From the inception of the (Section) Small Arms of the 1980s project in 1970, the intent behind British adoption of a bullpup rifle had been to replace as many section (squad) firearms as possible. This included the 7.62x51mm L1A1 self-loading rifle (SLR) and L4A4 (Bren) light machine gun (LMG), as well as the L2A3 Patchett-Sterling submachine gun (SMG) in 9x19mm. By 1970, all of these weapons were considered “legacy” designs, outdated in concept and each designed and manufactured 20 or more years previously. Although the SMG was not excessively powerful, heavy and expensive to build and maintain like the SLR and LMG, the advent of compact and lightweight small calibre, high velocity (SCHV) designs was casting doubt on its relevance. Even a conventionally laid-out 5.56x45mm automatic rifle could allow an armed force to retire its SMGs, with their limited range and terminal effect. A design in bullpup configuration was even more appealing to some, and the SA80 rifle was developed from the beginning as an “SMG killer.” Nonetheless, Enfield did investigate an ultra-compact carbine or submachine gun variant at least as early as 1984. 

1984 Prototype 

In 1984, the L85A1 rifle and L86A1 machine gun gained official approval, and our earliest evidence for an SA80 carbine emerges. This takes the form of an archival photograph dated November 1984 of an early attempt shown alongside a full-size IW and the Sterling SMG (see Steve Raw’s The Last Enfield, p. 216). This is a converted XL64E5 EWS “IW” (Individual Weapon—NATO nomenclature for a rifle or similar arm) in an ultra-short format. The weapon itself is still extant in the former MoD Pattern Room collection, allowing this author to examine it closely. The barrel is 242mm (9.5 inches) in length; the shortest barrel ever fitted to an SA80 variant. The barrel and gas block are adapted from surplus XL70E3 components, and so the weapon is chambered for 5.56x45mm. The portion of the barrel forward of the gas block had been turned down to a smaller diameter and left “in the white.” The gas block was reshaped to accept the new plug, and the upper surfaced bevelled for a low profile. 

The 1984 prototype lacks a muzzle device or any threading; although there is a groove cut at the six o’clock position near the crown that hints at a possible pinned-on muzzle device of some kind. The Body (upper receiver) is crudely cut away on top to expose the gas system, and to offer rudimentary reinforcement, short “flaps” of sheet steel have been folded down against the outside of the Body. In this configuration, the only way to fire the weapon with both hands would be to wrap the support hand around the firing hand as in a modern two-handed pistol shooting hold. The bolt carrier group is the original XL64E5 assembly with its tungsten recoil pellet and dorsal cut-out for use with the XL65E4 light support weapon’s (LSW) open-bolt automatic mode of fire (at this stage of development, the carrier groups were interchangeable). The bolt itself is also the original pattern, with deeply relieved “neck” to accommodate the huge extractor. Overall, this early effort was not well designed, and the operating rod appears to have bent during testing. 

It is curious that Enfield should base this weapon upon the XL60 series, as by 1984, the current variant was the substantially redesigned (X)L80 version. Yet the evidence speaks for itself; not only is there no earlier evidence of work on a carbine, the gas block on this first prototype is that of an (X)L80 series weapon. The recycling of an older prototype suggests that this was not an attempt to “sell” the concept of a carbine to the UK military (in which case a more “current” variant would have been used). It was likely just an in-house project, perhaps anticipating a military requirement that had yet to be articulated. Whenever it was first explored, the deliberate shortening of an SA80 down to exactly the length of a Sterling with folded stock is telling. It suggests that the justification for such a weapon was that an SMG in the personal defence weapon role might be used with its stock folded. Not only might there not be time to deploy the stock (especially the ingenious but over-engineered Sterling stock) in an emergency, but users might actually still be in the confines of a vehicle or aircraft when they needed their weapon. The Sterling with its stock closed was substantially shorter than the L85A1, and the latter was much bulkier and heavier to boot. No feedback on this attempt survives today, and it would be another few years before the idea was tried again. 

1989 Prototype 

In 1989 a short run of unnamed carbines was built from L85A1 parts (as evidenced by the lack of the four attachment holes for the outrigger; at this time only LSW Bodies were so modified). These weapons were, superficially at least, remarkably similar to the current in-service design. They featured a barrel of similar length to the 1984 iteration; this time measuring 310mm (12.2 inches) including a flash suppressor. The new design was mechanically different, however. As might be expected, the gas system was shortened quite dramatically. This would have affected the functioning of the weapon. Gas pressure would have been increased, but the operating duration would be reduced, most likely resulting in “short-stroking.” Presumably to address this, the bolt carrier was lightened with a deep v-shaped groove on top. This appears to have induced further problems (perhaps excessive carrier velocity and therefore undesirable wear to the weapon). To address this, in turn, the return spring was augmented with a second internal (“nested”) spring. The Heckler & Koch (HK) solution to the problem of a “shorty” SA80 was far more elegant (see below). It should be noted that Raw (p. 221) incorrectly describes these mechanical changes as having been applied to the 1994 prototype (see below). Raw also speculates that these changes were made to increase the rate of fire, but this seems an unlikely and undesirable purpose in light of the pressure change/carrier velocity explanation. 

The installation of a standard L85A1 flash suppressor, and a sheet-metal “outrigger” below it to protect the firing hand, permitted a proper two-handed hold on the 1989 gun. To facilitate this, an LSW rear grip was permanently fitted as a vertical foregrip. These guns were serial numbered in the range “CA 00X,” and the Body was marked with the commercial “ENFIELD” trademark. No service designation is applied; these were never introduced into British (or any other) military service. However, they are not quite prototypes either, as they were advertised for sale by Royal Ordnance. A handful still exist, divided between the Royal Armouries and Shrivenham (Defence Academy of the UK) weapons’ collections. Raw (p. 219) suggests that a small quantity were sold to an unspecified Middle Eastern country but were destroyed in a warehouse fire and were therefore never issued. Clearly this product failed commercially, and it does not appear to have been seriously trialled by the British MoD. 

1994 Prototype 

After Enfield had closed and SA80 production had moved to Nottingham, Royal Ordnance plc experimented with yet another carbine-length SA80. This was again based on the L85A1 but featured a longer barrel and a complete LSW handguard, with just the birdcage portion of the long L85 flash suppressor protruding from the flat front of the handguard. To accommodate this arrangement, the gas block (with its integral front sight base) had to be machined off. With a perceived requirement for iron sights, a second gas block was installed further down the barrel with its gas plug hole left unfilled, and, as before, a carrying handle with its integral rear sight was installed. As per the 1989 prototype, no major changes were made to the mechanical components of the gun, other than a shortened operating rod, about 1 inch shorter than the full-length L85 equivalent. The intent here seems to have been to move the gas port only as far as necessary for proper function. The weapon’s longer 390mm (15.4 inches) barrel may also have been an attempt to maintain reliability while sacrificing a greater reduction in overall length. This variant also failed to enter military service or garner any export sales. 

L22A2 

In 2003, with the SA80 now the weapon system that it should have been in 1985, attention turned once again to the development of a carbine model. This time, the requirement seems to have originated from the military. As with the A2 rifle and LSW, the new L22A2 carbine received the benefit of HK’s long experience in firearms design and manufacture. The prototype seen here is a converted L85A2 and is marked as such. The bolt carrier group has not been changed, and, in fact, minimal engineering changes were made to the weapon. HK focused on the gas plug, both reducing its internal diameter to compensate for the increased gas pressure of the shorter gas system and lengthening it to increase duration (approximately 2.5mm extra travel). This at last successfully balanced the weapon’s time/pressure curve. The plug was also altered externally, with twin lugs to permit more convenient removal from the front of the gas block. The “excessive” and “off” positions were deleted, and the operating rod was of course shortened. 

The new front end is finished with a specifically designed, vented, aluminium heat-shield/ rail accessory system, with Picatinny rails at the 6 o’clock and 3 o’clock positions. The latter is often used to mount the Laser/Light Module (LLM) or a stand-alone mounted flashlight. In either case, an activation switch is sleeved onto the foregrip. No rail is provided on the left side, allowing space for an angled sling loop (the standard buttplate/rear loop remains in place, and the single-point sling appears to be favoured in service). A flat cover is hinged and clipped in place over the gas cylinder/operating rod. An HK vertical foregrip (a “downgrip” in British military parlance) is furnished as standard. This can be removed or relocated on its length of rail by unscrewing the adjustment cap at its base. 

