During the war, the Red Army used the ROKS-2 for the first time in the fight against the Finns. Later it was also used on the other fronts. This flamethrower was disguised as a rifle, the lance embedded in the converted wooden stock of a Mosin-Nagant rifle, with original sling and with ignition by pulling the trigger. For the firing method, the Soviets used special primers made from standard 7.62x25mm cartridge cases. The two incendiary tanks on the back carrier were boxed with sheet metal to simulate a rucksack. The bottle with the propellant hung crosswise under the box.

When filled, the ROKS-2 weighed about 23kg (50lb) and required two men to operate. Towards the end of the war, smaller quantities of the simplified ROKS-3, on which the tanks were no longer covered, were sent to the front. Although both models had proven to be quite reliable in action, after the war the military leadership demanded an easier-to-operate model with a longer range.

After testing and introduction as the LPO-50, the new model went into series production in the spring of 1955. LPO is the abbreviation of Lyogkiy Pyekhotnyy Ognyemyot (Легкий Пехотный Огнемет), i.e. a light infantry flamethrower. The weight itself, however, was not lightened, because the LPO-50 weighed 23kg (50lb) just like its predecessor.

Instead, the construction had changed completely. The backpack now consists of three cylindrical tanks arranged next to each other, each with a capacity of 3.5 liters (0.76 gallons). Each tank has a filler neck. A powder chamber is then inserted and screwed into each filler neck. An additional pressure relief valve per tank, non-return valves on each hose connection and a grip safety device on the front of the grip provide the necessary safety.

To make the LPO-50 ready for use, first insert one powder charge per tank into the powder chamber and one PP9-RO primer cartridge into the socket above each. At the bottom of each chamber there are six holes through which the gases flow into the tank after ignition and push the incendiary mixture through the hose to the lance. Underneath all three tanks is a common manifold to the hose.

The lance resembles a rifle with a stock, pistol grip and folding bipod. At 85cm (34in), it is rather long and unwieldy. On both sides and below the muzzle are three chambers for one incendiary cartridge each with PP9-RO primer. Each chamber is connected to a specific tank. The battery for the electrical control and ignition system is located in the butt. It lasts for about 600 ignitions.

The shot is activated by pressing the trigger, which sends an electric impulse to the glow igniters of the two primers. A switch allows the operator to select the desired tank. It was thus possible to fill the tanks with different mixtures and fire them as required. The incendiary mixture ignites on the incendiary cartridge when it leaves the muzzle.

Without reloading, the flamethrower could fire three shots – one from each tank. The duration of a shot was 2-3 seconds and the range 50 to 70m (55 to 77yd), depending on the viscosity of the mixture. If there was a tailwind, even a little more. This was a very short firing time and in reports of the East German Army (NVA) this was also criticized by soldiers. They also felt that the effect on the target was insufficient.

In a combined arms engagement, the platoons and squads of flamethrower units were to be linked up with motorized rifle units. The flamethrowers then accompanied the rifle platoon or squad but had to move hidden behind it. Experience had shown that if they were discovered, they quickly drew the enemy’s fire. Only when a target could not be eliminated with the other infantry weapons were flamethrowers used. In this case, using camouflage and covering fire, they had to advance up to a distance of about 40 to 50m (44 to 55yd) from the target.

For all its advantages, the LPO-50 also had the characteristic disadvantages of a flamethrower. In a real battle, such weapons were not only dangerous for the enemy, but also for the own operating crew and the surrounding comrades. For this reason, the military was also looking for alternative ways to increase the infantry’s firepower.

And so, at the beginning of 1975, they introduced the new type of infantry rocket launcher, the RPO “Rys”. It could be carried and operated by one man, weighed only 3.5kg (7,7lb) empty, fired rockets filled with 4 liters (0.9 gallons) of napalm up to 200 meters (220 yards) away and could be reloaded. The LPO-50 thus became obsolete and was gradually taken out of service, stored and in some cases passed on to friendly countries.

In the 1950s, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China intensified their cooperation in military and weapons technology. China showed great interest in the new flamethrower and even acquired the rights to manufacture it under license in their own country. They only changed a few minor details in the production process, otherwise their Type 58 corresponded to the Russian model. A longer series of tests was carried out with different incendiary mixtures.

Based on the experience gained, China developed a modernized version in the 1970s. This Type 74 had an improved lance with only two incendiary cartridge chambers, as well as only two tanks. Overall, the flamethrower became somewhat lighter, although the capacity of the two tanks was increased to 4 liters (0.9 gallons) each. The Type 74 is still in active service today and is regularly and impressively staged for the press photographers during various exercises and demonstrations.

