How Can a U.S. Company Import U.S.-Origin Military Surplus Firearms?

In continuation of my previous “Legally Armed” column, “How U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Concerns Impact International Trade,” Small Arms Review, Vol. 23 No. 1 (January 2019), I thought I would delve into the complex issue of the barriers that prevent private companies from importing U.S.-origin firearms back into the United States for commercial sale. This is a surprisingly complex area where law and politics intersect with international trade and the commercial market of military surplus firearms.

There is a tremendous amount of interest among history buffs and firearms enthusiasts in the weapons of World War II and other international conflicts in which the United States was involved. Some examples include the M1 Garand, the M1 Carbine and the 1911 pistol. At the end of these conflicts, much of the most desirable materiel may have been left overseas or given to foreign governments. However, since 2013 private entities have been prohibited from importing these pieces of history back into the United States for sale to the public. This Obama-era block to private industry remains in place because of lack of action on the part of both the Republican-controlled Congress and President Trump.

How can such a prohibition exist? We are talking about U.S.-made products, so why can’t a private importer bring these back into the United States for the domestic collectors’ market if the foreign government doesn’t want them anymore?

As many readers may be painfully aware, there is an intricate process that must be followed to import any article of U.S. origin. Further, surplus military articles are subject to very high government scrutiny for foreign policy implications and the potential impact on public safety. Inevitably, political motivations also find a way into the discussion.

A. Overview of Applicable U.S. Export Laws

First, we must briefly review the U.S. laws governing the original sale and export to the foreign party. In general terms, U.S. law is structured to prevent firearms and other defense articles from being exported unless the foreign recipient promises it will not transfer, dispose or change end-use without prior permission from the U.S. Government. This restriction on transfers, change in end-use or destination applies to firearms obtained through U.S. Government Foreign Military Sales Programs, Grants (Military Assistance Program or Excess Defense Article) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), even when the foreign party wants to sell the firearms to a private U.S. entity many years later for import back into the United States.

Arms Export Control Act (AECA). “In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States,” the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) grants the president the authority to control the export and import of classified and unclassified defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and services. The AECA restricts retransfers of U.S.-origin defense articles by requiring foreign recipients of U.S.-origin defense articles, whether by sale or lease, to request permission from the State Department before it resells, retransfers or re-exports such articles.

Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The FAA governs defense articles provided to foreign countries on a grant basis. Like the AECA, the FAA places end-use restrictions on foreign recipients of weapons and gives a right of first refusal to the U.S. Government for any weapon a foreign government wants to sell. The FAA also requires the U.S. Government receive the net proceeds from any sale of defense articles provided as aid to a foreign country, unless the State Department waives this requirement.

Also pertinent to our discussion is Executive Order 13637 (“EO 13637”), under which the president delegated to various agencies the functions conferred under the AECA. Under Section 38 of the AECA (Control of Arms Exports and Imports), the functions related to exports, temporary imports and brokering of defense articles and services are delegated to the Secretary of State, who in turn delegated down to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs (PM). The PM oversees the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) and the Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT). DDTC administers the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the registration and licensing regulations governing exports, temporary imports and brokering of defense articles and defense services.

The AECA functions related to permanent imports of defense articles and services are delegated to the Attorney General. The Attorney General in turn has delegated administration of the permanent import regulations in 27 C.F.R. Chapter II, Part 447 to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). However, EO 13637 makes clear that “[i]n carrying out such functions, the Attorney General shall be guided by the views of the Secretary of State on matters affecting world peace, and the external security and foreign policy of the United States.”

The process for a private entity to bring U.S.-origin military surplus back into the United States consists of two steps: (1) the foreign owner must obtain approval to transfer the firearms to the U.S. importer; and (2) the importer must obtain approval to enter the firearms into the commerce of the United States. You may be thinking, “It’s only two steps, so how hard can it be?” Let me show you.