Alternatively, for an even more compact package, the folding foregrip issued for use on the L129A1 Sharpshooter rifle may be fitted (and is apparently standard equipment on those L22A2 rifles issued to British Army Apache helicopter crews; see the image). This grip is adjustable into one of five angled positions. In either case, a substantial forward extension to the weapon’s rail system prevents installation too far forwards and significantly reduces the chance of injury to the support hand; although this will always remain a training issue for such a short barrelled weapon. Due to the very short sight radius, previous attempts to provide a backup iron sight system on the weapon itself were abandoned. Instead, the SUSAT or LDS optics both possess Emergency Backup Sights. A 20-round magazine is available to maintain the weapon’s compact silhouette as befits an AFV crew PDW, but of course the standard 30-round magazine of the rifle/LSW is interchangeable. Although the L22A2 is frequently supposed to be a conversion of the L86A1/A2 LSW, in fact, there is no evidence of this, and detailed inspection suggests that they are assembled from surplus L85A1 parts plus newly manufactured HK components. 

The L22 is issued as a standard personal weapon for AFV crews of the Royal Armoured Corps and is also to be found stowed in the cockpit of Army Air Corps WAH-64 (Apache AH Mk.1) attack helicopters as not just an aircrew survival weapon but a compact personal weapon, befitting of a corps of soldier aviators. For this application, a special holster is attached to the right side of each crewmember’s seat. It is also provided for use by Royal Navy and Royal Marines’ boarding parties. As to the effectiveness of the design, it is the nature of an emergency use weapon that it is less likely to see use in combat, since, if it does, something has gone badly wrong. As a result, we have no real feedback on the effectiveness of the weapon, but there appear to have been no complaints either. There is of course a loss in muzzle velocity, from the 930 m/s of the rifle down to 780. The state effective range for accurate rapid fire is 200m—100m less than the 300m of the rifle—but is of course dependent upon training, skill and circumstances. In doctrinal terms, it is regarded and treated as a rifle. 

L22A2 Carbine 

• Calibre 5.56x45mm 
• Overall length 571mm 
• Barrel length 327mm (11.2in) (285mm ex. flash suppressor) 
• Weight (unloaded with SUSAT)  3.52kg (7.76lb)
• Feed device 20- or 30-round detach-able magazine 

A Note on Nomenclature 

It is important to note that there remains a good deal of confusion over the official designation of the L22 Carbine. Some official documentation has given the name as “Carbine, 5.56mm, L22A2,” yet as of 2014 some contemporary official literature uses “L22A1.” Yet all of the actual weapons are marked “L22 A2 5.56×45.” Regardless of this discrepancy, the Enfield- and Nottingham-built prototypes were never designated, as they are sometimes assumed to have been, “L22A1.” The L22 is also occasionally (but nonetheless officially) referred to as “SA80K” and was at one time nicknamed “Stubby K.” 

• • • 

Special thanks to the National Firearms Centre at the Royal Armouries, who graciously allowed us access to their world-class collection. Thanks are also due to Mike Sterry for his assistance with some of the finer technical details. 

This is Part 6 in a series of articles examining the developmental history of the United Kingdom’s SA80 family of firearms. Part 5 appeared in Small Arms Review, Vol. 23, No. 7. See armamentresearch.com for further original content. 

(This article is adapted from a chapter in Mr. Ferguson’s forthcoming book on British bullpup rifles, which will be published by Headstamp Publishing in 2019. HeadstampPublishing.com) 

The final prototype series of the SA80 family actually overlapped with the service L85A1 and L86A1 variants and consisted of 10 variants; although the E1 is the only pre-production build standard. All others were created afterward (1987-1990) to address ongoing reliability issues (see below):

• XL85E1, E2, E3, E4 & E5 Individual Weapon (IW)
• XL86E1, E2, E3, E4 & E5 Light Support Weapon (LSW)

Throughout development “IW” and “LSW” were used interchangeably with “Rifle” and “MG.” This is not a case of confusion so much as a hierarchical nomenclature. One set of terms reflects a weapon’s role (specifically, its NATO standardized role), the other its class. In theory, weapons other than a machine gun may fill the light support weapon (LSW) role—an automatic grenade launcher, for example. Similarly, an individual weapon might not necessarily be a rifle—unrifled weapons firing fléchette projectiles were considered by several countries, for example.

Despite the loss of a dedicated left-handed variant, at this point left-handed users of the IW were still to be catered with an armor-er-level conversion kit. Details on this are lacking, but presumably this would have taken the form of a “bare-bones” barrelled upper into which the donor weapon’s working and gas parts were transferred (the bolt would have to be replaced, however).

The new wedge-shaped receiver introduced on the XL70 series was carried over to the XL80 series, but the whole unit was redesigned in detail, re-toleranced, and the method of welding was changed. The rear sling loop was once again deleted. Two important external changes were also made. The extended magazine well added to the XL70 series was very much an afterthought, and neither the best nor the cheapest way to achieve the intended functional design. With the XL80 series, a new magazine housing insert was designed. Tabs were added to the redesigned TMH in order to support it and provide a surface to spot weld it in place (in lieu of the previous seam weld). The stop-lips remained an integral part of the TMH, however. The re-engineering of the XL70 into the XL80 added still further to the weight of the rifle (another 30g). The weapon was not going to meet the 3.2kg target originally set, and with optical sight it weighed only 83g less than the 7.62 x 51mm SLR (FN Herstal FAL) that it replaced (without an optical sight). Although a lot of this excess weight was thanks to the value engineering done on the design and the arguably over-engineered SUSAT sight, a fair amount lay in the barrel profile (carried over from the XL70). This appears thin from the outside, but tapers up drastically under the handguards, becoming very thick and heavy near the chamber. Fortunately, this is near the point of balance, and so for handling purposes the weapon does not feel its weight.

The other major change in this series was the “outrigger” support added to the LSW forend. This was added in order to mitigate a long-running issue with the type; that of split groups on target. The first shot would impact in one place and the remainder of the group several inches away. This seems to have been caused initially by the tapered barrel profile; the second and subsequent shots of a burst being subject to the flex induced by the previous shot. It was likely made worse by positioning of the bipod in earlier designs: clamped around the barrel forward of the handguard, limiting movement of the thicker rear portion and exaggerating the “whip” of the muzzle. The out-rigger solution effectively clamped the end of the barrel in place, producing a stiffer barrel without increasing its weight (although the outrigger itself added weight to the weapon). This was a quick and dirty fix compared to a fuller redesign that would allow for a fully free-floated barrel. For the same reason, the weapon also received a new vertical grip towards the rear of the weapon and was fitted with a folding wire butt-strap (the angle of the latter being altered due to trials feedback). Nonetheless, whereas the IW was accepted for service in January 1984, the LSW was deferred until later that year. As an aside, despite the split group issue, the LSW eventually went on to acquire a reputation for accuracy in semi-automatic mode and has even been used in an expedient designed marksman’s rifle (DMR) role. The LSW handguard was now fully developed, matching the IW design in most aspects but retaining the truncated hand-stop shape prototyped on the XL73E2. Both the rifle and MG also received new flash suppressors of a cylindrical, slotted bird-cage design, although these were not interchangeable.

At this point in the history of the SA80, politics and recrimination began to overtake actual firearms history. Much has been made of the drive to sell off the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield for profit, a narrative in particular of Steve Raw’s The Last Enfield. This is an oversimplification. What actually happened was that the publicly owned factory was combined into a new private sector company along with the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF), a number of which still existed despite post-Second World War closures. This was incorporated as Royal Ordnance plc (public limited company) and was founded with the intention of floating it on the stock market. The UK government of the day was committed to a policy of privatising public organizations. This may therefore be seen as primarily an ideologically and politically motivated move, rather than simply selling off the proverbial family silver. The goal was to preserve the UK’s organic small arms and ordnance manufacturing capability by forging it into a viable private company; Mrs. Thatcher’s government took the view that such bodies could not survive without substantial government subsidies, as we have seen at play in other countries with legacy national arsenals. Unfortunately, despite an injection of public money and the sale of ROF Leeds, the company could not be made into an attractive investment, and flotation plans were abandoned. Royal Ordnance was put up for sale after all, giving rise to the somewhat plausible, but nonetheless unlikely, conspiracy theory that this had been the secret plan all along. Thus, in 1987, British Aerospace (now BAE Systems) purchased the company for £188.5 million and, only a year later, had begun to sell off assets that were deemed unprofitable. Enfield was one of these.