Apart from China, only one independent production in Romania is known to date. All other Warsaw Pact countries received their LPO-50s from Russian production. Some of the decommissioned ROK old stocks were also passed on to friendly states. The German Democratic Republic acquired larger quantities and used them in the NVA forces as the ‘Light Flamethrower LPO-50’. The earliest known service record dates back to 1966. Flamethrowers from Soviet and Chinese production were also used in Vietnam. However, their active use was limited because the required quantities of flammable liquids were often not available at the front.

Of course, the worldwide distribution also led to devices disappearing into dark channels time and again. When the Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacked the Derryard vehicle checkpoint on 13 December 1989, an LPO-50 flamethrower was also present. British units subsequently recovered at least six Russian-made units. How and where they came from is still unknown.

As long as you keep water in the water jacket and keep the loaded belts coming, it will keep on working as steadily as a sewing machine, only requiring a new barrel every 15,000 rounds; a change that can easily be done in 15 seconds. If a part does break, the Maxim is a modular design that allows the swapping out of the bolt or feed block with a spare to keep on firing. When faced with swarming infantry, this is a life-or-death matter. When the Russians attacked the Ukrainian Bakhmut meat grinder in waves, reminiscent of a WWI-style assault, the Maxim really came into its own, cutting down lines of attackers like wheat before a McCormac reaper.

There have been other ingenious applications of the Maxim, such as mounting telescopic sights and grouping four or six guns together in one mount. This enables 2000 to 3000 rounds per minute to be fired at attacking aircraft. When a modern jet comes in low with all the electronic warfare devices to hide it from sophisticated ground-to-air missiles, it’s still quite vulnerable to a low-tech anti-aircraft position that can raise a curtain of lead with a row of linked Maxims.

As the war drags on, the costs keep mounting and the Ukrainians are hard pressed to get enough ammunition, as they have drained the NATO stockpiles. Only Russia has kept all its WWII production lines intact and modernized and, while they are well-supplied, the cost of artillery shells necessary to deny continuous passage through an area is astronomical. A steady rain of indirect machine gun fire does the same job for a fraction of the cost. This requires a water-cooled gun that does not wear out quickly.

This is a job for a Maxim. Its toggle action spreads out the shock of operation so there is less wear and breakage of parts. When it does wear out, the bearing surfaces on the receiver are riveted on and can simply be changed for new ones while the modular parts are sent back to the ordnance depot for rebuilding. Being recoil operated, it does not have a gas system to foul and jam as the number of rounds fired adds up. The Germans were well aware of this issue with gas operated guns and stated that the gas operated systems had inherent problems. They kept designing recoil operated guns as a result.

TACTICAL USE OF THE MAXIM IN 2024

To get the best use of the Maxim today, you would want the WWI German 08-15 version with the optional Lafitte 34 mount. No one today seems to remember that the 08-15 with its shoulder stock and bipod was just intended as a more mobile heavy machine gun that storm troopers could emplace as they infiltrated the enemy lines and then dominate that sector with sustained machine gun fire. The mobility of the 08-15 eliminated the weakness of the emplaced heavy machine gun under artillery fire as the 08-15 machine gunner could move about like a rifleman, changing firing positions. Even though the weight was 50 pounds with a full water jacket and a 100-round belt in a drum magazine, the weight was so well distributed that many men could fire it from the shoulder like a rifle. This was something almost no one could do with the barrel-heavy Lewis gun, which was a true light machine gun and weighed considerably less. The ability to use a heavy, sustained-fire, water-cooled machine gun in the light machine gun role was a testament to the Maxim’s versatility.

For accurate fire in the heavy machine gun role, many of the remaining 08-15 Maxims were mounted in the Lafette 34 mount in the 1930’s. This ultimate machine gun mount features recoil absorption, telescopic sight, automatic traverse (if desired), and enabled accurate fire out to 3500 meters converting any machine gun mounted in it to a miniature artillery piece. We see these today with MG34’s and MG42’s primarily mounted on them, but they cannot deliver the sustained fire of a water-cooled gun in the Lafette 34.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE

The abandonment of the sustained fire machine gun and its replacement with air cooled guns had disastrous consequences. The air-cooled machine gun is a wonderful weapon in its place, but it can never do the job of a sustained fire machine gun. In WWII, the Germans found that the Russian human wave assaults kept coming until the air-cooled guns overheated allowing the Russians to overrun them. The Normandy invasion was admittedly a close-run affair and water-cooled Maxims fully deployed for both direct and indirect fire would have been more than enough to dip the balance in the German defender’s favor.