B. Step One: Obtain Approval for Transfer to U.S. Importer

The first hurdle an importer faces to bringing U.S.-origin military surplus firearms back into the United States is obtaining approval from the Department of State for the transfer from the foreign owner to the U.S. importer. As mentioned above, U.S. Government approval is required before a foreign end-user can transfer, sell, dispose of or change end use of any U.S. origin defense article. This rule applies even when the proposed transferee is a U.S. company interested in bringing the firearms back into the United States.

The transfer approval process begins with the foreign government owner submitting a retransfer request to the State Department, not the U.S. importer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs handles all retransfer requests, and the responsibility is divided as follows: (i) for exports undertaken under a foreign military or government-to-government sales program, the retransfer requests should be submitted to PM-RSAT; (ii) for exports that were direct commercial sales, retransfer requests should be submitted to DDTC.

The process for obtaining State Department approval for retransfers of U.S.-origin firearms is anything but easy. Often, the private importer cannot even get the process started because so little is known about how the firearms got to the foreign government in the first place. This is especially true for the curio or relic firearms because so much time has passed since the original export. Regardless, this history is vital to determine what retransfer restrictions attached to the firearms (remember the retransfer restrictions are created at the time of export). Without knowing the terms of the original export, it is virtually impossible to know how to go about obtaining the retransfer approval. In fact, without sufficient evidence to the contrary, for example a bill of sale, conveyance document or export license, the State Department will presume undocumented firearms to be of Grant origin.

All retransfer requests undergo an extensive interagency review prior to being recommended for approval or denial to the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs or the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. This whole process can take years, and there is no guarantee that the State Department will ultimately approve the retransfer.

C. Step Two: Get ATF Approval for Permanent Import into the Commerce of the United States

If the State Department finally does approve the retransfer, the process then turns to the U.S. importer, who must prepare the Application and Permit for Importation of Firearms, Ammunition and Defense Articles, also known as the “ATF Form 6.”

Generally, the Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits importation of surplus military firearms unless the import is for government or law enforcement end-users. ATF defines a surplus military firearm as any firearm that belonged to a regular or irregular (e.g., militia) military force at any time. See Firearms-Guides-Importation & Verification of Firearms, Ammunition and Implements of War–Surplus Military (available at atf.gov/firearms/firearms-guides-importation-verification-firearms-ammunition-and-implements-war-surplus, last visited Dec. 14, 2018).

Curio or relic firearms, however, are exempt from this prohibition. To qualify for the curio or relic designation, a firearm must fall into one of the following three categories: (1) manufactured at least 50 years prior to the current date (this does not include replicas); (2) certified by the curator of a municipal, State, or Federal museum which exhibits firearms to be curios or relics of museum interest; or (3) derive a substantial part of its monetary value because the firearm is novel, rare, bizarre or associated with some historical figure, period or event. This last category requires proof of qualification by evidence of present value and that like firearms are not available except as collectors’ items or that the value of like firearms available in ordinary commercial channels is substantially less.

ATF stated policy has been to return without action any application to import U.S. origin curio or relic military surplus firearms unless the application includes a copy of the State Department retransfer authorization given to the foreign supplier. But is ATF obligated to approve an import permit for U.S.-origin firearms once the State Department has approved the retransfer? As at least one case illustrates (discussed below), State Department transfer authorization does not guarantee the importer will be able to enter the firearms into the commerce of the United States for resale.

D. Notable Cases and Recent Developments

To illustrate the difficulties in importing U.S.-origin firearms, let us review a case that gained significant media and political attention a few years ago: the case of the Korean M1 Garands and M1 carbines, which the United States sold to the South Korean government for use in the Korean War. Both types of rifles are over 50 years old and obsolete to the South Korean Government, but can bring in revenue if sold to United States importers because of the significant market of U.S. collectors and firearms enthusiasts. Because of the age of their manufacture, these M1 Garands and carbines qualify as “curio or relic.”