Regardless of the details, morale at the factory was low. Enfield workers felt their livelihoods threatened as UK industry in general suffered job losses. The government’s privatization agenda suggested to many that even if jobs did persist in the firearms manufacturing sector, these would not be at Enfield. Many were not in a position to move to follow new jobs, and there would not be enough positions to go around even if they could. Like their rivals Sterling, RSAF Enfield were by this time a one-trick pony. Even if SA80 were a success, the UK’s limited civilian market, few products to market for export and shrinking armed forces mean that difficult times were all but certain.

The closure of Enfield spelled the end of an era for British firearms manufacturing. Worse was to come for both the industry and for the SA80. Although the intent of this series is not to apportion blame for the SA80’s early troubles, and the subject is a complex and opaque piece of firearms history, the critical factors boil down to Enfield (and the UK government more broadly) biting off more than it could chew. The days of expert firearms design and unlimited resources were long gone, whereas manufacturing technology had moved on and left the old factory behind. It lacked modern manufacturing expertise, and the famous quality control of the past had clearly lapsed. It even lacked firearms design experience. The original designer, Sydney Hance, was apparently the only member of the original Enfield team with previous experience of designing firearms, and he retired in 1976. The finalized XL64E5 depicted in Hance’s U.S. design patent #251,979 of May 29, 1979, shows that he was involved right up until this major redesign. According to Raw, he believed that his design was sound at that stage and had gone awry after his retirement from the factory. This is by no means certain given the fundamental issues that all of the SA80 build standards suffered, but the oversight of an experienced firearms designer and less enthusiastic cost-cutting measures might just have seen the Hance EWS through to a more successful outcome than the SA80A1. Matters were made much worse by a set in-service date and an insistence upon cost saving, as well as formal acceptance of the weapon system before it was ready for actual use.

In fact, issues with the SA80 did not stop with its formal acceptance and type classification as L85A1 IW and L86A1 LSW. Mechanical issues, and modifications to address these, were ongoing. The first steps were taken with the E2-E5 series mentioned above, a continuation of the XL80 series produced for environmental trials. None of these translated directly into improved service variants as the XL/E1 series had. Instead they acted as test beds for a raft of experimental tweaks to the working parts, gas parts and other areas. For example, the alloy used to manufacture the bolt was changed, different-sized gas port and gas plug apertures were tried, and a double-nested return spring was trialled.

In the case of the XL86E3, the only external changes visible are the experimental white nylon safety catch and “Ejection Opening Cover” (dust cover). On some guns, a large paddle-shaped cocking handle/case deflector was also fitted. Most of these changes were not embodied in the production weapons. The serial number shows that this XL86E3 was manufactured in 1987, two years after the L86A1 had already been introduced into service. However, it has not been fitted with the first pattern magazine catch shroud, introduced during that same year to prevent accidental pressing of the catch and loss of the magazine (a common issue in service). This gun has also been fitted with the second pattern of trigger, fitted to production guns from 1985. This was made heavier to prevent inadvertent firing when dropped on the muzzle. Conversely, the XL85E1 shown has the first pattern, pressed sheet metal trigger. This change had not been trialled on E2-E5 guns, but feedback from those trials resulted in the third pattern snow clearance trigger still in use today. Note also the “ENFIELD®” commercial maker’s mark on the TMH, not found on service weapons (in contrast to the first two “Enfield” rifles, the Pattern 1853 muzzle-loader and the Lee-Enfield magazine rifle).

The many subsequent trials and “mods” incorporated into the SA80A1, while not reflected in distinct experimental variants, are detailed in Steve Raw’s book. However, it is worth noting here that not all of the A1 series issues were inherent to the guns. When they were introduced, the proprietary Radway Green magazines (identifiable by their plastic baseplates marked “RG”) contributed a new weak point in the system. The XL70 and XL80 series were tested and trialed with USGI Colt magazines, but the new British-designed magazine exacerbated the weapon’s problems.

SPECIFICATIONS – XL85E1 IW

• Caliber: 5.56x45mm
• Overall length: 780mm
• Barrel length: 541mm (with flash suppressor)
• Weight (unloaded): 4.42kg (9.74lbs)
• Feed device: 30-round detachable magazine

The next instalment in our series on the SA80 will examine the L85A1 and L85A2 and cover the Heckler & Koch A2 upgrade program.

Special thanks to the National Firearms Centre at the Royal Armouries, who graciously allowed us access to their world-class collection.
This is Part 4 in a series of articles examining the developmental history of the United Kingdom’s SA80 family of firearms. Part 3 appeared in Small Arms Review, Vol. 23, No. 5.
See armamentresearch.com for further original content.
(This article is adapted from a chapter in Mr. Ferguson’s forthcoming book on British bullpup rifles, which will be published by Headstamp Publishing in 2019. HeadstampPublishing.com)

An “area effect” weapon was a requirement from the outset of the SA80 program and appeared in wooden mock-up form in the “1970 Preliminary Study” (published 1971). General Staff Requirement (GSR) 3518, issued in 1974, notes that the individual weapon was required to “… be able to accept an area target capability for muzzle or tube-launched grenades.” GSR 3518 goes on to note that “[t]he area target capability may be provided by tube-launched or muzzle-launched grenades but will have recoil forces no greater than 80 joules.” 

Interestingly, the only existing grenade launcher assessed in early studies was the Colt XM148, but it appears that no attempt was made to adapt this system for the SA80 prototypes. However, a quite detailed design and mock-up were produced for an Enfield-designed, under-barrel grenade launcher (UBGL). In a forward-thinking move, this was designed to pivot out to one side with the press of a lever, permitting the use of cartridges with a greater overall length. The mock-up included a rifled barrel, and its mechanism was fabricated from metal, with a support arm running in a track to guide and retain the breech end of the tube as it pivoted outward. 

Given equal weight in the study was the alternative or supplement of the traditional muzzle-launched rifle grenade, which was already in limited anti-tank service with the L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle (FN FAL). The ENERGA high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rifle grenade, produced by MECAR of Belgium, was formally issued to British forces in 1952 as the “Anti-Tank Grenade, No. 94 (ENERGA).” Early in the SA80 program, a wooden rifle grenade was made that could be slotted into the muzzle of the various mock-up rifles. Unfortunately, this mock-up rifle grenade appears to be no longer extant in the former Pattern Room collection. These two solutions, UBGL and rifle grenade, would be investigated in parallel for a number of years. 

UBGL 

The fairly elaborate mock-up UBGL design was built into a fully functional weapon and fitted to a single example of the XL64E5 rifle, probably in early 1976. As in the mock-up, the barrel was rifled. No grenade sight appears to have been fitted; if it was, no evidence of it exists today. Similarly, no replacement upper handguard was produced, leaving the gas parts exposed. This XL60 series grenade launcher features an unconventional and not wholly practical trigger mechanism, which surprisingly enough is also present on the mock-up in functional form (that is, it cocks and dry fires). This is located on top of the UBGL, placing it between the barrel of the grenade launcher and the gas block of the host rifle. The front portion is grasped between thumb and forefinger and pulled back against spring tension to cock the weapon. In much the same way as the cocking handle of an open-bolt machine gun, it must be manually returned to the forward position. At this point, the cocking slide may be left in the rear position, covering the trigger lever and acting as a safety. In the firing prototype, an additional safety shroud with grasping grooves has been fitted behind the cocking slide. This slides backward to place the weapon in a more positive safe condition. A short lever on the right side acts as the trigger, requiring the firer to either reach over the weapon with the left hand or to abandon the pistol grip with the right in order to reach forward and fire the weapon. 

XL60 SERIES GRENADE LAUNCHER 

• Caliber: 40x46SRmm 
• Overall length: 770mm 
• Barrel length: 534mm (21in) 
• Weight: 3.98kg (8.8lb) (all-up weight on gun with no sights fitted) 
• Feed device: Single-shot 

Rifle Grenade 

There is no information on any trials that this weapon may have taken part in, and it was not carried forward as the SA80 platform continued to develop. Meanwhile, work continued on the potential rifle grenade. This was initially intended to be launched with a specialist Ballistite-loaded cartridge as the previous No. 94 grenade had been on the L1A1 SLR. This concept was eventually dropped, and a bullet-trap-type rifle grenade was sought. The profile of the flash eliminator (flash suppressor) was designed with an annular grenade-launching flange a short distance behind the slotted “birdcage” of the muzzle device, which, as of the “0 series” guns, was provided with a groove and circular spring to properly retain a 22mm diameter rifle grenade. Sights for the rifle grenade were conceived as auxiliary additions to the improved version of the Sight Unit Infantry Trilux (SUIT), soon named the Sight Unit Small Arms Trilux (SUSAT). Two experimental solutions were attempted, one pivoting aperture sight graduated from 25m to 125m, and another plastic clip-on design with a simple open combat-style sight. The body of the SUSAT was at first machined with an integral dovetail bracket on the side for a more elaborate grenade launching sight, but this feature was not pursued and was eliminated from the design as the SA80 family matured. 