During WWII, in Burma, the British managed to sucker the Japanese into Banzai charges against WWI-style barbed wire backed by their Vickers machine guns (a Maxim variation) resulting in the annihilation of the attacking Japanese troops.

No machine gun is as reliable or able to fire as long as a Maxim. When John Basilone got his medal of honor defending Henderson Airfield at Guadalcanal with the two machine gun sections he commanded, his commendation stated, “he went from machine gun to machine gun repairing them and keeping them firing.” They weren’t supposed to need repairing! If they had Maxim guns, there would not have been any stopping for repairs. And if there was a problem, the gunner could have swapped out the modular part in a few seconds and kept firing without needing his commander’s help. It seems clear that water-cooled guns would have been a powerful help against Japanese Banzai attacks throughout the war as they could keep on coming long after an air-cooled gun overheated.

In the Korean War, the Chicom human wave assaults pushed back the American troops just as the Russian human wave assaults had done against the Germans in the preceding war. Water-cooled guns properly employed for direct and indirect fire would have foiled these assaults, but they were scarce, and the U.S. military has never wanted to invest the training time and equipment needed for effective indirect machine gun fire.

During the Vietnam War, American fire bases were overrun largely because of inadequate machine guns of modern design and the improper use of them. No one wants to learn the lessons of history if it involves using old ways. Newer is always supposed to be better and anything from the past tends to be dismissed out of hand if not ridiculed as anachronistic and obsolete. What could be more obsolete than the world’s first machine gun? A weapon designed back in 1884! The problem with that line of reasoning is that the inventor got it right and the design was perfected. Once you get to the top of the mountain of machine gun design, all roads go downhill… and the Maxim is the pinnacle. No gun made since has come near its longevity and reliability.

MORE THAN GUNS

Maxim was one of the great geniuses of all time. He patented the electric light bulb and Edison was only able to steal the design when Maxim went out of town and told his plant director to renew the patents… which he failed to do. The patents lapsed and Edison was able to grab the invention and run with it.

Maxim also flew the first airplane in front of England’s elite and the English press. When investors were not forthcoming, he wisely dropped the project. The airplane industry didn’t take off until many years later in WWI. When the Wright brothers wanted to build an airplane, they went to Maxim, and he gave them his notes, enabling them to build an airplane, as well.

When you look up and see an automatic fire sprinkler system in a building you are looking at another of Maxim’s inventions that has remained unchanged, defying improvement.

When you look more closely at the man behind the Maxim machine gun you realize why it has also defied improvement and still reigns supreme as the all-time greatest in its field.

Since World War I, flamethrowers have had a permanent place in the armament of many armies. In the far north, however, there was no need for them – until the Russian invasion in November 1939, when the Winter War broke out.

In autumn 1939, the Soviet Union had demanded that Finland cede a large part of the Karelian Isthmus and other territories. After Finland refused the demands, the Red Army attacked the neighboring country on November 30, 1939. Although vastly superior in numbers and material, the Russians made only slow progress against the stubbornly fighting Finns, which avoided open field battles and used the rough terrain for guerrilla methods to inflict heavy losses on the enemy from ambush.

Flamethrowers would have been a helpful weapon for the battles in the dense forests and against the fortifications that were mostly built from wood. But the Finns did not have any. Since it had to be done quickly, they searched the international market and found what they were looking for in Italy. There, the military used the portable Lanciafiamme Spalleggiabile Modello 35 and the Italians agreed to sell 176 of them to Finland. However, the units arrived in Finland too late to be used. Despite all the fighting spirit, they could not permanently withstand the Red Army and the war ended in mid-March 1940. By then, only 28 flamethrowers had been delivered; the rest were still on their way by ship.

The Finnish Liekinheitin M/40 Solution

After the ignominious peace with their dangerous neighbor to the east, the Finns wanted to remain on guard. The Finnish army introduced the Italian flamethrower as the Liekinheitin M/40 to its engineer battalions. It consisted of two tanks, each divided horizontally. The upper chamber contained the propellant (nitrogen) and the lower one, the incendiary agent; 6 liters (1.58 gallons) of fuel oil, each. When filled, the flamethrower weighed just under 23 kilograms (50.7 pounds).

The ignition at the front of the lance was electric, either via an 18-volt dry battery or a high-voltage inductor. One charge could deliver 20 to 30 bursts of fire lasting one second. However, only at a range of about 10 to 15 meters (30 to 50 feet). If the maximum range of 20 meters (65 feet) was used, the number of possible bursts dropped rapidly.

