During 1983-1985, Harold “Hal” Johnson designed and built an experimental prototype .30 cal., lightweight machine gun for the Austin Aerospace Corporation for use on their ultra-light aircraft, the Austin Hawk, the Austin Armament Support Program (ASP) referred to it as the ASP machine gun, showing it as a twin gun system in their promotional literature. Two ASP machine guns and a supply of 1000 rounds of belted .30 caliber carbine ammunition in M-27 links formed a light-weight offensive/defensive gun system. This gun system, when mounted under a Hawk, would have been used for scout and escort missions in a hostile environment. This system never saw field use, and all that remains is one gun, some drawings, some literature, several memos, a few photos, and a rather interesting story.

Prior to tasking Johnson with the design and manufacture of the ASP machine gun, Austin Aerospace did a trial with dual-mounted 7.62 NATO caliber M-60 machine guns on their Hawk aircraft. The M-60 was available as an off-the-shelf item and was well worth trying as it had a proven track record. Two M-60s were mounted on a Hawk and, during live fire with the Hawk air born, one of the M-60s jammed and ceased firing. Due to the sudden lack of recoil impulse on one side of the aircraft, the aircraft became unstable in flight. At that point it was decided that a recoil-free machine gun was what they needed. This live fire testing was done at Edwards Air Force Base, California.

The .30 caliber carbine round was chosen because it most closely met the criteria for this weapons system: a gun and caliber combination that Austin literature states has an effective range of 600-700 meters and a maximum range of 1400 meters, and that was as near to recoil free as possible. The fact that an ASP with a given load of ammunition was approximately half the weight of an M-60 with the same quantity of ammunition was also a factor.

The gun is simple in design, and could be produced in quantity without great expense. The bolt has a fixed firing pin, with a claw extractor, and operates much as a blow back sub machine gun does. When cycling, the bolt travels to the rear, until spring tension overcomes the movement of the bolt, and pushes it forward to pick up and fire the next round.

The gas operating system is somewhat unique. Gas is tapped from the barrel, travels to the feed block in a gas tube and powers a feed piston with an attached feed pawl. High pressure gas pushes the piston and the attached feed pawl over the next linked round. As  pressure drops in the barrel, the compressed gas piston spring repositions the piston, whose feed pawl positions the next linked round in the feed block for pick-up by the forward traveling bolt. The  guns are fired by the pilot via an electric trigger motor.

The Austin Hawk was intended for sale to small countries fighting small non-conventional wars. It was small, lightweight, and modular for ease of shipping. It would be easy to maintain and easy to learn to operate. (Part of what Austin Aerospace was going to offer was training on operation, and use and maintenance of the system). It could operate off a 300 foot, smooth surface and while no information exists as to the cost of a complete system, it would certainly have been less expensive to buy and operate than modern military aviation hardware.

Johnson did not make any profit from his design and work on the ASP. There is a memo to him from Austin Aerospace explaining that he would receive a $15-per-gun royalty for the first 2000 guns sold, and $7.50-per-gun thereafter. In this he joins many inventors throughout history who did not receive a benefit for the fruits of their labor.

Sidebar: A word on Hal Johnson. Hal grew up in New York near Bannermans, and got an early start In the world of guns. He enlisted in the Marines at age 17 in 1944 and fought on Okinawa as a bow gunner in an M4-A2 Sherman tank. He served in the Korean war as a platoon Sgt in 1st Battalion, 5^th Marines. He went on to serve 20 years and retired as a Chief Warrant Officer after spending most of his career in ordnance, to include having been the officer in charge of the 5th Atomic Ordnance Platoon at Camp Pendelton. (Atomic Ordnance Platoons are now called Nuclear Ordnance Platoons). He authored several editions of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Small Arms Identification and Operation Guide’s. Simply put he was the master of all things ordnance.

Packing

The Record of Army Ordnance Research and Development, Volume Two, Book Two, published by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance in January 1946, is a unique source of information providing thorough description of the numerous research and developments conducted all along the Second World War concerning, among many others, the containers for ammunition belts used with ground machine guns. The following descriptions of developments of ammunition boxes are based or excerpted from this Record of Army Ordnance.

Before World War II, .30 caliber ammunition was packaged in the M1917 wood box with steel metal liners. The majority of the cartridges were packed in bulk, in 20-round paperboard cartons, seventy-five cartons per M1917 metal lined wood box. Most of the belts were issued empty and the belting was to be accomplished by the troops using the crank operated M1918 Browning Belt Filling Machine. Merely for war reserve only, a comparatively small amount of .30 cal. ammunition was packed in 250-round Browning fabric belts, five belts per M1917 wood box.