M203 

In the mid-1980s, as SA80 neared its in-service date, the UBGL concept resurfaced. By this time the U.S. AAI M203 (largely produced by Colt) was well-established as an industry standard, and one example was adapted to the bullpup shape of the L85A1. More effort was made this time, with a standard L85 handguard cut away underneath to permit attachment of both launcher and handguard. However, the front mounting point was still a clamshell, bolted-on arrangement as per the first (side-opening) UBGL, making quick detachment impossible. The overall length of the full-size M203 (at that time the only variant available) resulted in the barrel of the grenade launcher protruding a couple of centimeters beyond the flash suppressor of the rifle. The surviving combination weapon pictured here is lacking any sighting arrangement. 

COLT M203 

• Caliber: 40x46SRmm 
• Overall length: 380mm 
• Barrel length: 305mm (12in) 
• Weight: 1.36kg (3lb) 
• Feed device: Single-shot 

ENCAW 

A home-grown offering came in 1988 from Royal Ordnance plc, which threw out its own original side-opening design in favor of what it called the Enfield Close Assault Weapon (ENCAW), allegedly designed in only 20 weeks (see Steve Raw’s, The Last Enfield, p. 244). Royal Ordnance offered the weapon for sale simply as the “Enfield Grenade Launcher,” and a sales pamphlet gives the range as 350m and the weight as 1.8kg, while emphasizing the weapon’s “automatic opening and ejection” and “positive safety mechanism.” 

The ENCAW was certainly a novel design, the grenade launcher barrel being sleeved over the rifle’s barrel and encased in an enlarged LSW-style handguard, with the release catch at the rear, just above the trigger guard. At the far end, a substantial barrel-support bracket held the GL muzzle to the grenade launching ring on the host rifle’s flash suppressor. This arrangement was enabled by the unique rotating loading mechanism whereby the launch tube pivoted around the rifle barrel to expose the breech. Like a side-opening design, this theoretically allowed the use of grenade cartridges with a greater overall length than would be compatible with a slide-forward breech design. However, due to the compact design, the barrel’s length was dictated by that of the rifle barrel above, resulting in a barrel which would not be compatible with many longer projectiles. The prototype SUSAT on the weapon was furnished with a folding leaf sight after the fashion of the existing U.S. M79 standalone launcher. In this prototype form the launcher was bolted in place around the barrel and onto the front of the body (upper receiver). 

Neither of these designs was apparently satisfactory. Ultimately, the weapon entered service without a UBGL and relied upon the old-fashioned rifle grenade launched from the flash suppressor with a live round. An optical sight, designed to clip over the front part of the SUSAT was issued under the designation L15A1. 

ROYAL ORDNANCE ENCAW (Enfield Grenade Launcher) 

• Caliber: 40x46SRmm 
• Overall length: Approx. 340mm 
• Barrel length: 175mm (6.9in) 
• Weight: 1.8kg (4lb) 
• Feed device: Single-shot 

HK79 

At least two other grenade launcher designs were trialled with the SA80 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The first is a variant of the German Heckler & Koch (HK) HK79, which was also seen during testing with the L85A2 during the Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST) program of the early 2000s. A contemporary of the M203, the HK79 has seen limited export success. The variant seen in SA80 trials replaces the host weapon’s handguard, as it does on HK’s G3 and HK33 series of rifles, placing minimal strain on the barrel of the rifle. The HK79 is manually cocked after loading, and the weapon is fired using the support hand (for right-handed users) via a trigger on the left-hand side of the handguard replacement unit. The HK79 uses yet another different loading mechanism from those types examined previously; a drop-breech design results in the barrel pivoting downwards from the point at which it meets the supporting bracket, allowing for longer munitions to be used. 

HK79A1 

• Caliber: 40x46SRmm 
• Overall length: 357mm 
• Barrel length: 297mm (11.7in) 
• Weight: 1.67kg (3.7lb) 
• Feed device: Single-shot 

HG40 

The second was the HG40, produced by the Hilton Gun Company, a small, now-defunct British firm based in Derbyshire. A two-piece bracket arrangement clamps over the barrel behind the grenade launching ring on the host rifle’s flash suppressor. Much like the HK79, the HG40 employs a drop-breech system. The trigger mechanism for the grenade launcher sits almost directly below that of the host weapon. Little else is known about the weapon. The 1991 edition of Jane’s Infantry Weapons gives the statistics below and indicates that the HG40 was undergoing UK military trials at the time of publication. 

Hilton HG40 

• Caliber: 40x46SRmm 
• Overall length: 388mm 
• Barrel length: 310mm (12.2in) 
• Weight: 1.5kg (3.3lb) 
• Feed device: Single-shot 

AG SA80 

In 1995, a decade after the SA80 entered service, Heckler & Koch offered British forces a variant of their AG36 UGL known as AG SA80. This design has proved to be a popular replacement for the legacy weapons of several nations, including the United States, where it is known as the M320. The AG SA80 was adopted and received the designation L17A2, the parallel A1 variant being an accessory for the L119A1 (Diemaco C8 SFW). The weapon is aluminum in construction with a polymer mount that replaces the host rifle’s handguard. This mount includes a hinged top cover to access the weapon’s gas parts. This includes an integral folding tangent sight mounted on the left side and graduated from 50m to 350m. A Picatinny rail strip opposite allows the mounting of the laser/ light module (LLM). These also feature a polymer bracket to accommodate the activation switch. The barrel has six grooves with a 1:1200 twist. The AG SA80 features a double-action trigger; the other models are single-action or cock-on close. Comparable with most other 40x46SRmm weapons, the L17A2 has an effective range of some 400m and develops a muzzle velocity of 76m/s. The example pictured in this article is a developmental iteration of the L17A2 marked simply “SA80 GL.” It is installed on an L85A1 rifle, which is not a configuration that ever saw service. 

However, the L17A2 was not actually issued until the A2 program had been completed in 2002, at which point it became the L123 (the current service variant being designated the L123A3). The folding ramp quadrant sight may be removed and replaced with an elevating bracket mount for either the EOTech reflex sight or the RAAM UGL-FCS electro-optical fire control system. Needless to say, this package of rifle, GL and two optical sights is significantly heavier than the base rifle with optic. A more conventional form of the AG36 appeared in 2016 on the prototype L85A3. That weapon’s new rail system enables the much more compact launcher to be fitted directly to the 6 o’clock rail. Given that the new top rail is integral to the new handguard, it seems very likely that this new launcher will replace the L17A2/L123 series in service (the alternative being to continue using legacy rail adaptors for UBGL-equipped rifles). 

HK AG SA80 (L17A2 Grenade Launcher) 

• Caliber: 40x46SRmm 
• Overall length: 348mm 
• Barrel length: 279mm (11in) 
• Weight: 1.5 kg (3.3lb) 
• Muzzle velocity: Approx. 76 m/s 
• Feed device: Single-shot 

• • • 

Special thanks to the National Firearms Centre at the Royal Armouries, who graciously allowed us access to their world-class collection and other videos and photos. 

This article is adapted from a chapter in Mr. Ferguson’s forthcoming book on British bullpup rifles, which will be published by Headstamp Publishing in 2019, headstamppublishing.com 

This is the eighth and final installment in a series of articles examining the developmental history of the United Kingdom’s SA80 family of firearms. These articles ran in Small Arms Review between issues Vol. 23, No. 1 and Vol. 23, No. 10. 