While George W. Bush was still president, the South Korean government submitted to the State Department a request to transfer a total of 857,470 rifles (87,310 M1 Garands and 770,160 M1 carbines) to U.S. importers. This request went through an interagency review process, but it was not until May 2009 that the State Department granted approval for the South Korean government to transfer the M1 Garands and carbines. Soon after the approval, the new Obama Administration expressed concerns, including trepidation that transferring the M1 carbines into the United States, particularly in the stated quantities, posed a significant law enforcement and public safety risk. These concerns ultimately led to the State Department rescinding its May 2009 decision to allow South Korea to transfer the M1 firearms.

In 2012, however, there appeared to be a break in the case. On January 18, the Korea Times reported that according to Lee Sun-chul, the Korean deputy defense minister for force and resources management, the U.S. Government had agreed to allow the importation of 86,000 M1 Garand rifles from Seoul. The article cited to an approval letter from the United States, dated September 2, 2011. 600,000 M1 carbines were rejected for import, reportedly because of detachable high capacity magazines.

The prospective import of 86,000 Garands was put on hold indefinitely on August 29, 2013, when President Obama announced a new policy of prohibiting commercial re-importation of U.S.-origin surplus military firearms that the United States supplied to foreign governments, either as direct commercial sales or through foreign military sales or military assistance programs. With no action from President Trump to revoke this policy, the prohibition remains in effect.

It is important to point out that the administrative blocks to the import industry from bringing in military surplus firearms back into the United States do not affect the ability of the Civilian Marksmanship Program (CMP) from obtaining surplus firearms, such as the M1 Garand or 1911 pistols. The CMP is able to acquire U.S. surplus military firearms, including those from overseas, from the U.S. Army. The CMP then refurbishes the firearms and sells them at retail to the public participating in competitive shooting programs. U.S. citizens can purchase these firearms from the CMP, provided they are not prohibited from owning a firearm under the GCA and they are a member of an affiliated club.

On April 7, 2017, Gina Johnson, General Manager of the CMP South operations in Alabama, announced the CMP would be acquiring 86,000 M1 Garands, which the U.S. Army was due to receive back from the Philippines Government. It is unclear when these firearms will be imported, if they have not already been shipped to the United States.

On the legislative front, there have been repeated stabs at passing the “Collectible Firearms Protection Act,” although none successful. The bill would amend the AECA to allow the importation of certain curio and relic firearms into the United States by a licensed importer without the requirement of an authorization from the Department of State upon certification to the Department of Justice that such firearms are lawfully possessed under the laws of the exporting country.

The first introduction was in 2009 by Rep. Cynthia Lummis (R-WY), then again in 2011, 2013 and 2015. The most recent attempt was by Rep. Doug Collins (R-GA) in 2017; each time the bill stalled in committee. What is even more telling is the number of co-sponsors. In 2011 there were 142 co-sponsors. In 2013, the number was only 38, and in 2017 only 3 co-sponsors joined.

So as we near the start of a new Congress, where Democrats will once again control the House, the Collectible Firearms Protection Act is likely a dead issue. In the remaining two years of President Trump’s first term, it is possible he may take action to lift the prohibition against private industry from importing U.S.-origin military surplus firearms. Until then, at least this part of the market is out of reach.

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The information contained in this article is for general informational and educational purposes only and is not intended to be construed or used as legal advice or as legal opinion. You should not rely or act on any information contained in this article without first seeking the advice of an attorney. Receipt of this article does not establish an attorney-client relationship.

About the Author

Johanna Reeves is the founding partner of the law firm Reeves & Dola, LLP in Washington, DC (reevesdola.com). For more than 15 years she has dedicated her practice to advising and representing U.S. companies on compliance matters arising under the federal firearms laws and U.S. export controls. Since 2011, Johanna has served as Executive Director for the Firearms and Ammunition Import/Export Roundtable (F.A.I.R.) Trade Group (fairtradegroup.org). She has also served as a member of the Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) since 2016. Johanna can be reached at jreeves@reevesdola.com or 202-715-9941.

A Word to the Wise— Don’t Forget About OFAC!