The Finnish pioneers practiced intensively to get to know the device and to develop suitable tactics for its use. Very quickly, it became clear that the tanks should be filled shortly before use. The system was never completely leak-proof at 20 atmospheres, and the longer the waiting time, the shorter the duration and range of the operation. The electric ignition also caused considerable difficulties in humid conditions. Due to the weight and location of the valves, the operation of the M/40 flamethrower always required a second man.

Despite some shortcomings, the flamethrower proved to be a useful support weapon. And the practice soon paid off, because on June 25, 1941, the so-called Continuation War against the Soviet Union began. Finland strove to regain its lost territories.

Russian ROKS-2

It was during this renewed campaign that the Finns first encountered Russian flamethrower units. Their ROKS-2 model was first mentioned as booty in a military brochure from September 1941. Subsequently, more and more devices could be captured, so that the Finns introduced the flamethrower as the Liekinheitin M/41-R. Even spare parts were produced, and major repairs were carried out at Arms Depot 1 (Asevarikko 1) in Helsinki. In action against its former owners, the Russian model was much more popular and reliable than the Italian one.

In terms of appearance, the ROKS-2 does not correspond to a typical flamethrower. The Soviets had tried to disguise it as a rifle. The lance was embedded in the converted wooden stock of a Mosin-Nagant rifle, using the original rifle sling and with ignition by pulling the trigger. The two incendiary tanks on the back stretcher were covered with sheet metal to simulate a backpack. The bottle with the propellant hung crosswise under the box.

Whether this camouflage was really useful in practice is doubtful. The enemy soon got to know the device and the bulky sheet metal covering of the nozzle and the thick hose to the backpack could hardly be overlooked. And for the Finns it brought no advantage anyway, since the Russians knew their former possession very well. Towards the end of the war, the Finns also captured a few copies of the simplified ROKS-3, on which the tanks were no longer covered.

When filled, the ROKS-2 weighed about 23 kilograms (50 pounds), and also required two men to operate. The Soviets used special ignition cartridges made from standard 7.62x25mm cartridge cases. The propellant tank could be filled up to 115 atmospheres and gave the flamethrower an enormous range of 30 to 45 meters (98 to 147 feet) with about six to eight bursts. This also depended on the type of filling because the Finns used two different mixtures depending on the season: in summer 66% heavy fuel oil and 33% highly flammable fuel oil. In winter, 55% heavy fuel oil, 30% highly flammable fuel oil and 20% petrol.

Liekinheitin M/44 Upgrade

The two flamethrowers M/40 and M/41-R served the Finnish army well. They were feared by the enemy – and therefore became priority targets on the battlefield. Because of the total weight and the lance, the operator could only carry a pistol for defense. He was, therefore, always given a second man with a submachine gun at his side. Nevertheless, the situation remained unsatisfactory and the losses high.

To overcome this shortcoming, Sergeant M. Kuusinen of Infantry Regiment 1 designed a combination weapon. He combined a light flamethrower with the Suomi KP/-31 submachine gun. The structure of the flamethrower corresponded to the usual composition of tanks for incendiary and propellant agents. But the lance was now attached with a pair of clamps under the barrel jacket of the fully functional submachine gun. The flamethrower was initially called Liekinheitin M/Kuusinen and was renamed Liekinheitin M/44 when small series production began.

Battlefield Performance

Since Finland had few resources for developing its own weapons, Kuusinen’s idea came in very handy for the army. The Suomi KP/-31 did not require any modifications. A first prototype was successfully presented at the headquarters of the Finnish Armed Forces in April 1944 and led to approval for further development. This was followed by the production of a small series for intensive troop trials with cavalry, engineer, and tank units. The feedback was predominantly positive. The main criticism was the limited range: the flamethrower managed a total burning time of up to one minute or 50 to 70 short flame bursts. But only up to about 10 meters (33 feet.) That was considerably less than the two models that had already been introduced.

When fighting at short range in trenches or urban areas, the advantages of the M/44 became apparent: long endurance, comfortable carrying, and lighter weight. But such situations were rare. Most combat took place at longer distances and the power was not sufficient to cover that much ground. Moreover, the pilot flame on the nozzle burned permanently after the first ignition. During the first combat deployment of three prototypes with Pioneer Battalion 35 on the night of August 16, 1944, the Finnish attack unit was therefore discovered too early. Nevertheless, the operation near Loimola (Karelia) was ultimately successful and the men of the flamethrower squad were decorated for it.