Small Arms Technology in the Face of Opposition

Genesis

Better known than either the Korsak E.M.1 or the Thorpe E.M.1 bullpup firearms covered so far in this series, is the so-called “Janson E.M.2.” It is often incorrectly supposed to be a direct ancestor of Britain’s present-day L85, but in fact, only the concept was retained in the SA80. Stefan Kenneth Janson was the Anglicised adopted name of Captain Kazimierz-Stefan Januszewski, who in 1949 was head of a team of immigrant firearms designers based at Cheshunt, under the aegis of the “C.E.A.D.” or “Chief Engineer & Superintendent of Armaments Design;” in turn part of the Armament Design Establishment (ADE), which had been relocated from RSAF Enfield during the war.

It should be noted that Janson’s E.M.2 was the second weapon to bear the designation. The first, developed c1945-1947, was an inertia-locked blowback design with fluted chamber credited to a Lieutenant Jeziorański (whose name was habitually misspelled in official British documents). Work on this original E.M.2 was ordered stopped in 1947, save for a trial to be carried out with a weapon converted to chamber the U.S. T65 cartridge; unfortunately, nothing is known about this weapon. It seems to have been at this point that the weapon was retrospectively dubbed “E.M.2 Jesieranski.” (There is some disagreement on whether “E.M.” stood for “Experimental Model” or “Enfield Model.”) The Jeziorański E.M.2 bore two ADE codenames during development: first “Mamba” and latterly (c.1951) “Yellow Acorn.”

Around the same time as this, the Korsak E.M.1 was selected as the starting point for the development of a potential new service rifle. Januszewski, who had worked under Korsak on the E.M.1, was selected to take the helm on this new project. Assisting was Sydney Hance, who would go on to design the original incarnation of the SA80. Leading the Armaments Design Establishment was Colonel Noel Kent-Lemon of the Royal Artillery, who would later shepherd into service the L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle.

Description

Januszewski’s design retained the receiver arrangement of Korsak’s gun, inspired by the FG42 (1st model), with its push-button disassembly latch, rotate-to-remove butt-plate/return spring/guide rod assembly and push-pin grip frame. The magazine shares the built-in sliding charger guide of the Thorpe E.M.1 and a similar rocker-type magazine catch arrangement. Later variants included a welded-on shroud/guard to prevent accidental activation. This is located on the left side of the receiver, most likely to prevent a soldier’s own equipment from fouling the catch. It is not clear from the provisional manual which hand was used to remove and fit the magazine, but in any case, the shroud does not prevent access by the support hand thumb if the weapon is loaded as per modern practice. This modification would certainly have been required for military issue, given the exposed location and weak spring of the magazine catch.

The rest of the weapon was substantially redesigned. It was significantly lightened, partly by virtue of a permanently fixed “pencil”-profile rifle barrel, rather than the heavy barrel of the Korsak. This was now chambered for the new .280 Enfield intermediate cartridge. The gas system reverted to long-stroke operation, still with a typical rotary adjustable gas plug having Normal (“N”), Excess (“E”) and (in later variants) Shutoff (“S”) positions. Roller-locking was also abandoned, but there was no return to the twin front rotating lugs of the FG-42. Instead the Korsak’s rollers were replaced by a pair of laterally-acting, wedge-shaped lugs, close to those used in the German G41 and G43 rifles. These are forced into recesses in the receiver by means of the firing pin assembly, which is driven between the lugs when the weapon is in battery. When the lugs are not engaged, they prevent the firing pin from being released prematurely. There is no bolt carrier but rather a very complex bolt assembly (“breech block”) with the outer forward portion acting as the bolt face, with the two lugs positioned just behind it. Cocking is achieved by the round lug on the piston assembly, which fits into a hole in the bolt (breech block), and when the piston is pulled back (either by hand or in recoil) the firing pin/striker is withdrawn, allowing it to be caught by the spring-loaded sear on the bottom of the bolt. Cocking the weapon is difficult, in large part due to the physical effort required to draw back the striker. Designs that use the bolt carrier to override a pivoting hammer simply afford more mechanical advantage than those that require the user to pull back a striker spring via a mechanical linkage—in this case, the piston itself.

The entire trigger group was redesigned. The trigger mechanism was much simpler than Thorpe’s E.M.1 and even Korsak’s ingenious “slide” trigger linkage. However, it did resort to a form of the now-standard linkage bar approach, referred to as the “tripping lever.” Although this is rather shorter and more rigid than is typically found in modern bullpups, the trigger pull remains indistinct and measures at a staggering 15 pounds on a trigger tester gauge. It is one of the worst triggers that the author has ever experienced, second only to the 20-pound pull of a “Brown Bess” musket! Other examples have been tested with lower pull weights, with the average likely sitting around 11 pounds. The safety catch is borrowed from the M1 Garand, being easily reached and operated by the trigger finger with some potential for accidental operation of the trigger due to the location of the safety lever inside the trigger guard. It also actuates a “safety bar” at the rear of the trigger group, which intrudes upward into the bolt and prevents the sear from being operated.

The fire selector (“change stud”) is a cross-bolt type similar to that of the German StG 44, with the right-hand position (which shows the marking “R” for “Rounds” or “Repetition”) being semi-automatic and the left (“A”) for automatic fire. The selector has a slot cut in the top that on semi-automatic mode is positioned under the center portion of the trigger bar (“tripping lever”). This does several things to the trigger bar/tripping lever. First, it pushes the large projection at the rear of the bar upwards and into a corresponding curved recess in the head of the bolt. This means that the bolt must now override the tripping lever (which it does as soon as it begins to move backward after firing). Second, it permits the bar to pivot about the axis of the selector “stud” and drop down into the slot in the selector. Finally, the bar is now free to reciprocate a short distance (there is a short track cut into the center of the tripping lever where the selector passes through). This angling and sliding of the trigger bar activates the disconnector (“sear lever”) by elevating it such that the bolt can override it and push it down. The tripping lever bears upon the disconnector (sear lever), which sits adjacent to it inside the trigger mechanism housing. This in turn pulls the sear lever downwards and out of engagement with the sear (which is housed within the bolt in this design). The weapon will now not fire again until the trigger is released, which permits the tripping lever and therefore the sear lever (disconnector) to pop back up again and reconnect the trigger with the sear lever.

Adoption

Although the weapon was developed in parallel with the Thorpe E.M.1, it was agreed with the Americans that the latter would be dropped from comparative trials in order to speed up the selection process. The E.M.2 was also clearly the more mature and user-friendly of the two. Trials at home and abroad convinced British authorities that this was the No.4 rifle replacement that they needed, and a unilateral decision was taken to adopt the weapon. This was despite the E.M.2 and indeed the other rifles having effectively failed U.S. trials on the basis of insufficient lethality.

These trials also concluded that the U.S. T25 Lightweight Rifle and the developmental T65 7.6 2mm (.30 caliber) round submitted for testing were “not suitable for Army Field Forces use because of its excessive recoil, blast, flash and smoke,” and nonetheless concluded that “of the basic types submitted for the test, the British .280 round is preferred.” This position was effectively overturned by the U.S. Board of Ordnance, which refused to accept any cartridge less powerful than the .30-06 in service with the M1 Garand. If anything, the U.S. at this stage favored the Belgian FN Herstal design that would become the FAL, but at the same time was obviously not yet convinced by the .280 cartridge; facts not lost on E.M.2’s detractors.

It is worth noting that Britain had not been wholly obstinate in its adherence to the .280. Compromises between the two calibers were offered by the UK, Canada and Belgium for NATO trials as early as 1950. These consisted of the “7mm Compromise” (7 x 51mm, in two different bullet weights), “7mm Optimum” (7 x 43mm, again with two different bullets), “7mm Second Optimum” (7 x 49.15mm) and “7mm High Velocity” (7 x 49.5mm). These pleased neither side, however. One might reasonably predict—as British E.M.2 detractors did—that the U.S. would come to adopt the FN rifle and the 7.62mm cartridge. Nonetheless, the E.M.2 was officially adopted in 1951 as Rifle, No.9 Mk I (note that the “other No.9” rifle, a .22 training weapon, is actually Rifle, N9; apparently the only “Naval Service Designation” ever applied to a small arm).

The latter variant (there had been several) of the .280 Enfield cartridge was adopted alongside it as “Cartridge, 7mm S.A.A. Ball, Mk.1Z.” According to Anthony Williams, this definitive version of the 7 x 43mm cartridge fired a 9.0 g bullet at 777 m/s (140 grains at 2,550 fps). The broader politics surrounding the adoption and cancellation of the E.M.2 are well detailed in the PhD thesis of Dr. Matthew Ford (chapters 4-6) and in his recent book Weapon of Choice.

