exported as the Firebird. This pistol was a favorite of the Soviet sponsored terrorist band known as Baader Meinhoff. Carlos the Jackal preferred the CZ 52, but this German based gang preferred the 9x19mm Parabellum Tokarev.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the old Evil Empire was hungry for cash. The Chinese followed suit as each exported great quantities of pistols. Some are old, many unissued, and numerous special variants exist. I have seen a Chinese produced variant with a high capacity magazine. The most common modifiction, other than the simple rebarreling to 9x19mm Parabellum caliber, is the concession to the US ATF point system. Intended to preclude the importation of crude ‘Saturday Night Specials’, these points are given for each step toward becoming a ‘respectable’ handgun. Sights, safety, grips and other add-ons are graded. The Tokarev has been fitted with target grips, but most modifications are limited to the addition of a safety. These safeties can be found just behind the trigger guard or just at the rear of the frame. They lock either the trigger or the hammer. The version tested for this report featured a hammer blocking safety which moves in the opposite direction of the usual Browning safety. How does the Tokarev shoot? I selected a like new example in 9x19mm Parbellum for evaluation. The pistol was in excellent condition. Fit and finish were not up to the pistols I saw brought back from Vietnam, but it was more than acceptable. The pistol was purchased for less than $150. My RCBS trigger gauge showed that trigger compression broke at 6 pounds. The sights are large and easily acquired quickly.

I have fired the original type Tokarev and expected no surprises. I had found the pistol in its original caliber fed reliably, ven with handloaded soft point ammunition. I selected a number of full metal jacket rounds for this test firing session, and a number of hollowpoints. Some of these hollowpoints featured a rounded bullet oglive which has always fed in military 9mm pistols, even the Luger. The Tokarev would prove more difficult. I lightly lubricated the pistol with Birchwood Casey gun oil and began an evaluation. The initial rounds were Wolff surplus ammunition, in keeping with the budget theme of this pistol. There were no failures to feed, chamber, fire or eject. I found the Tokarev comfortable to fire. The grip is slim and rounded, with no sharp corners. The pistol is heavy enough for a 9mm, and the pistol simply does not kick very much. Muzzle flip was light. The sights were well regulated for ball ammunition.

The Wolff ammunition was a surprise, more than worth its modest price. However, I was disappointed that the pistol would not feed hollowpoint ammunition. Even a special full metal jacket bullet, designed to expand, would not feed. It had a slight dimple in the nose. I sacrificed a magazine of my Lapua CEPP anti terrorist loads. The first bullet hung on the feed ramp. I hand fed this round. It fired and the others all fed, but this could not be counted on. Mark the Tokarev as suitable only for ball ammunition. I have polished and radiused the feed ramp on many 1911’s and could do the same on this pistol, but this is not something the average purchaser of an inexpensive pistol would wish to do.

As for accuracy, I fired several three inch seventy foot groups from the bench rest with Black Hills 124-grain ammunition. The heavy trigger was easy to manage off the bench. I would not expect I could do the same with only my arms as a platform. Just the same, the Tokarev handled smartly in combat drills. It was fast on target with little muzzle flip. It was easy to put a magazine in the X ring to ten yards. The Tokarev is easily reloaded in Browning/Colt fashion. As a must-have addition to the armory of the collector of military handguns, this gun is interesting and worthwhile. It can be fired safely and accurately and is pleasant to fire. It would not be a bad choice for introducing any shooter to center fire semi automatic handguns. As a defense gun, there are much better choices available for a few more dollars. The inefficient safety and an inability to feed hollowpoint ammunition make the 9mm Tokarev a poor choice for defense. Just the same, it is reliable and handles quickly. This is an interesting handgun well worth consideration by the handgun enthusiast of historical or practical bent.

By David M. Fortier

Since the Communists came to power Chinese small arms development has always been “A riddle wrapped in a mystery behind the Bamboo Curtain”. All we in the West suspected was that the Chinese military was mostly armed with domestic copies of various obsolete Soviet designs. While there is truth in this, the rest of it may surprise you. The Chinese began extensive research and development on domestic designs as early as 1958. This led to the 1st (Type 63 and Type 74) and then 2nd (Type 81 and Type 87) generations of Chinese small arms. In the last 20 years, especially since the Open Door policy, China has made significant progress in small arms development. This has culminated in the design and adoption of their unique 5.8x42mm weapons complex. A system, they claim, that outperforms both the current NATO 5.56×45 SS109 and Russian 5.45×39 7N6 cartridges.