The acceleration of the training program and defense preparations already indicated in 1940 that the separate issue of ammunition and empty machine gun belts, which required the belting be accomplished by troops using the M1918 crank operated belt filling machine, introduced a serious problem in field operation and made it difficult to keep machine guns in operation. Troops in the field had neither time nor facilities for repacking ammunition in functional assemblies. This reopened the question of supply of ammunition to the services in assemblies packaged for ready use.

In 1942 after the entry of the USA into World War II, the question of field belting of large quantities of ammunition for ground machine guns became an even more acute problem. The first result was to increase the procurement of pre-loaded belts packed by five in the M1917 wood box while still relying on manual belting in the field for a part of the requirements.

To assist in readily identifying types of ammunition, a system was devised that consists of painting different colored stripes: vertical stripes on the front and rear faces and horizontal stripes on the ends just above the handle cuts.

The colors used correspond to those found on the 20-round cardboard boxes: red = Ball, green & yellow = Tracer and blue & yellow = Armor-Piercing. Accordingly, M1917 crates filled with belts loaded with a mix of Ball and Tracer are painted with red-yellow-green stripes, whereas those with Armor-Piercing and Tracer are painted with blue-yellow-green stripes. For WW2 production, M1917 boxes containing belted ammunition are sometimes observed without the color stripes.

Early in 1942, the standard belt box to accommodate one 250-round belt for infantry weapons was the Chest, Ammunition Belt, Caliber 30, which was constructed of wood, was not expendable and was issued as an accessory to the weapon.

Both the WW1 design with the typical 45 degree angled cut in the bottom/side of the box and the 1930s square box (Ordnance Department Drawing 49-1-84) were in service. These wood boxes were to be repeatedly refilled with either pre-loaded belts or belts loaded in the field by the Troops. These wood boxes proved very durable and were still used as late as 1945 in Europe as many combat pictures show.

Because of the large quantities of ammunition required for use with ground machine guns, expendable small metal boxes were developed and adopted as containers for pre belted cartridges. Extensive development work was invested in this project of expendable containers and thorough description of the various prototypes and improvements are available in the relevant chapter in Dolf Goldsmith’s book. This type of box was suitable both as a shipping and storage container, and could be used as an ammunition ready box with the appropriate weapon. These boxes were packed initially at factory or depot and their content could be fed directly to the gun without the necessity of transferring the ammunition to special chests or feed boxes before firing.

The expendable airtight container adopted as Box, Ammunition, Caliber .30, M1, became the standard packing container for all 250-round fabric belts of ammunition for caliber .30 ground Browning machine guns. This item was in quantity production in the early fall of 1942 and underwent various improvements during the entire duration of the War. M1 boxes usually bear on their outer surfaces markings painted in yellow. These markings indicate the type of content (caliber, quantity, type of belt), the sequence of the different types of cartridges, and a repacked lot number. Four of these M1 boxes are assembled in a wirebound box for shipping.

Early in the war (1941-43) the official belting for ground machine guns involved ordinary M2 Ball and M1 tracers with either (9 Ball + 1 Tracer) or (4 Ball + 1 Tracer); early Armor-Piercing belting ratio was 9 Armor-Piercing M2+1 Tracer M1.

Standard belting was then changed officially in July 1943 for a ratio of 4 Armor-Piercing M2 + 1 tracer M1. This change did not start to be packed out at the plants until later in 1943. This is the type of belting sequence that was the most widely produced during WW2.

Since ammunition packed in preloaded belts may consist of more than one type of cartridge and hence would require two or more lot numbers marked on packing boxes and entered in records, a single “repacked lot” number is assigned by the repacker in order to replace the original ammunition lot numbers. The “repacking” operation consists in assembling belts with the various types of cartridges, those being removed from the original bulk packing as issued from the munition factory. Repacking operation was conducted either directly within the munition factory or in separate Ordnance depots. The repacked lot number is painted on the outside of the packing box and on a repacked reference data card inserted in the box. The repacked lot number consists of the words “REPACKED LOT,” the repacker’s initials; the letter “B” or “L” indicating Belted (fabric) or Linked (metallic) cartridges respectively; and the serial number assigned by the repacker.

Early in 1945, the repacking lot number was inked directly on the belt thereby avoiding the use of the cardboard Reference Data Card inserted inside the box. The corresponding marking inked on the belt is “REPACKED LOT” immediately followed by the lot number.