Oh, who? OFAC. It is the Office of Foreign Assets Control, a small but extremely powerful agency in the U.S. Department of the Treasury charged with administering and enforcing the economic and trade sanctions of the United States. OFAC’s mission is based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against certain foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, weapons proliferators and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. Its primary statutory authorities are the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA). These laws are implemented principally through presidential executive orders and OFAC regulations, codified at 31 C.F.R. Ch. V. In certain instances, Congress may legislate certain sanctions. This is true for the sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Venezuela and Russia. Most recently, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which imposes new sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea.

All too often, U.S. companies engaged in international trade focus on the export license requirements and restrictions of the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce, but fail to appreciate the swift and harsh repercussions that can come about, usually first in the form of blocked or frozen funds or enforcement penalties, when U.S. sanctions are violated. It is important to remember that OFAC sanctions apply regardless of whether an export license has been obtained from either the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S. Department of State.

A. U.S. Sanctions—What Are They and Who Is Subject?

OFAC implements approximately 30 sanctions programs, which range from comprehensive to limited, through blocking (freezing) assets and implementing trade restrictions. Because the sanctions are imposed, modified or lifted depending upon the foreign policy and national security objectives of the U.S. Government, each program has different levels of restrictions and can vary significantly depending on the target.

1. Comprehensive Sanctions

The comprehensive sanctions, so termed because of their broad scope of coverage and geographic orientation, generally prohibit the following activities: direct and indirect exports and imports of goods, technology, services, trade brokering, financing or facilitation, as well as any attempt to evade or avoid the sanctions. These restrictions apply to most goods, technology and services; although there are certain limited exceptions. North Korea, Iran, Syria and Cuba are examples of comprehensive sanctions.

2. Limited Sanctions

OFAC also implements limited sanctions that target individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf of certain regimes, as well as individuals, groups and entities, that engage in certain activity, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers, so-designated under sanctions programs that are not country-specific. These sanctions are “list-based,” meaning the targeted entities and individuals are listed on any one of OFAC’s sanctions lists, such as the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”), the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List and the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (“SSI List”), implemented pursuant to the Russian-Ukraine Sanctions. These sanctions generally prohibit transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing or otherwise dealing in blocked property.

The SDN List is the largest list of sanctioned and blocked persons that OFAC maintains. It contains over 5800 entries, including individuals, entities, vessels and aircraft designated or identified as blocked under a particular sanctions program. All property and interests in property of a SDN that comes under U.S. jurisdiction is immediately blocked or frozen, which imposes an across-the-board prohibition against transfers or transactions of any kind involving the property. When a corporation, including a bank, blocks a prohibited payment it must report the action to OFAC within 10 days.

OFAC defines “property” in sweeping terms to include anything of value. This includes money, checks, drafts, debts, obligations, notes, warehouse receipts, bills of sale, evidences of title, contracts, negotiable instruments, trade acceptance, goods, wares, merchandise and anything else real, personal or mixed, intellectual property and intangible assets. “Property interest” is defined as any interest whatsoever, direct or indirect.

OFAC offers a Sanctions List Search application to the public that enables searches against all the OFAC lists. This tool is available at sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov. The sanctions lists are updated frequently, so it is critical that U.S. companies and individuals wishing to engage in international business check the transaction parties against the OFAC lists early and often. Many of the individuals and entities named on the list are known to move from country to country and may end up in unexpected locations. Furthermore, OFAC’s sanctions programs are constantly changing, so it should be checked frequently and before each new international transaction.

It is important to note there are several U.S. Government lists in addition to the OFAC lists that U.S. persons should check before proceeding with any transaction involving the export, reexport or import of goods, services or technical data, to ensure no parties are debarred or require special licensing. These lists are maintained by other federal agencies, including the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State. The Consolidated Screening List (CSL) is a list of parties for which the U.S. Government maintains restrictions on exports, reexports or transfers of items. The CSL is accessible at build.export.gov/main/ecr/eg_main_023148, and there is a CSL search engine, downloadable CSL files and other tools to aid industry in conducting party screening.