E.M.2’s initial supporters included the Armament Design Establishment whose future depended upon a home-grown design and the Director of Infantry, for whom it seemed to fit the bill as a tactically flexible individual weapon. In particular, Infantry wanted a lightweight yet controllable automatic rifle in order to shift the fire base of the infantry section (squad) away from dependence upon the Bren LMG. Some later observers have argued that these institutions, along with the Director General of Artillery/Director of Artillery (Small Arms), worked together to try to ensure that the E.M.2 would be adopted regardless of external factors. In fact, as external circumstances changed, support for E.M.2 fell away. In the end, the No.9 rifle was to become the shortest-lived British service arm in history.

Decline

The E.M.2 was never to enter mass production. Famously, it was sunk by none other than Winston Churchill, whose Conservative party won the General Election in 1951. The E.M.2 had been something of a pet project for the outgoing Labour government, and Churchill was skeptical. After the U.S. announced in January 1952 that they would not adopt the .280 caliber, Churchill revealed a joint U.S.-UK decision made during talks in Washington that month. Both nations would hold off on adopting a new rifle and would reconsider their options. The actual exchange upon which all of the rumour and speculation about backroom deals with the U.S. is based follows below:

“Mr. Wyatt—Asked the Minister of Defence whether he will make a statement, consequent upon his conversations in the United States of America, on the future of the .280 rifle.”

“The Prime Minister—As was indicated in the Communiqué which was issued after my talks in Washington on 9th January, neither we nor the United States consider it wise to take the important step of changing our rifles at the present time, and we shall both continue to rely upon rifles and ammunition which are now in stock or are being produced. Both countries will produce new rifles and ammunition on an experimental scale only, and this will apply to the production of the.280 rifle in the United Kingdom. Every effort will be made to produce a standard rifle and ammunition for all N.A.T.O. countries.”

“Mr. Wyatt—Does that mean that Her Majesty’s Government have now abandoned the hope of persuading the Americans that our rifle is better than theirs?”

“The Prime Minister—I see no prospect of carrying out that process of conversion.”

—House of Commons Debate
February 20, 1952, Vol 496 c234 234

.280 was clearly dead, and the E.M.2, despite continuing experimental work, was in serious trouble. It was clear that Churchill was going to go all-in on a common NATO rifle in a common NATO caliber, and that the Americans were unlikely to change their minds on E.M.2, even given a caliber change. Despite the politics involved, the move was arguably not a political one. As his later clarification (in which he also backs E.M.2 as a possible special-issue weapon for Paratroopers) shows, Churchill was convinced of the need for NATO standardization of both ammunition and small arms. This was partly to ease logistical supply in the field, but also in order to be able to better exploit the American industrial base that had allowed the Allies to win the Second World War. If Britain found itself short of rifles with a NATO/U.S.S.R. conflict looming, it would be able to place an order for more rather than rely on its own very limited production capability.

Standardization of small arms between the western powers was not a new idea. The standing British intent during the Second World War had been for Britain to adopt the .30-06 cartridge and the M1 Garand rifle; until it became apparent that the U.S. was determined to replace them. As British advocates and close-run comparative trials had failed to convince the U.S. or Canada of the superiority of either the .280 cartridge or the E.M.2 rifle, Churchill felt that British effort should concentrate upon convincing both countries to adopt the FN FAL alongside the nascent 7.62mm NATO cartridge. In fact, it appears that he took his decision under the illusion that this was practically a foregone conclusion, and, for a time, it looked as though he might have been right. Canada adopted the FAL in 1953, which only added momentum to the British drive toward the type. Of course, it soon became apparent that the U.S. was going to ditch the T48 FN FAL just as it had the E.M.2, and instead go it alone with a rechambered and modernized M1 Garand (T44, the future M14).

Although it was his primary motivation, Churchill’s standardization argument does not reflect his full view on the controversy. Whereas he claimed that he regarded the two designs as “neck and neck,” at one point even stating that he thought the .280 rifle “the best,” he was clearly not personally convinced by the E.M.2. In fact, Churchill was chief among a number of detractors in positions of influence that helped kill the weapon off even after it was successfully converted to 7.62 x 51mm. He was opposed to the very idea of a weapon designed around controllable automatic fire and was convinced that soldiers would waste precious ammunition if given the opportunity to do so. This appears to have naturally led him (and others who thought as he did) to view the more traditionally designed FAL in a full-power chambering—and especially a version modified for semi-automatic fire only—in a more favorable light. He further believed that “… the F.N. is a better weapon both with the bayonet and with the butt and is capable of giving confidence to a soldier in a mêlée.”

There had been engineering difficulties with converting E.M.2 to the new T65 cartridge, with the result that the three initial prototypes had had to be withdrawn from U.S. trials in 1952. By the time that small quantities of functional 7.62 x 51mm E.M.2 rifles had been produced, the type was already out of the running. Five thousand FAL rifles (X8E1) had already been ordered in December 1953 for troop trials and had acquitted themselves well. For its part, the E.M.2 had lost some of its favorable handling characteristics in the conversion to 7.62mm, losing any edge in performance (other than its shorter overall length) that it may have had over the FAL.

The Legend

Today, despite a very positive British military experience with the L1A1 SLR rifle, the E.M.2 enjoys a near-mythical “what might have been” reputation among small arms enthusiasts (especially British ones). This was cemented almost as soon as the rifle had failed and only grew with the distance of time. George Wigg MP reflected the views of many in Britain when he told Parliament that it was “… the finest rifle in the world” in 1963. In reality, the .280 Enfield cartridge failed to make its case as a substitute for existing full-power offerings. The weapon itself was also outperformed in trials by the FN, if only marginally. E.M.2 did come out on top in the U.S. sand and mud tests, for example, as this U.S. trials report shows (pp. 21-22).

There was a reasonable chance that the U.S. might adopt the FAL, and indeed Canada, Belgium and other countries did, making it a NATO standard rifle, if not the NATO standard that Churchill had sought. Januszewski’s is a complex and expensive design by comparison with the FAL, with its many different curved surfaces and recesses, each requiring separate or even multiple machining operations. Dugelby alleges that the bolt carrier assembly alone cost £50 to produce; well over £1,000 in today’s money, although it must be remembered that this was for a pre-production, practically hand-built weapon. Significant cost savings would no doubt have been made in a final redesign for mass-production, aside from the sheer economy of scale. For example, the wooden furniture and walnut veneer was slated to be replaced with a polymer fore-end and fiberglass cheekpiece, respectively. Yet as cheaply as the E.M.2 might have been made in the long run, it could not be made (or maintained) as cheaply as the FAL. Even the ADE admitted that the E.M.2 was costlier to produce, although it claimed that this was by design, since the weapon had been intended to serve (if required) as a “sniper rifle” (hence the complex bolt with its twin front locking lugs and, presumably, the machined receiver). One estimate placed projected production at six FAL rifles for every five E.M.2 models. Britain simply could not afford as many of the latter. Keeping the E.M.2 would have been just as political a decision as ditching it; taking a risk on an unproven and expensive home-grown design (even in 7.62 NATO) in order to prop up the UK small arms industry. It seems unlikely that such a “boutique” gun would have found success on the export market, and production would in any case have struggled to meet even domestic needs.

In any case, it is all too easy to criticize in hindsight those who made the “safe” call in the interests of international cooperation and a future where NATO, and especially the United States, would set military priorities and trends for decades to come. The FAL was not only cheaper, but faster and less risky to produce. With the Cold War burgeoning and with a substantial British post-WWII economic deficit, it made a lot of sense to license the FAL, especially if the gamble on NATO standardization had paid off. Churchill was not a lone voice of opposition to this mould-breaking futuristic weapon. There were inevitable complaints that a bullpup rifle could not be used for parade square drills. The weapon was light and compact certainly, but ergonomics were by no means stellar (and the trigger really is terrible). Recent developments in so-called “general-purpose calibers” indicate that the vaunted .280 cartridge was probably not the “ideal caliber” that it is often still claimed to be. Even one of its most vocal advocates (Wigg) had to admit in a political rearguard action fought in the House of Commons in 1954 that E.M.2 looked “… more like the weapon associated with Chicago gangsters than a military weapon ….” In the subsequent vote, fellow E.M.2 advocate Woodrow Wyatt MP failed (albeit by only 34 votes) to gain support for his motion “that this House deplores the decision of Her Majesty’s Government to adopt the Belgian F.N. rifle for use by the British Army in place of the new British E.M.2 rifle.”