By mid-1945, the term “Repacked Lot” was generally replaced by “Functional Lot,” these being assigned a whole new series of lot numbers which were assigned in blocks of numbers to each plant. After this change, the term “Repacked Lot” was still used but only applied to lots repacked by plants or depots to upgrade packing or replace unserviceable components. Functional Lot reference inked on the belt is just “LOT” immediately followed by the lot number.

(The author is deeply indebted to Frank Hackley, Anaheim, CA-USA for the sharing of his knowledge on U.S. Small Arms Ammunition management system and to H.E. Wanting, Bedburg-Hau, Germany for his constant help in improving the manuscript and pinpointing the smallest inaccurate detail.)

During the Second World War, over 30 million 250-round fabric belts were procured for the U.S. Army to feed their different .30 cal. Browning machine guns used by the infantry.

The objective of this series of three articles is to describe the evolution and the many variants observed as a function of manufacturer, starter tang design, fabrics weave and color. Part 1 will be dedicated to design development and the different manufacturers; Part 2 will be dedicated to the numerous production variants and Part 3 will be dedicated to the various packings.

A first attempt to address this vast subject was provided by the author’s contribution in Dolf Goldsmith’s book The Browning Machine Gun – Volume III – Supporting the Rifle Caliber Brownings. Since that publication, much new information based on further surviving specimens and a key official U.S. report dated October 1945 shed further light on this subject. This latter report issued by the Chief of Ordnance/Industrial Service Office/Small Arms Division and entitled Machine Guns – Development and production of metallic belt link and fabric ammunition belt contains a wealth of extremely detailed data on production figures and historical background on development process. When applicable, some parts are literally excerpted from this report in the following article.

After the First World War, much of the development work on fabric machine gun belts was done by Russell Manufacturing Co. of Middletown, CT in cooperation with the Springfield Armory. The original M1917 machine gun belt was based on the U.S. Patent No. 1,168,876 by F. Frissell, assignor to the Russell Manufacturing Co., issued on January 18, 1916. This called for two distinct layers of fabric, each including a set of warp strands interwoven with a set of weft, or filling strands. Each set of warp strands was to be crossed at regular intervals from one face of the composite fabric to the other and back again to form pockets for the cartridges. However, it was found that only about one-half the warp strands could be crossed, for more would be so crowded as to make the edge objectionably wavy. Therefore, it was found necessary to cross only about half the warp strands and stitch the others in place at the point of crossing. This weaving feature is clearly illustrated in the patent drawings. As a result, the pockets were not as strong or rugged as desired and the cartridges were not firmly gripped.

These original M1917 belts are fitted with two tapered 4.5 inch long brass starter tangs riveted at each end of the belt to facilitate the insertion into the feed block. Cartridge pockets are numbered with ink markings every 25 rounds to indicate to the gunner the number of rounds that have been expelled from the belt. The fabric also bears an ink stamp referring to the Frissell Patent date which actually is January 18 1916. However, for an unknown reason, all belts observed are consistently wrongly inked “Pat. Jan. 18 ‘15” therefore showing 1915 instead of 1916. These original 250-round M1917 belts were still standard issue for the infantry until 1941.

Really intensive sampling and development work on fabric belts by Russell Manufacturing Co. was resumed in 1928. A new and more rugged belt was developed and accepted by 1933 and patented in November 17, 1936 by J. Hendley, assignor to the Russell Manufacturing Co., under number 2,061,072. It is a modification of the 1,168,876 patent in that it allows substantially all the warp strands to be crossed from one side to the other between pockets without undesirable distortion and without making the belt unduly wide at point of crossing. This is accomplished by a change in the weave which also permits the formation of a hollow pocket between the small ends of the cartridge pockets. This affords greater flexibility than is possible when this area is woven solid and achieves better alignment of the cartridges. The new design permits herringbone weave, twill weave or almost any manner of weave desirable. This new design of belt became standard for production of new belts by Russell from the late 1930s on.

It can be noted that the features of the 2,061,072 patent were not only incorporated in .30 cal belts but also in both .22 and .50 cal. Browning belts according to the patent number also inked on the latter two types of belts.

Since the stock of the early 250-round M1917 .30 belts on hand for the infantry was sufficient, the first contracts of .30 cal. belts produced following the 2,061,072 Patent were mostly intended for the Armored Force which required 100- and 150-round belts.

In October of 1941, it became apparent that the supply on hand of .30 cal. web belts for use by ground troops amounted to only about 25% of the total needed to meet requirements for M-Day (Mobilization Day). Furthermore, the need for belts loaded prior to packing and shipment, would generate a major increase in the number of 100- and 250-round belts needed, which in turn would necessitate a dramatic increase in manufacturing facilities.