China historically had relied on foreign designed weapons to equip her vast armed forces. Germany in particular was a major player in China from the turn of the century until signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Imperial Japan in 1937. After 1937 another country’s influence was strongly felt in China, that of the Soviet Union. As early as 1932 the Soviets began supplying weapons to the Communist forces in China. Over time this aid greatly expanded. However, relations began to sour between the Chinese and Soviets after the Korean War and took a nose dive after Khrushchev came to power.

Using their experience with the Soviet designs, the Chinese undertook extensive research and development work beginning in 1958 to improve their small arms. It was based on their combat experience with full power battle rifle cartridges, as well as the less powerful 6.5 Arisaka and 7.62×25 sub-machineguns. They recognized the potential of the new intermediate 7.62×39 cartridge and admired the reliability of the Kalashnikov design. However they were not impressed by the AK-47’s accuracy or ergonomics. To fit their tactical needs they wanted a rifle as reliable as the Kalashnikov but with increased accuracy. It was intended to be used primarily in the semi-automatic mode for ammunition conservation. They also felt it must be useful with a bayonet for hand to hand combat. This was due to their doctrine calling for fighting very close to an opponent to negate his superiority in artillery or air support.

The result of their efforts was a weapon that outwardly resembled the Soviet SKS-45 carbine. Internally however it was quite different from Simonov’s design. It was adopted for service in 1963 and designated simply Type 63. The Type 63 rifle (incorrectly identified in the West as the Type 68) and the Type 74 Squad Auto represent the First Generation of domestically designed Chinese small arms. Not a battle rifle nor true assault rifle, it was outclassed by the M-16 during combat operations in Vietnam. It remained in service up until approximately 1974.

Seeing the changes in modern warfare, the Chinese went back to the drawing board. The Second Generation of Chinese small arms is seen in the Type 81 weapons series. The goal of the design team of the Type 81 rifle was to provide a modern assault rifle with the reliability of the Kalashnikov but with superior accuracy and ergonomics. After studying in detail the Soviet SVD Dragunov sniper rifle (Chinese Type 79) the Chinese came away quite impressed with its system of operation. They eventually used a modified short stroke gas system and a bolt/carrier system gleaned from it. It should be remembered however that the bolt/carrier system of the SVD is itself derived from the Kalashnikov. The culmination of their work was a rugged and reliable rifle with a few features not offered on the Kalashnikov. Unlike the AK-47/AKM the Type 81 features a bolt holdopen, a selector lever accessible by the operator’s thumb, an integral capacity to launch rifle grenades, and an adjustable gas system. The Type 81 weapons series includes the standard rifle weighing 7.49 lbs, a 7.7 lbs folding stock model, and an 11.4-pound squad auto. These three weapons maintain a high degree of interchangability with 64 parts common between them. Overall they are a well thought out and reliable design chambered for the venerable 7.62×39 cartridge.

However just as the Chinese were quick to appreciate the 7.62×39 intermediate cartridge they were also quick to take notice of the 5.56×45. As soon as the M-16 rifle appeared in Vietnam, the Chinese noted the advantages of the 5.56×45 cartridge. They appreciated that it allowed a compact and lightweight weapon, produced a low recoil impulse, was controllable on full auto, and allowed a larger basic load of ammunition and supplementary equipment. This increased a soldier’s survivability on the battlefield. What the Chinese were not impressed with was the reliability of the M-16 rifle itself, compared to their experiences with the AK-47.

Noting the advantages of the small, high velocity round, they began extensive research and theoretical studies based on their combat observations of the war in Vietnam. Their goal was no simple one. They desired to find the ideal caliber to satisfy the Chinese military requirements for use in assault rifles out to medium ranges (400m) as well as in the supporting role of a machinegun (up to 1000m). Their intention was not just to build a series of weapons based on an existing cartridge but rather to build a weapons complex using the ideal cartridge. This “Universal caliber” had always been a Holy Grail for which many have sought but none had found.