The Finnish Army initially ordered components for 100 M/44s with a delivery date of July 15, 1944. Assembly was carried out by Arms Depot 1 in Helsinki. According to the few documents that have been preserved, only about 40 units were completed. At the same time, attempts were made to increase the range. A safety device in the form of a ‘dead man’s switch’ on the handle of the lance was also tested, so that the flame would go out immediately if the operator was injured or killed.

After World War II, flamethrowers played practically no role in the Finnish army. A small number were still kept by the border guards for training purposes and were scrapped in the 1970s. A few years after the war, Sergeant Kuusinen received a payment of 10,000 Finnish marks for his flamethrower design. Only a few examples of the Liekinheitin M/44 have survived in museums to this day.

When small-scale production of Sholokhov’s anti-tank rifle started in Moscow, plans for a more powerful weapon in a larger caliber also began at the same time.

In July 1941, the USSR State Defense Committee (Gosudarstvennyj Komitet Oborony / GKO) announced a development program for a new 14.5mm caliber anti-tank rifle. The committee had been established shortly after the outbreak of the war to organize the country’s defense against the German attack.

Vassily Alexeyevich Degtyarov and Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov, two respected weapons designers, were commissioned to carry out the program. They were to develop two different types of anti-tank rifles in 14.5×114mm caliber as quickly as possible. A simple model as a single-loader and a somewhat more elaborate model with semi-automatic function.

Operation

Degtyarov took care of the single-shot model. He created a bolt-action rifle with a cylindrical rotating bolt mechanism, which was even easier to handle than an ordinary rifle. This saved time in training the soldiers. A special feature of Degtjarjow’s weapon was the sliding barrel: After firing, the barrel slides back on the buttstock, absorbing about one third of the recoil force. During the return movement, the cocking handle hits a slanted metal plate on the right side of the stock, which pushes it upwards and thereby unlocks the bolt. The bolt then slides back even further, pulling the empty case out of the chamber and ejecting it downward. The barrel is pushed forward again by a strong spring. However, the bolt remains in its open position and the shooter closes it by hand after inserting a new cartridge. This cocks the firing pin, and the gun is ready to fire again.

The massive muzzle brake proved to be very effective. Together with the padded shoulder rest and an equally padded cheek rest, these measures made shooting at least bearable for the shooter. The folding rear sight with two settings for 400 meters (437yd) and 600 meters (656yd) and the front sight are offset to the left.

The cartridge accelerated the projectiles to a muzzle velocity of more than 1,000m/s. At 300 meters (328yd), the lighter bullet (B-32 / 63 grams) penetrated 35mm (13.8in) of armor steel and the heavier bullet with a tungsten core (BS-41 / 64.4 grams) almost 40mm (15.7in). The strong muzzle flash, which resulted from the powder quantity of 30 grams, could be dangerous. All too easily, it betrayed the position of the shooter.

Production

In August 1941, the NIPSVO (Small Arms Research and Testing Organization) in Shchurovo received some specimens for testing. This went very well and thus the introduction of the Protiwotankovoje Ruschjo Degtjarjowa (Degtjarjow tank rifle), or PTRD for short, followed shortly thereafter. Serial production at the Instrument Factory No. 2 “K. O. Kirkish” in Kovrov started in October and the PTRD was already in front-line service in the battle for Moscow. However, the further course of the war was still uncertain and Kovrov was not far from Moscow. To avoid immediate danger from German troops, another production facility was established at Weapons Factory No. 74 in Izhevsk, about 1,200km east of Moscow. Production at Kovrov ended in November 1943 and was transferred to Weapons Factory No. 385 at Slatoust in the Urals. Towards the end of 1944, the Soviet Union then completely ceased production of anti-tank rifles.

Thanks to its simple design, the PTRD could be produced quickly in large quantities even by less skilled workers. No other anti-tank rifle was produced in larger numbers during World War II. The gigantic output reached 281,111 pieces:

1941:   17.688
1942: 184.800
1943:   62.350
1944:   16.273

The Wehrmacht captured large quantities of the PTRD along with ammunition during their advance. Designated as the Panzerbüchse 783(r), the weapons were usually immediately issued to the Wehrmacht’s own troops and used against their former owners.

Technical Data

Caliber: 14.5x114mm                            
Length: 202cm (79.5in)
Length of barrel: 135cm (53.1in)
Weight (empty): 16.3kg (36.0lb)
Magazine capacity: single loader