In January 1942, Russell granted the government a non-exclusive, irrevocable, non-transferable royalty free license to manufacture, or to have manufactured, machine gun belts under their Patent No. 2,061,072 – this license to continue until one year after the cessation of the national emergency.

The very first war-time productions of 250-round belts were provided by the Russell Co. and the Schlegel Manufacturing Co. of Rochester, NY. For the first productions, Russell used the marking R.M.C. and then switched to THE RUSSELL MFG CO.

By June 1942, in addition to Russell and Schlegel, five more facilities had initiated production of the 250-round .30 caliber belt. In the next few months the remaining facilities who had received contracts initiated production. By end 1942, a total of 13 different U.S. manufacturers were involved in the production of 250-round cal. 30 fabric belts.

The first productions of George C. Moore Co. of Westerly, NY, were marked G.C.M. Co and then switched to GEO. C. MOORE CO.

To these must also be added the import by the Ordnance Department of a total of 489,700 belts from the British company Thomas French & Sons of Manchester from June through December 1942.

It can also be noted the existence of belts exhibiting standard features of U.S. belts but bearing the Canadian property mark “Arrow in C” with the manufacturer’s marking S.C.C. LTD. So far, such belts dated 1942 and 1943 have only been reported to the author bearing the Canadian Property Mark.

It remains unknown whether these are specific production by a U.S. manufacturer for export to Canada or Canadian domestic production. Some Canadian collectors suspect that SCC might stand for Syracuse Cordage Company of Syracuse, NY, but no real evidence to confirm that identification has come to light so far. Another educated guess is that SCC might stand for Samson Cordage Co corresponding to the Samson Cordage Works described in the U.S. Ordnance report of 1946. Here again, no real evidence to confirm this supposition is available. Pending reliable evidence, SCC remains as “unidentified.”

The following table summarizes the 14 different manufacturers as well as their production figures as provided in the 1945 report. Details on location of these companies were found in the Official American Textile Directory of 1923. So far, specimens manufactured by the Samson Cordage Works have not been definitively identified.

It can be noted that these production figures are different from those presented in Dolf Goldsmith’s book where only production figures between June 1942 and March 1943 are displayed.

From January 1942 until May 1944 a total of 28,283,433 belts were produced with monthly production rates rising and falling as a reflection of variation of demand for the material. The production output reached its peak monthly production in July 1942 when it reached 2,368,500 units. Then the output was diminished steadily to a low mark of 264,323 in July 1943 from whence it rose to 1,324,584 in December 1943. After this, production again fell off until it was terminated in May 1944.

The manufacture of these belts was begun again in 1945 when it was indicated that stocks were reaching a low level. In January 1945 a requirement of 3,000,000 belts was received. This was increased to 7,100,000 in February and to 11,200,000 in May. Steps were taken to secure production from six facilities. In June 1945, the requirement was reduced to only 4,250,000 belts. Production orders originally set up for the International Braid Co., Murdock Webbing Co., and the Oehrle Bros. Co. were cancelled and no production was realized from these companies in 1945. The Russell Manufacturing Co. realized first production in May, followed the next month by the George C. Moore Co. The Warren Featherbone Co. manufactured only 7,451 belts by V-J Day when all production was terminated, thus making Featherbone belts dated 1945 the scarcest WW2 U.S. cal. 30 Browning belt for collectors.

For 1945, the George C. Moore Co. produced 320,832 belts and the Russell Manufacturing Co had produced 1,703,372 belts when terminated.

All together, over thirty million 250-round .30 cal. ammunition fabric belts were manufactured during the war. The Link, Metallic Belt, Caliber .30, M1 was adopted by Ordnance Committee action in August 1945 for the belting all caliber .30 ammunition. This action reclassified the fabric belt as Limited Standard. (The author is deeply indebted to Frank Hackley, Anaheim, CA for the sharing of his knowledge on U.S. Small Arms Ammunition management system and to H.E. Wanting, Bedburg-Hau, Germany for his constant help in improving the manuscript and pinpointing the smallest inaccurate detail.)