After extensive calculations they concluded that the ideal caliber would be 5.8mm, 6mm, or 6.2mm. They then designed a vast assortment of prototype cartridges for use in comparison testing. This is similar to our own SAW project which tested over 1000 configurations in calibers ranging from 5.56 to 7.62. Our final result was the 6x45mm SAW round which was never adopted due to logistical reasons. This shows that the U.S. and Chinese designers came to a similar conclusion as to the ideal caliber. Based on their test results the Chinese came to the final conclusion that the 5.8mm best fit their needs. The result is their new small caliber, high velocity 5.8x42mm cartridge. Designed from the ground up to fit the needs of their weapons complex, this cartridge is produced in 3 different ball loadings: a standard loading for use in assault rifles, a heavy projectile loading for use in their GPMG, and a specialty loading for use in sniper rifles.

The standard loading features a 64-grain FMJBT projectile with a 22.6-grain AP core loaded into a copper washed steel case. The overall cartridge length is 58mm, case length is 42.2mm, and the projectile is 24.2mm long. The cartridge case somewhat resembles the Russian 5.45×39 in that it is tapered; however, the case neck is shorter. It bears no outward resemblance to the 5.56×45. While straightwall cases like the 5.56 are inherently more accurate, tapered cases aid feeding and extraction. The projectile also exhibits a substantial sectional density, although not as great as that of the 5.45×39. Muzzle velocity from the Type 95’s 18.2-inch barrel is 3,050 fps. Out of the Type 95 Squad Auto’s 21.9-inch barrel it clocks 3,182 fps. The Chinese have tested their new cartridge extensively against both the 5.56×45 SS109 and the Russian 5.45×39 7N6. They claim their 5.8x42mm outperforms both cartridges with penetration superior to the SS109, a flatter trajectory, and a higher retained velocity and energy downrange.

Although the Chinese had developed their ideal cartridge they still had one major hurdle to overcome, the Chinese military. During the last Sino-Japanese war the Chinese had made extensive use of captured 6.5 Arisaka rifles and machineguns. From their combat experience they felt that this cartridge performed poorly, lacking penetration and killing power. They felt this was especially true when it was used from machinguns firing at long range. Recent combat experience, on the other hand, had proven the effectiveness of 7.62×39 assault rifles and 7.62x54R GPMG’s and sniper rifles. Due to this the Chinese military wanted nothing to do with a small caliber cartridge intended for use in machineguns as well as rifles.

So in order to convince the military, the Chinese Armament Bureau produced a quantity of transitional 5.8×42 assault rifles. These were based upon the Type 81 and were designated the Type 87. They were then submitted to the military for extensive testing and field trials against the existing 7.62×39 weapons. During these trials the 5.8×42 weapons outperformed the 7.62×39 weapons in every way. They proved superior enough for the Chinese military to adopt the new cartridge for use in the next generation of Chinese small arms.

With the problem of a suitable cartridge out of the way, during the late 1980’s the Chinese set to work designing the weapons to use it. The result of their work is not just a new assault rifle but an entire weapons complex. This includes an assault rifle (Type 95), Light Squad Auto (Type 95), Sniper rifle (Type KBU88), and surprisingly, a belt fed GPMG (Type QJY88). Obviously following the current trend in small arms development, they chose to use the bullpup configuration (except for the GPMG).

I was told that in designing the Type 95 they again took a long hard look at the SVD Dragunov design. This can be seen in the Type 95’s 3 lug rotating bolt, carrier, and adjustable short stroke piston gas system which is similar conceptually to the SVD’s. The main features of these new weapons are their extensive use of high tensile aluminum and modern high impact synthetic materials coupled with improved human engineering. In addition they feature cold hammer forged barrels for superior accuracy. The design emphasizes keeping as close as possible the distance between:

1. The center of gravity of the whole weapon and the center of gravity of the axis of the barrel.
2. The center of gravity of the bolt assembly and the axis of the gas piston.
3. The center of gravity of the barrel and the axis of the gas tube.
4. The center of gravity of the bolt carrier and the center of gravity of the whole gun.

They state, “This design brings a combined effect of compact structure, minimizing the supplementary force of inertia, ensuring a stable and smooth movement of the bolt carrier, minimizing the overall weight of the rifle, increasing shooting accuracy, and promoting reliability.” It is also interesting to note that they claim a reliability rate equal to that of the Kalashnikov. That in and of itself would be quite a feat.

These weapons were designed to use the following accessories:

1. Fixed or variable power telescopic sights with quick detachable mount.
2. Their latest star light night vision scope with quick detachable mount.
3. Quick detachable 35mm grenade launcher that mounts to the forend.
4. Multi-purpose bayonet which can be used as a bayonet, field knife, wire cutter, or a dagger.