On the other hand, the E.M.2 was undoubtedly a design ahead of its time; a lightweight, straight-line design, bullpup, select-fire assault rifle fitted with an optical sight as standard and chambered for a true intermediate caliber cartridge. If we do allow the luxury of hindsight, time and experience have shown that Churchill and others placed excessive emphasis on strict standardization and interoperability, as even those nations adopting the FAL settled on different build standards. Today, NATO countries maintain their own logistical chains for the most part, and even common cartridge types are not necessarily interchangeable in the many different small arms in use across the organization.

In recent years, reliance upon intermediate cartridges and emphasis upon bullpup designs have also been challenged; although this has occurred well beyond the likely service life of E.M.2. In any case, Januszewski, Kent-Lemon, Hance and the rest of the ADE team deserve credit for pushing the small arms technology envelope as far as it would go in the face of robust opposition and very nearly succeeding. Today’s near-universal military adoption of intermediate-caliber, selective-fire rifles with optical sights (many of which embody either straight-line design, bullpup layout or both) shows that the concept was sound, even if the execution and political support was lacking.

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Special thanks to the National Firearms Centre at the Royal Armouries, who graciously allowed ARES access to their world-class collection for research and photography, and to the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom at Shrivenham, for allowing us to handle and fire an E.M.2 rifle. Thanks are also due to Neil Grant.

This is Part 3 in a series of posts examining the developmental history of the United Kingdom’s E.M.1 and E.M.2-designated firearms. Part 1, “British Korsak E.M.1 Light Machine Gun,” appeared in Small Arms Review, Vol. 22, No. 9, and Part 2, “The British Thorpe E.M.1 Automatic Rifle” appeared in Small Arms Review, Vol. 23, No. 1.

See armamentresearch.com for further original content.

(This article is adapted from a chapter in Mr. Ferguson’s forthcoming book on British bullpup rifles, which will be published by Headstamp Publishing in 2019. HeadstampPublishing.com)

Above: The Thorpe E.M.1 automatic rifle in profile (left-hand side). (N.R. JENZEN-JONES/ARES)

Introduction

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, the standard British service rifle was still the rifle, Short, Magazine, Lee-Enfield (SMLE), by that time known simply as “Rifle, No.1.” A successor had already been adopted and put into mass-production but this, the No.4 rifle, was simply a re-engineered SMLE; still chambered for the outdated rimmed .303 cartridge and still a manually operated firearm. Surprisingly, self-loading rifles had been trialled soon after the turn of the century, culminating in the adoption (but not the issue) of the Rifle, Self-Loading, Pattern 1918. This weapon was intended for use by aircrew; a relic of the early war in the air. However, in 1940, a new future rifle specification was issued by the British War Office, specifying a weapon of SMLE (i.e., relatively short for the period) with overall length, a 22- to 24-inch barrel, a maximum weight of 10 pounds, semi-automatic-only operation by means of either gas or recoil, a bayonet similar to the No.4 pattern and—perhaps most interestingly—a calibre of 7.92mm.

By contrast, post-war Britain was determined to replace its full-power service rifle, submachine gun and light machine gun with one universal weapon or family of weapons in an intermediate calibre and capable of automatic fire. This was partially realised with the introduction of the Enfield Weapon System/SA80 in 1985. However, the ambition originated with the Small Arms Calibre Panel of 1945, which decided upon a new “ideal calibre” cartridge of the following specifications:

Calibre—.27 in
Bullet weight—130 grains
Bullet length—1.03 inches
Charge weight—19.1 grains
“Round length”—1.5 to 1.8 ratio

This new round would become the .280 Enfield, which was eventually (albeit briefly) adopted as the “7mm Mk.1Z.” The next step, logically enough, was to agree to a new War Office specification (which became WOPS No.9, issued in September 1947) for a new universal “Infantry Personal Weapon,” intended for use out to 600m, as opposed to the 1000m of prior doctrine. At this time, three new weapons were already under development, all of which were developed further, to a greater or lesser extent, as a result of the new specification. The real intention here seems to have been to combine the best features of existing cutting-edge designs into one new weapon. The two most promising were Korsak’s 7.92x57mm light machine gun and an automatic rifle developed by a team led by Stanley Thorpe, at that time chambered for the intermediate 7.92x33mm cartridge. The new requirement specified a light weight of between 7 and 8 pounds, a short overall length and rifle-grade accuracy with a closed, front-locking bolt and long barrel and automatic fire capability. This was further refined, following an ADE meeting of May 27, 1947, to require a bullpup configuration and gas operation.

As per this latest thinking, Thorpe’s E.M.1 was given a drastic redesign into a bullpup weapon chambered for .280 calibre; although no details or images of the original, conventionally configured prototype survive. This redesign might explain the incredibly complicated trigger mechanism—of which, more later. One early prototype included an FG 42-style integral bipod that was soon dropped in favour of a detachable version. Only one prototype survives, which resides in the Royal Armouries collection. Its trigger group is missing, but aside from a straight magazine released using a long magazine release lever, it is very close to the final design.

Nomenclature

Confusingly, both the Korsac and Thorpe designs received the designation “E.M.1” (for “Experimental Model 1”). This might have made sense given their differing roles; there would be a British E.M.1 rifle and E.M.1 light machine gun, just as there was an M1 Rifle and an M1 Carbine in U.S. service. However, this does not seem to have been how the system of nomenclature worked in practice, since there were in fact two weapons designated “E.M.2”, as well as two designated “E.M.3” and one designated “E.M.4!” Rather, it seems that E.M. designations were “rebooted” in 1948, superseding existing ones and creating the following two series, which we have numbered for clarity:

Series 1 (to May 1947)

• Korsak E.M.1 (gas-operated, rotating bolt, 7.92x57mm)
• Jezioranski E.M.2 (blowback, inertia-locked, 7.92x33mm)
• Metcalf E.M.3 (gas-operated, roller-locked, 7.92x33mm)*
• *NB the Series 1 E.M.3 became the Thorpe E.M.1 in Series 2.

Series 2 (1948 onwards)

• Thorpe E.M.1 (gas-operated, roller-locked, .280 Enfield)
• Janson E.M.2 (gas-operated, flapper-locked, .280 Enfield)
• Hall E.M.3 (gas-operated, dropping block, .303 Rimless)*

*This appears to be an error of some sort, as the Hall self-loading (semi-automatic-only) rifle had never progressed beyond the mock-up stage and had, in fact, been discontinued in 1947. This second E.M.3 can thus be ignored for practical purposes.

Regardless, the key thing to remember is that Korsak’s series 1 E.M.1 LMG shares a design lineage with Janson’s later series 2 E.M.2 rifle, whereas the Thorpe E.M.1 rifle was of a totally different design. The Thorpe shares a design lineage with the earlier Metcalf E.M.3, as noted above.

Both the Thorpe E.M.2 and Korsak E.M.1 (and later Janson E.M.2) did share German inspiration, however. Korsak’s LMG had been closely based upon the FG 42 automatic rifle, and Thorpe’s rifle also took cues from the FG 42’s pinned trigger group and the pistol grip shape of the second model. The gas system and working parts were based upon the German Second World War Gerät 06, however. One variant, the roller-delayed blowback Gerät 06H (H for “half-locked”), is often touted as a putative “StG 45” that would have replaced the long-stroke, gas-operated StG 44. This elegant and lightweight design evolved into the extremely successful CETME, G3 and MP5 family of small arms. However, with delayed blowback as-yet unproven in a full-power long arm, Thorpe chose to revert to a mechanism wherein the rollers positively locked the bolt closed—just as a tilting or rotating bolt would—relying upon a gas piston to unlock the bolt. Instead of the short-stroke gas piston of the Gerät 06H, however, he opted for a long-stroke gas piston.

Description

Sources disagree on when the first Thorpe prototypes were completed and proofed; either June 1948 (Edwards, 2014) or December 1949 (Dugelby, 1980, 41). Nomenclature was further complicated by the use of a codename: “COBRA.” Unlike the rival E.M.2, the Thorpe E.M.1 made use of the latest manufacturing techniques to produce square-section pressed and welded steel body with reinforcing ribs. Its receiver should therefore have been cheaper and quicker to produce had it reached the mass production stage. Unfortunately, other assemblies were not so well designed for modern industry.