3. The 50% Rule

U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing with SDNs wherever they are located and all SDN assets are blocked. In addition, entities that a person on the SDN List owns (defined as a direct or indirect ownership interest of 50% or more in the aggregate) are also blocked, regardless of whether that entity is separately named on the SDN List. This is known as the 50% Rule and can be quite daunting from a compliance and due diligence perspective.

For example, under the Ukraine Related Sanctions Regulations (examined more closely below), OFAC regulations at 31 C.F.R. § 589.406 state: “[a] person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to §589.201 has an interest in all property and interests in property of an entity in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. The property and interests in property of such an entity, therefore, are blocked, and such an entity is a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to §589.201, regardless of whether the name of the entity is incorporated into OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List).“

OFAC’s 50% Rule speaks only to ownership, not to control. Consequently, transactions with a company in which a sanctioned entity owns 50% or more interest are prohibited in the same way as transactions directly with the sanctioned entity, regardless of whether that company itself is listed on any of OFAC’s lists. According to its Frequently Asked Question No. 40, “OFAC urges persons considering a potential transaction to conduct appropriate due diligence on entities that are party to or involved with the transaction or with which account relationships are maintained in order to determine relevant ownership stakes.” This means that U.S. exporters and importers should conduct thorough due diligence to determine whether the 50% rule applies to any party to a transaction.

B. OFAC Jurisdiction

OFAC has sweeping jurisdiction over U.S. persons and persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This includes U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens (“green card” holders) whether in the United States or abroad, entities organized and formed under U.S. law, including foreign branches, and any individual or entity physically located in the United States at the time of the activity, regardless of nationality. Under certain sanctions programs (Iran and Cuba), entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States are also subject to OFAC’s jurisdiction.

OFAC sanctions also prohibit the facilitation of foreign trade with targets of U.S. sanctions. The facilitation prohibitions prevent U.S. persons from undermining sanctions through indirect support and apply to approving, financing, guaranteeing or otherwise assisting foreign trade with a sanctions target, changing policies or procedures to permit foreign affiliates to engage in activities with a sanctions target that previously required U.S. approval and even referring declined business opportunities to a foreign party.

C. The Ukraine/Russia-Related Sanctions Program

In 2014, President Obama issued four Executive Orders in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. These Executive Orders had a significant impact on the firearms and ammunition export/import industries. It started with EO 13660 (March 6, 2014), which declared a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the actions and policies of certain persons who had undermined democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine, as well as threatening peace, security, stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The scope of the Russian sanctions were subsequently expanded by EO 13661 (March 16, 2014), 13662 (March 20, 2018) by adding persons/entities to the SDN or prohibiting transactions with certain Russian sectors. Kalashnikov Concern was one such entity added to the SDN List on July 16, 2014, pursuant to EO 13662.

These sanctions, known as the “Sectoral Sanctions,” were introduced in EO 13662 and are implemented through Directives. They impose prohibitions on U.S. persons for certain specified transactions with entities identified in the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List (“SSI List”). Under Directive 3, which applies to the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy, U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting in, providing financing for and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to this Directive, their property or their interests in property. OFAC also applies the 50% Rule to entities on the SSI List. All other activities with these persons or involving their property or interests in property are permitted, provided such activities are not otherwise prohibited pursuant to Executive Orders 13660, 13661 or 13662 or any other sanctions program implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

In December 2014, the President issued and EO 13685, which prohibits U.S. persons from exporting or importing any goods, services or technology to or from the Crimean region of Ukraine or from undertaking new investment in the Crimea region.

D. OFAC Compliance and Enforcement

OFAC may learn about violations in a number of ways, including self-disclosures, blocked and rejected property reports, current investigations, referrals from other U.S. agencies as well as foreign government agencies, informants, disgruntled employees, public interest watch dog groups, competitors and other publicly available information.