While I personally do not care for bullpup style rifles, the Type 95 appears ergonomic and well balanced. The rear sight is mounted on an M-16 style carrying handle, which also accepts optical sights. The front sight assembly reminds one of the familiar AK unit. The charging handle is located inside the carrying handle, AR-10 style, and is ambidextrous. Feed is from 30 round synthetic magazines. The Type 95 Squad Auto shares the same bolt assembly, trigger assembly, upper and lower receiver, and magazines with the rifle. For its fire support role it’s equipped with a longer, heavier barrel to which a bipod is directly mounted. To increase its practical rate of fire, 75 round drum magazines are issued for it, although the standard 30 rounders will also work. In my experience Chinese drums are usually quite noisy though, as they allow the rounds to slap back and forth. Weighing in at just 8.7 lbs it is more of a machine-rifle, along the lines of the L86A1 British Light Support Weapon, rather than like our own M249 SAW.

For reaching out and touching someone, there is the KBU88 sniper rifle. It’s equipped with a 25.1” hammer forged barrel, and the carrying handle has been replaced with a 3-9x variable telescope. The optics feature an illuminated reticle with aiming holdover points in 100 meter increments. Fold down backup iron sights are also provided. An integral folding bipod, with legs individually adjustable for height, is attached to the barrel just in front of the handguard. Feed is from 20 or 30 round magazines. When tested against the Type 85 7.62x54R sniper rifle (SVD Dragunov) the KBU88 outperformed it in accuracy, higher hit probability at long range, was quicker to get into action, had less recoil, had a larger ammunition load capacity, and was lighter in weight -thus increasing the mobility of the sniper. We would consider it a Designated Marksman’s Rifle, rather than a true sniper rifle. In this role it would prove quite useful on the modern battlefield.

The latest member of the 5.8mm family is the QJY88 GPMG. This project began in July 1989 and after extensive testing in freezing cold, hot desert, windy, and sandy conditions to eliminate defects, it was formally adopted in July 1999. Feed is from 200 round belts. The feedway is equipped with 3 rollers, and the feeding pawl also has a roller, to minimize friction during feeding and to aid reliability. It’s equipped with a bipod for use in the LMG role but can also be tripod mounted for sustained fire use. The tripod is equipped with a recoil-absorbing device to enhance accuracy and quickly converts for A.A. use. For long service life the core of the barrel is hardened more than the rest during heat treating. Also a special pattern of rifling is used and the chrome plating carefully kept to .18-.28mm to increase barrel service life. The Chinese claim it to be very simple, reliable, and mobile due to its light weight, coupled with long range and a high hit probability.

So the question is, exactly how well does this new Chinese 5.8×42 round stack up against our 5.56×45 and the Russian 5.45×39? The Chinese have tested their new cartridge extensively against both the 5.56×45 SS109 and the Russian 5.45×39 7N6. They claim their 5.8x42mm outperforms both cartridges with penetration superior to the SS109, a flatter trajectory, and a higher retained velocity and energy downrange. I was recently able to get my hands on some documents containing some of their test results. Testing was conducted using a 5.45×39 AK-74 and 7N6 ball ammunition, a 5.56×45 FNC and SS109 ball and P112 AP, and a Type 95 with 5.8×42 ball. Accuracy testing was conducted out to 600m between the three weapons. Projectile Time of Flight was recorded out to 800m. 3.5mm NATO spec hardened steel plates were shot at 640m and 700m. A 10mm hardened steel plate was shot at 310m. Finally, anesthetized livestock between the weight of 26-44 pounds were shot at a distance of 90m. All the information recorded from these tests is contained in the accompanying charts. For comparison I also included one chart on the performance of typical military rifles against NATO 3.5mm steel plate from tests performed by the USMC Firepower Division in Quantico, VA in the early 1980’s.

The Chinese test results indicate that their new 5.8x42mm cartridge is intended to provide an increase in effective range and penetration. The difference is that it is now possible for the high velocity small bore military cartridges to place fire at medium ranges without the weight and recoil penalties of the older full power cartridges. While obviously lacking the punch of a 7.62×51 at long range the 5.56×45 has none the less proven itself to be capable of superb accuracy at 600m. This has not been lost on the Chinese. Their 5.8×42 ball round is designed to surpass the performance of the 5.56×45 SS109, including at long range. That the Chinese wish to be able to extend the practical effective range of their small arms can also be seen in the Type 95’s ability to easily mount optical sights. While we don’t yet have any specifics on the dedicated sniper load for the KBU88 sniper rifle, that it outperformed the 7.62x54R SVD out to 1000m speaks for itself.