Interestingly, specific mention was made in its provisional manual of its in-line design, intended to manage recoil. This was of course one of the much-touted features of the later Stoner/ArmaLite AR-10 and AR-15 series of rifles. The weapon also included an StG 44-inspired sprung “ejection opening cover” (dust cover) which, together with a well-sealed architecture, would have limited internal contamination in the field. Less prescient was the incorporation of a mechanism to automatically drop the bolt and chamber a round upon the insertion of a loaded magazine. As on the E.M.2, the magazine catch doubles as a bolt release catch. Pushing it forward releases the magazine as one would expect, but pushing it to the rear activates the bolt hold-open catch and releases the bolt. Unlike modern hold-open devices, the E.M.1 locks open when empty whether or not a magazine is fitted. This means that the user must manually close the bolt as well as “ease springs” (i.e., dry fire) whenever the weapon is cleared. Also shared with E.M.2 is the built-in charger guide in the rear of the magazine body. This slides upward to receive a charger clip of cartridges for rapid loading.

There is a combined safety catch and “change lever” (selector switch) conveniently positioned for use by the right thumb. Much of the rear portion of the body and grip frame assembly are, in British fashion, clad with a walnut veneer. Sling loops are provided on the bipod lug and on the bottom of the butt-plate assembly. Notably, provision is also made for an optional bipod, although this is hardly of quick-detach design, requiring the removal of the front handguard/heat-shield assembly to access the circular bipod lug. The cyclic rate of fire is a controllable 600rpm, although this was probably a beneficial feature given the .280 Enfield cartridge produces somewhat more felt recoil than smaller intermediate cartridges such as 5.56x45mm.

Along with the E.M.2, this weapon was one of the first to offer an optical sight as standard, specifically the Universal Optical Sight or “UOS” with a simple sheet steel protective cover. The UOS was adjustable for elevation and windage and featured an inverted pointer with graduations for 300-900 yards—despite the original requirement for 600 yards maximum. Finally, as befits a 1950s military rifle, the Thorpe rifle was fitted for both bayonet and an optional rifle grenade projector, attached by means of the same twin lugs on the barrel near the muzzle. The socket bayonet was of a combat/utility knife pattern sensibly shared with the E.M.2. The grenade launcher attachment had a built-in flip-up leaf sight graduated to the terrifyingly short ranges of 50, 75 and 100 yards. Official reports were positive, praising the ability to perform all functions without removing the weapon from the shoulder as well as the weapon’s accuracy, balance and low recoil. The trigger, whilst unconventional in form, is of typical military style, with a single stage, some take-up and a pull just shy of 7 pounds. Due to the unusual trigger mechanism, it is free of the typical bullpup linkage rod foibles.

With the benefit of hindsight, however, there are some obvious flaws. The UOS sight has a tiny field of view, is non-magnifying and is not adjustable without a tool. Worse, there are no integral iron sights or indeed any emergency backup sights on the weapon. This is a heavy weapon and feels every ounce of its more than 10 pounds (when fitted with an empty magazine), although the rebalancing effect of the bullpup design compensates somewhat for this. The 8-pound E.M.2 clearly had the advantage in this respect. It is also extremely difficult to cock due to the need to overcome the resistance caused by the interface of piston, cocking plate and upper sear. Once the upper sear is out of its corresponding bent on the piston, the working parts move with ease. The weapon might have benefitted from a lever-type cocking handle offering some mechanical advantage as on the CETME/G3 series.

Operating System

Where the gun really falls down, however, is in its mechanical complexity. The bolt carrier group is unnecessarily complicated, with an additional assembly known as the “piston extension.” In most firearms, the striker or hammer is cocked by the bolt carrier as it travels to the rear. Because of the extremely compact in-line design of the EM-1, the bolt carrier group equivalent is located adjacent to the gas piston rather than directly below or above it as in most gas-operated designs. This means that the piston extension is also offset to one side, requiring a unique circular “cocking plate” with its own captive spring to translate the backward movement of the piston into a rotary cocking motion for the so-called “hammer” plunger (see below). This plate is actuated by a machined surface on the gas piston. If this seems confusing, that is because it is! However, the provisional manual for the type helps a great deal.

Trigger Mechanism

The trigger mechanism within the grip frame consists of a hinged (not sliding as its appearance might suggest) trigger assembly containing a sheet metal primary trigger, solid “upper trigger” and a disconnector pawl. This is acted upon by the rotating selector, which also activates an elaborate out-of-battery safety housed at the rear of the trigger group. There are no sears contained with the trigger group; instead, it engages with an extremely convoluted internal fire control group housed in the body of the rifle. This group houses the two safety/auto and primary (known as “upper” and “lower”) sears as well as a plunger (confusingly called the “hammer”) into which corresponding bents are cut. This plunger reciprocates in the housing under tension from its own spring, in effect operating like a backward-acting striker. Instead of directly impacting the primer—it is afterall travelling in the opposite direction!—it strikes the top of a lever in yet another assembly, which in turn pivots to thrust the firing pin forwards.

This Heath Robinson-esque arrangement was designed simply to connect the bullpup trigger to the working parts some distance behind it. Korsak’s LMG had used a long “slide” to allow its more conventional sears to interface with the working parts. Modern bullpups invariably make use of a long linkage bar, resulting in an inferior trigger pull. It is not clear whether Thorpe had anticipated the trigger bar solution and was actively seeking to avoid it, or whether the design team had simply not realised the potential of the simpler bar idea.

Fire selection is more conventional. On automatic, the trigger pawl provides support for the “upper trigger,” which in turn presses upward on the lower sear, allowing the working parts to continue cycling until the trigger is released or ammunition is expended. With the selector set to semi-automatic, its lower portion (inside the housing) pushes against the lower part of the trigger pawl as the trigger pushes the latter to the rear. This rotates the upper part out from under the upper trigger. This disconnects the trigger and requires the shooter to manually reset it for the next shot. The third selector position is a traditional applied safety that rotates the same lower portion of the selector forward to physically bar the trigger from moving to the rear. The mechanism incorporates two additional mechanical safeties. To prevent malfunction and out-of-battery discharge, the safety sear is lifted by another machined surface on the piston to release the “hammer” plunger onto the lower sear only when the bolt is fully forward. Finally, a pair of vertically acting appendages or “safety levers” are (on “safe”) cammed up into the underside of the fire control unit, blocking both the hammer and the piston itself. On semi-automatic or automatic, they are withdrawn from engagement. They are not connected to the trigger itself and do not impinge upon its action.

End of the Road

As NATO trials approached in the early 1950s, the decision was taken to withdraw the Thorpe E.M.1 on the basis that Janson’s E.M.2 rifle was in a more advanced state of development. A comparison by the author suggests that the Thorpe was simply the more flawed of the two. Both designs featured a substantial number of complex machined components, but the trigger mechanism of the E.M.1 added an additional level of difficulty in terms of manufacture and maintenance. Likewise, the more advanced pressed steel construction, whilst it might pay dividends in ultimate manufacturing cost, was an unknown quantity in 1950 and required new tooling and expertise to perfect for mass production. Russia was at this time struggling with the “Type 1” stamped metal AK; Enfield faced similar challenges with its SA80 project as late as the 1980s. The E.M.1 was also 2 pounds heavier than the lighter and generally more svelte E.M.2. Finally, aside from the obvious extravagance of wood veneer, the weapon featured two separate handguards. The front handguard, together with its own metal armature, could have been left off the rifle entirely were it not for the recommended grenade launching and bayonet fighting stances illustrated in the manual. The sheer quantity of wood on the weapon (the front handguard was even named the “fore-end”) seems designed to fend off inevitable criticism from those used to the walnut and steel of traditional infantry rifles of more conventional designs. Whatever the specific relative merits of the two rifles, the Thorpe E.M.1 was discontinued in early 1950, shortly after the provisional manual was printed. This allowed all efforts to be focused upon the more promising Janson E.M.2.

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(This article is adapted from a chapter in Mr. Ferguson’s forthcoming book on British bullpup rifles, which will be published by Headstamp Publishing in 2019. HeadstampPublishing.com)

Special thanks to the National Firearms Centre at the Royal Armouries, who graciously allowed ARES access to their world-class collection for research and photography.

This is Part 2 in a series of posts examining the developmental history of the United Kingdom’s E.M.1 and E.M.2 designated firearms. Part 1, “British Korsak E.M.1 Light Machine Gun,” appeared in Small Arms Review, Vol. 22, No. 9.

See armamentresearch.com for further original content.