By Robert Bruce

“The pattern of machine gun operation in Korea is highly unconventional and contrary to the book, but the ground permits of nothing else. Good fields of fire for the machine gun are rarely met…[this] deprives the weapon of its normal tactical power and persuasion, and throws an extra load on the mortars, the BARs, and the riflemen.” Operations Research Office Report R-13, Oct 1951

John M. Browning’s water-cooled .30 caliber M1917 machine gun was introduced late in WWI and was still going strong during the Korean War more than 30 years later. His air cooled, belt-fed thirties, fielded in the late 1920’s initially for cavalry use, also served in “The Forgotten War.” Built on the same receiver but dispensing with the cumbersome and often impractical water jacket, they were considerably lighter yet still capable of sustained fire. This last characteristic was to prove indispensable against massed formations of Chinese attackers.

BARs vs. BMGs

The remarkable Browning Automatic Rifle, also a late WWI development, is unquestionably one of the most highly praised infantry arms in combat accounts from WWII and the Korean War. Not much bigger than the Garand rifle and weighing only about 20 pounds, this selective fire shoulder weapon was highly portable, accurate, dependable under all weather conditions and hard-hitting. Able to punch out powerful .30-06 bullets at a cyclic rate of some 550 rpm to a maximum effective range in excess of 500 yards, its only significant limitations came from 20 round magazine feed and lack of sustained fire capability.

So, because of the tendency of both North Korean and Communist Chinese to utilize “human wave” assault tactics, vastly outnumbered units of the US Army and Marines counted on belt-fed Brownings of .30 and .50 caliber to even the odds of survival. (A separate feature by Robert Bruce on the .50 cal. M2HB M2 is included in this issue – Editor).

The M1917A1 water cooled .30 cal., capable of almost continuous fire limited only to supplies of ammunition and water, was theoretically ideal for this task and could be found in the weapons mix of every infantry battalion. But, as previously stated, this multi man crewed 95 pound system was found to be impractical due primarily to excessive weight and its need for skilled and frequent attention.

In contrast, the M1919A4, an air-cooled version of this same gun, weighed considerably less at about 50 lbs. on an M2 tripod. Its maximum effective range and cyclic rate of fire were essentially the same as that of the heavier gun with the added benefit of dispensing with water for the jacket (and anti-freeze in winter) plus all the special parts, tools and skills needed to keep the water from seeping out without locking up the barrel. Broken down into three main loads of gun, tripod and a good supply of ammunition, the A4 system was far more easily humped up and down the jagged ridges that characterized much of the Korean countryside. Problem solved, right?

“The interrogations indicate that in the mind of the average gunner “firing in short bursts” is about synonymous with lifting the finger from the trigger for a few seconds at frequent intervals rather than resting the gun at all times when there are no manifest targets and no compelling tactical reasons for firing. This affords no relief to the weapon as far as over-heating is concerned, and it does not conserve ammunition.” ORO-R-13

There is no free lunch, however, and the A4 Browning had its own limitations. In addition to the need for frequent cleaning and proper lubrication that varied depending on weather conditions, the air cooled gun would overheat rather quickly from prolonged firing. Despite having a heavier barrel that acted as a heat sink and radiator, only about 1 belt – 250 rounds — could be fired in a minute before a too-long pause for cool down or panic barrel change was necessary. Since swapping barrels was a several minute exercise that also required careful setting of headspace, this was often a life-threatening problem.

Combat Crapout

“Not less surprising is the percentage of failure in machine gun fire at some time during the course of the average engagement because of mechanical trouble of one kind or another, faulty handling by the crew, etc.” ORO-R-13

Interviews with Eighth Army troops following combat action in the winter of 1950-51 suggested a failure rate for air-cooled thirties in excess of twenty percent. Various reasons were both observed and theorized, including poor mechanical training, neglect of regular and proper cleaning of the guns, and failure to keep ammo clean and correctly seated in the cloth or metallic belts. None of these, by the way, is inherent in Browning’s excellent design that – in the proper hands – is highly regarded for combat efficiency.

The ORO report cites an average figure for company-sized infantry units of just two guns in operation per engagement and, all too frequently, not even one gun was working. When these luckless GIs experienced a total loss of their base of fire belt feds in the heat of an assault or defense, the full burden of firepower was thrown primarily on BARs and M1s. Fortunately, both the auto rifles and the Garands were almost invariably up and running no matter how hostile the weather or their handling.

Epilogue

Disappointment with combat utility of the A4 and A6 Brownings in Korea led to postwar development of the M60 General Purpose Machine Gun. Fielding of the new “Sixty” and its companion, the selective fire M14, was nearly complete when America began sending combat units to yet another Asian misadventure. This time it was Vietnam.

Primary References

FM23-55 and TM 9-2005

Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, “Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea; Winter of 1950-51,” Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office Report ORO-R-13, Oct 27, 1951