Against steel plate the 5.8 easily outperformed the 5.45 7N6 ball loading as well as the 5.56 SS109. It equaled the penetration of the 5.56 P112 AP loading while providing greater retained energy. It should be remembered though that the 5.45 7N6 loading has a mild steel core and a more even test would have been to use the newer 7N10 High Penetration round. While the 5.8 retained more energy and velocity downrange, there is a downside to a light weight, small diameter projectile with high penetration. Such rounds can zip right through a man without doing significant damage. This was first seen on the Italian Front during World War I when it was common for soldiers hit through the lungs at long range by 6.5mm rounds to recover in a matter of weeks. Recently American troops witnessed this first hand in Mogadishu when close range hits on rebels with SS109 ammunition produced no immediate visual results. This was verified in the livestock testing performed by the Chinese. Here the 5.45 7N6 load showed what it was designed to do and produced significantly larger wounds than either the 5.56 SS109 or the 5.8×42. However the range here was short, only 90m. While the Chinese were impressed by, and commented on the tremendous close range wound capacity of the 5.45 7N6 loading, they also stated that by 600m its accuracy, penetration, and wound capability had dropped off significantly due to its lightweight 52 grain projectile. However they also felt the 5.45×39 to be a very economical cartridge to manufacture. The Chinese were impressed by the 5.56×45 SS109 and felt that it was effective up to 600m. However they felt that it had the disadvantages of high chamber pressures, and because it utilized brass cartridge cases, was not economical to produce.

While the 5.8 was superior in penetration to the 5.56 SS109, the same was not true of accuracy. That the new Type 95/5.8x42mm combination was more accurate than the 70’s vintage Russian AK-74/5.45x39mm combo is really no great surprise. While the AK-74 is more accurate than the 7.62×39 AKM, at the time of its design Soviet doctrine relied on massed automatic fire rather than accuracy. By switching to a short stroke gas system, the Chinese intended to gain an increase in accuracy over the Kalashnikov while maintaining the same level of reliability. It appears that they have accomplished this. However the FNC/5.56x45mm combo easily outshot the new Chinese system. Straightwall case designs, such as the 5.56×45, tend to be more accurate than tapered case designs such as the 5.45×39 and 5.8×42. The trade-off being that tapered cases feed and extract easier. While troops complain about the M-16A2, it can not be faulted for its accuracy. Also keep in mind when looking at the Chinese data that the average muzzle velocity of an SS109 round out of an M-16A2 is higher than that listed for the test FNC. However they are within NATO SS109 spec’s which call for a 61.7 grain bullet at 3025fps 25m from the muzzle. While the 5.8 exhibits higher retained velocity and energy in their test results compared to the 5.56 SS109, the difference is small.

Why did the Chinese bother with developing an entirely new assault rifle cartridge when they could have simply adopted the 5.56×45 is a question I’m sure many will ask. The only reason I’ve been given is that the PLA has a defensive doctrine and if China were invaded their unique caliber weapons would prohibit an attacking force from utilizing captured weapons against the PLA. I will let you decide for yourselves on the effectiveness of this new cartridge based on the accompanying data. How China’s new 5.8x42mm series of weapons fares in service or combat remains to be seen. One thing is certain though, the Kalashnikov’s service with the PLA appears to be coming to an end. While the Type 95 was officially adopted in 1995 and is standard issue with the Hong Kong garrison force, it will be some time before it is in wide spread issue simply due to the size of the PLA.

Acknowledgments:

Much thanks to Dave Brown at Sierra Bullets for his patience and help making sense of the ballistic data in its original form and to Mark Vorobiev for a Russian point of view.

References:

Bolotin, David. SOVIET SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION. Finnish Arms Museum Foundation, Hyvinka, Finland. 1995.
Cutshaw, Charlie. THE NEW WORLD OF RUSSIAN SMALL ARMS & AMMO. Paladin Press, Boulder, CO. 1998.
Harris, C.E.. “The M-16A2: New World Standard For Infantry Rifles” GUN DIGEST, 40th Edition. DBI Books Inc, Northbrook, IL. 1986. SLIDE CAPTIONS