The penalties for violating OFAC sanctions are substantial and depend on the sanctions program. Treasury imposes civil penalties, while criminal cases are prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Under IEEPA, civil penalties can be up to $250,000 per violation or twice the transaction value, whichever is greater, but OFAC must adjust penalties upward pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended by the Federal Civil Penalty Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015.

It is also important to note that OFAC violations are subject to strict liability. This means that OFAC only has to prove a violation occurred. OFAC does not have to prove the U.S. person intentionally or knowingly violated the sanctions. In addition, OFAC violations also lead to denial or debarment of export privileges under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

In evaluating whether to impose civil penalties, OFAC looks at the characteristics of the violation, including whether the violation was willful or reckless, what was the harm to the sanctions program, the extent of remediation and the awareness of the conduct. OFAC also takes into consideration the characteristics of the violator, including the presence of an effective compliance program, cooperation with OFAC, previous enforcement actions and steps to ensure future compliance/deter similar actions. OFAC publishes a base civil penalty calculation matrix which takes into consideration (1) whether there was a voluntary self-disclosures; and (2) whether the violation was egregious.

OFAC’s responses to violations can range from a no-action letter, a cautionary letter, a finding of a violation or a civil penalty. Violations may also result in referrals to the Department of Justice for criminal enforcement, blocked funds and seized goods, license revocation, as well as negative publicity or loss of business.

E. Illustrative Enforcement Case—JPMorgan Chase

In October 2018, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”), settled potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs, including the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations. The cost of the settlement to JPMorgan was $5,263,171. It should be noted, (1) the settlement amount does not include the amount paid in attorney’s fees to negotiate the settlement; and (2) the total base penalty amount for the violations was $7,797,290, but the amount was reduced in part because JPMorgan voluntarily self-disclosed the apparent violations, which OFAC also found to be non-egregious case.

OFAC took into consideration several facts and circumstances, some of which were aggravating factors, and others were mitigating. Among the aggravating factors, OFAC determined JPMorgan appears to have acted with reckless disregard for its sanctions compliance obligations when it failed to screen participating entities in particular settlement transactions even though the bank had the necessary information to enable screening. Further, OFAC found JPMorgan engaged in a pattern of conduct in missing red flags and other warning signs on several occasions, including two separate occasions in 2011 when the bank received express notification from its client regarding OFAC-sanctioned entities participating in a settlement mechanism.

Included in the mitigating factors was the fact that JPMorgan cooperated with OFAC’s investigation of the apparent violations, including by entering into a retroactive tolling agreement (and multiple extensions thereof) to toll the statute of limitations. Also, the bank took several steps as part of a risk-based sanctions compliance program to prevent similar apparent violations in the future.

Among other things, this case exemplifies the significant risks when a U.S. person fails to take adequate steps to ensure transactions in which it engages or processes are compliant with OFAC sanctions, and the aggravating factor when a U.S. person has actual knowledge or reason to know, prior to the transaction being effected, of an SDN’s past, present or future interest in such a transaction. Likewise, the case also underscores the importance of a compliance program and the mitigating weight proactive measures may have if properly implemented in the wake of discovering violations.

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The information contained in this article is for general informational and educational purposes only and is not intended to be construed or used as legal advice or as legal opinion. You should not rely or act on any information contained in this article without first seeking the advice of an attorney. Receipt of this article does not establish an attorney-client relationship.

About the author

Johanna Reeves is the founding partner of the law firm Reeves & Dola, LLP in Washington, DC (reevesdola.com). For more than 15 years she has dedicated her practice to advising and representing U.S. companies on compliance matters arising under the federal firearms laws and U.S. export controls. Since 2011, Johanna has served as Executive Director for the Firearms and Ammunition Import/Export Roundtable (F.A.I.R.) Trade Group (http://fairtradegroup.org). She has also served as a member of the Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) since 2016. Johanna can be reached at jreeves@reevesdola.com or 202-715-9941.

How U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Concerns Impact International Trade

Many companies in the firearms and ammunition industries are increasing their efforts in global trade. There are many reasons for doing this, not the least of which is the significant downturn in the U.S. market since President Trump took office. As demand in the United States has decreased, companies are looking to the international marketplace to fill the gap. In addition, the Trump Administration has rolled out new policies to spur exports of U.S. military equipment abroad, including finally moving forward with the complete overhaul of the export controls over most firearms and ammunition. These so-called “transition rules” (see my 2-part Legally Armed series in Small Arms Review, Vol. 22, No. 8 (October 2018) and Vol. 22, No. 9 (November 2018)) are expected to be finalized at the end of 2018 or in the first quarter of 2019.

Despite the many draws, however, the decision to enter into the global marketplace must take into consideration the enormous amount of government oversight and risks inherent to bureaucratic permissions. As many readers know, a fundamental principle of the U.S. import/export control laws is that appropriate government authorization must be in place prior to either exporting or importing firearms or ammunition, as well as all parts, components, accessories and attachments. That authorization can be a license, agreement or other form of authorization (e.g., license or permit exemption, retransfer approval) issued by the controlling agency of the U.S. Government. Without such authorization, the company cannot lawfully proceed with an export or an import, as the case may be.

The licensing process is cumbersome and expensive. Noteworthy is the fact that many U.S. businesses have been deterred from venturing into foreign markets because of the complexity of U.S. import and export laws governing firearms and ammunition. But for those who have decided to play in this sandbox, the challenges do not end with getting authorization from the U.S. Government. There may be limitations on the license or permit (the dreaded license “provisos”) or required notifications (example, submitting a list of serial numbers of all firearms actually received by the foreign customer). But these pain points are often outweighed by the overall pleasure in obtaining the approval.

It is too tempting to take for granted that once an authorization is received it will remain valid for the term granted on the license. A done deal, so to speak. But such complacency presumes that the geopolitical relationships of the United States and its allies remain static. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Always lurking beneath the surface is the possibility that the U.S. Government may take away the permission to export or import at any time. Government authorization to export or import is not irrevocable. Indeed the ability of a U.S. company to engage in international trade is not a guaranteed right. With a rapidly changing international marketplace, it is vital that U.S. businesses keep this in mind.

When faced with a revocation, suspension or an amendment that changes the scope of an open authorization, companies may wonder how the U.S. Government has the authority to seemingly take away something that had been previously granted. The question may arise as whether such an action is a “taking” of property and if a company’s “due process” has been infringed in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Though decided several years ago, the B-West Imports, Inc. v. U.S. case, 75 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 1996), still stands as precedence and is illustrative of the U.S. Government’s broad authority to revoke, suspend or amend approved import or export authorizations. In this case, several munitions importers challenged a federal ban on the importation of defense articles from China. The ban originated in a press conference President Clinton gave on May 26, 1994, in which he announced the renewal of the Most Favored Nation trading status for China. Despite extending this status, however, President Clinton also made clear that his administration would implement certain trade sanctions against the country because of China’s continuing human rights abuses. One of the sanctions was a ban on the importation of munitions from China.

Two days after the president made this announcement, the Secretary of State advised the Secretary of the Treasury (at that time, the U.S. Treasury had jurisdiction over imports of defense articles under the Arms Export Control Act or “AECA”) to “take all necessary steps to prohibit the import of all defense articles enumerated in the U.S. Munitions Import List.” Consequently, the U.S. Customs Service advised its agents that the embargo was effective on May 28, 1994, and that all permits for importing munitions from China had been rendered null and void. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) advised permit holders that in light of the embargo, all permits were revoked, effective immediately. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that provided some relief to importers by allowing shipments in transit to the United States in a Customs Bonded Warehouse or Foreign Trade Zone as of May 26, 1994.

The plaintiffs in the case, B-West Imports, Hing Long Trading Co., K-Sports Imports, Inc., Century Arms, Inc., Intrac Corporation, Northwest Imports, J’s Pacific Enterprise, Inc., and Sportarms of Florida, filed suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). They argued the government’s actions exceeded the scope of authority granted by the AECA and that the revocation of import permits violated the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The CIT granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding the AECA authorized the President to order a ban on importing arms from China because of the statutory grant of authority to “control” arms imports, and such control includes the ability to totally prohibit such imports. Further, the lower court held that ATF was authorized to implement the ban by revoking or withholding regulatory approval (i.e., the permits). The court rejected plaintiffs’ constitutional claims on the grounds that there was no statute or regulation that gave the parties a property right to import firearms or other munitions into the United States from China. In other words, by virtue of granting a permit or license to import products into the United States, the government does not confer to the permit holder a legitimate claim of entitlement that invokes the government’s obligations under the Due Process Clause. According to the court, because the statutes and regulations governing arms imports make it clear that the business of importing into the United States is subject to such extensive government controls, the government’s denial or revocation of an import permit cannot be regarded as a taking of property within the meaning of the Takings Clause. See generally, B-West Imports, Inc. v. U.S., 880 F.Supp 853 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995).

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding no statute or regulation that grants a right to engage in the import of defense articles. Indeed the appellate court reiterated that nothing in the statute or regulations state or imply that an authorization, once granted, becomes irrevocable. As there is no right infringed, there is no valid due process argument to be made that a revocation of an open import permit constitutes a taking of property.

To drive home this point, the appellate court cites the Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States case (7 F.3d 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), another case in which the court rejected a takings claim. In the Mitchell case, ATF revoked import permits for certain “assault weapons,” resulting in Mitchell losing the opportunity to sell the firearms in the United States under an existing contract. The Mitchell court held that ATF’s revocation of the import permits did not amount to a taking under the Constitution.

Mitchell’s expectation of selling the assault rifles in domestic commerce was not inherent in its ownership of the rifles. Rather, it was totally dependent upon the import permits issued by ATF. In short, Mitchell’s ability to import the rifles and sell them in the United States was at all times entirely subject to the exercise of ATF’s regulatory power. Consequently, any expectation which arose on Mitchell’s part as a result of the import permits did not constitute a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Mitchell at 217.

This same rationale is equally applicable to export licenses issued by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). The receipt of an export approval from DDTC necessarily comes with it the chance that it could be revoked, suspended or amended by DDTC for foreign policy or national security reasons. Section 38 of the AECA grants the President the authority to control the import and export of defense articles “in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States.” As the B-West court points out, the U.S. Government’s authority to act in foreign affairs is broadly construed and has been held to include the ability to prohibit particular export and import activities, even if previously licensed.

With this broad authority comes the known commercial risk that approved licenses and permits may be suspended or revoked by the same government agency that granted them in the first place. Companies assume this risk when they choose to engage in heavily regulated activity, like importing and exporting firearms and other munitions. With the rapidly changing international landscape, it is more important than ever that companies keep this in mind when participating in international trade. Maintaining a robust compliance program, screening each transaction for prohibited parties, countries and end-uses, and generally keeping aware of current events can go a long way in staying ahead in the export control game.

The government giveth, the government taketh away.

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The information contained in this article is for general informational and educational purposes only and is not intended to be construed or used as legal advice or as legal opinion. You should not rely or act on any information contained in this article without first seeking the advice of an attorney. Receipt of this article does not establish an attorney-client relationship.

About the author

Johanna Reeves is the founding partner of the law firm Reeves & Dola, LLP in Washington, DC (www.reevesdola.com). For more than fifteen years she has dedicated her practice to advising and representing U.S. companies on compliance matters arising under the federal firearms laws and U.S. export controls. Since 2011, Johanna has served as Executive Director for the Firearms and Ammunition Import/Export Roundtable (F.A.I.R.) Trade Group (http://fairtradegroup.org). She has also served as a member of the Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) since 2016. Johanna can be reached at jreeves@reevesdola.com or 202-715-9941.